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# M.A. [PREVIOUS] SANSKRIT

## - ENGLISH MEDIUM -

भारतीयतत्त्वशास्त्रम्

168

# शाङ्करदर्शनम् - २

COURSE - IV BLOCK - 28

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*The Open University system has been initiated in order to augment opportunities for higher education and as instrument of democrating education.*

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ಡಾ. ಕುಳಂದೈಸ್ವಾಮಿ

*"The Open University system makes use of Multimedia in distance education system. ..... it is vehicle which transports knowledge to the place of learners rather than transport to the place of learning.*

*Dr. Kulandai Swamy*

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## ರಾಷ್ಟ್ರಕವಿ ಕುವೆಂಪು ಜನ್ಮ ಶತಮಾನೋತ್ಸವ ವರ್ಷ ೨೦೦೪

### ವಿಶ್ವಮಾನವ ಸಂದೇಶ

ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಮಗುವು ಹುಟ್ಟುತ್ತಲೇ - ವಿಶ್ವಮಾನವ. ಬೆಳೆಯುತ್ತಾ ನಾವು ಅದನ್ನು 'ಅಲ್ಪ ಮಾನವ'ನನ್ನಾಗಿ ಮಾಡುತ್ತೇವೆ. ಮತ್ತೆ ಅದನ್ನು 'ವಿಶ್ವಮಾನವ'ನನ್ನಾಗಿ ಮಾಡುವುದೇ ವಿದ್ಯೆಯ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯವಾಗಬೇಕು.

ಮನುಜ ಮತ, ವಿಶ್ವ ಪಥ, ಸರ್ವೋದಯ, ಸಮನ್ವಯ, ಪೂರ್ಣದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಈ ಪಂಚಮಂತ್ರ ಇನ್ನು ಮುಂದಿನ ದೃಷ್ಟಿಯಾಗಬೇಕಾಗಿದೆ. ಅಂದರೆ, ನಮಗೆ ಇನ್ನು ಬೇಕಾದುದು ಆ ಮತ ಈ ಮತ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಮನುಜ ಮತ. ಆ ಪಥ ಈ ಪಥ ಅಲ್ಲ; ವಿಶ್ವ ಪಥ. ಆ ಒಬ್ಬರ ಉದಯ ಮಾತ್ರವಲ್ಲ; ಸರ್ವರ ಸರ್ವಸ್ತರದ ಉದಯ. ಪರಸ್ಪರ ವಿಮುಖವಾಗಿ ಸಿಡಿದು ಹೋಗುವುದಲ್ಲ; ಸಮನ್ವಯಗೊಳ್ಳುವುದು. ಸಂಕುಚಿತ ಮತದ ಆಂಶಿಕ ದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಭೌತಿಕ ಪಾರಮಾರ್ಥಿಕ ಎಂಬ ಭಿನ್ನದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಅಲ್ಲ; ಎಲ್ಲವನ್ನು ಭಗವದ್ ದೃಷ್ಟಿಯಿಂದ ಕಾಣುವ ಪೂರ್ಣದೃಷ್ಟಿ.

ಕುವೆಂಪು

## *Gnanapeeta Awardee*
## *Kuvempu's Birth Centenary Year - 2004*

### *Gospel of Universal Man*

Every Child, at birth, is the universal man. But, as it grows, we turn it into "a petty man". It should be the function of education to turn it again into the enlightened "universal man".

The Religion of Humanity, the Universal Path, the Welfare of All, Reconciliation, the Integral Vision- these *five mantras* should become View of the Future. In other words, what we want henceforth is not this religion or that religion, but the Religion of Humanity ; not this path or that path, but the Universal Path ; not the well-being of this individual or that individual, but the Welfare of All ; not turning away and breaking off from one another, but reconciling and uniting in concord and harmony ; and, above all, not the partial view of a narrow creed, not the dual outlook of the material and the spiritual, but the Integral Vision of seeing all things with the eye of the Divine.

*Kuvempu*

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ಮಾನಸಗಂಗೋತ್ರಿ, ಮೈಸೂರು ೫೭೦ ೦೦೬

# शाङ्करदर्शनम्-२

## Block 28

| Unit No. 1 to 4 | Page No. |
|---|---|

UNIT - 1 : Śāṅkaradarśanam :
The Authority to know Brahman 01 - 22

UNIT - 2 : Śāṅkaradarśanam :
Adhyāsa and Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda 23 - 60

UNIT - 3 : Śāṅkaradarśana :
Refutation of other theories of error 61 - 106

UNIT - 4 : Śāṅkaradarśana - II
Sattā-Traividyā, Avidyā, Māyā and Avidyā 107 - 166



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# प्रस्तावना

प्रिय विद्यार्थिनः

अस्माकं कर्णाटक-राज्य-मुक्तविश्वविद्यानिलये स्नातकोत्तरशिक्षणकक्षां प्रवेष्टृभ्यः भवद्भ्यः हार्दं स्वागतम्।

विश्वस्य प्राचीनभाषासु संस्कृतभाषा प्रमुखतमा। वेदेषु दृश्यमाना इयं भाषा क्रि.पू. पञ्चमशतके काव्यस्य रूपं प्रापदिति वदन्ति। गच्छता कालेन संस्कृतभाषा उच्छशिक्षण-शासन-लेखन-काव्यादिषु अव्याहतं समुपयुक्ता। प्रायो लोके 2500 वर्षाधिकम् इतिहासं प्राप्तवती अन्या भाषा नास्ति।

वेदाः, शास्त्राणि, इतिहासाः, पुराणानि, काव्यानि, दर्शनानि, व्याख्यानानि, प्रशस्तयः, शासनानि, चाटुपद्यानि, सुभाषितानि इत्येवं नानाप्रकारेषु निबद्धाः कृतयः संस्कृतवाङ्मये विलसन्ति। अस्य परिचयः पाठ्यक्रमानुसारेण कारयिष्यते। विशेषाध्ययनाय गहनशोधनाय च युष्माकं सिद्धतायाः सम्पादनमेव स्नातकोत्तरशिक्षणस्य मुख्यः उद्देशः।

भवतां स्वाध्यायसुलभाय स्वयंबोधनपद्धत्या (SIM) एते पाठाः विशिष्टरूपेण आरचिताः। बहवः विद्वांसः एतान् पाठान् सज्जीकर्तुं कृतभूरिपरिश्रमाः सन्ति। तेषां साहाय्यं सकार्तज्ञं स्मरामि।

भवन्तः सर्वे सम्यगधीत्य अस्यां भाषायां साहित्ये च विशेषज्ञानं सम्पादयन्तु इति आशासे। 'श्रद्धावान् लभते ज्ञानम्' इति भगवद्गीतोक्तरीत्या भवतां श्रद्धायुक्ताध्ययनं फलप्रदं यशप्रदं च भूयादिति ममाशयः। शुभं भूयात्।

जीयात् गीर्वाणभारती।

डा. एन्. राधाकृष्ण भट्
संस्कृतविभागाध्यक्षः
कर्णाटकराज्य-मुक्तविश्वविद्यानिलयः
मानसगङ्गोत्री, मैसूरु



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## 1.0 BLOCK OBJECTIVES

In this block you will be able to understand the textual part of Śaṅkara Darśana of Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha. You will be able to know the main tenets of Śaṅkara Darśana such as the authority to know Brahman, Adhyāsa, Refutation of other theories of error. Satta - Traividyā, Māyā and Avidyā etc.



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# UNIT - 1

## Śāṅkaradarśanam :

## The Authority to know Brahman

1. Introduction
2. Objectives
3. Contact Exposition :
   Āgama is Pramāṇa to know Brahman
4. Siddhānta view
5. Summary and Revision Points
6. Intext Questions

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# UNIT - 1

## Śāṅkaradarśanam :

## The Authority to know Brahman

## 1. Introduction

In the previous unit it is established that Brahman deserves to be enquired into because there is doubt about it and there is a purpose to serve by the enquiry into it. Next comes the question as to what is the authority to know Brahman. This question needs to be answered with certainty in order to stall the opposite views that try to confuse the issue. The Siddhānta view is that the authority for knowing Brahman is Veda (Āgama). The opponent says that there is no authority to know Brahman. It is contended here that the authority to know Brahman is Veda (Śruti). The opponent argues that Veda does not teach the meaning of what is already accomplished (Siddha-artha), but teaches only what is to be accomplished (Sādhya or Kārya). As against this, the Siddhānta view establishes that Vedānta statements do not prescribe 'Vidhi', but teach only Brahman.

## 2. Objectives

2.1 The discussion here is intended to remove all the doubts regarding the authoritativeness of Vedānta statements to know Brahaman. The purpose is to remove all confusion about this. Unless this confusion is removed, the way will not be clear to enquire into Brahman. This also serves to establish that Brahman alone is worthy to be known and worthy to be realised. There is nothing which is beyond Brahman.

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## 3. Contact Exposition :

## Āgama is Pramāṇa to know Brahman

3.1 ननु इत्थंभूते ब्रह्मणि किं प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमो वा। न कदाचित्तत्र प्रत्यक्षं श्रमते। अतीन्द्रियत्वात्। नाप्यनुमानम्। व्याप्तस्य लिङ्गस्याभावात्। नाप्यागमः। "यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते" (तै 2 1 1) इति श्रुत्यैवागमगम्यत्वनिषेधात्। उपमानादिकमशक्यशङ्कम्। नियतविषयत्वात्। तस्माद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणं न सम्भवतीति चेत् - मैवं वोचः। प्रत्यक्षाद्यसम्भवेप्यागमस्य सत्त्वात्। "यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते " इति वाग्गोचरत्वनिषेधात्कथमेतदिति चेत् - श्रुतिरेव निषेधति वेदान्तवेद्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः श्रुतिरेव विधत्ते। न हि वेदप्रतिपादितेऽर्थेऽनुपपन्ने वैदिकानां बुद्धिः खिद्यते। अपि तु तदुपपादनमार्गमेव विचारयति। तस्मादुभयमपि प्रतिपादनीयम्।।

"It may be objected here : With regard to Brahman of the aforesaid nature, what is the authority ? Is it perception, Inference or verbal testimony ? Here perception cannot toil, because it (Brahman) is beyond senses. It cannot be Inference also, because there is no probans (hetu) which can be invariably concomitant with it (Brahman). It cannot be Verbal Testimony either, because the Śruti statement meaning "From which the speach returns" (Tai U., 2.1.1.) itself rejects the possibility of knowing it (Brahman) through Verbal Testimony. It is not possible even to think of the means like Analogy, etc., because their scope is limited. Hence, there is authority to know Brahman. If it is contended like this, the reply is not to say so, because even though perception and inference are not possible, there is Verbal Testimony for that purpose. When the Śruti statment meaning "From which the speech returns" is there, how is that possible ? The answer is : Yes, the Śruti statement denies, while the Śruti statement itself enjoins the knowledge of Brahman through Vedānta. The Vedic scholars do not become sorry when some meaning conveyed by veda is not compatible. Their mind searched for the way of making it

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compatible. Hence both types of the Śruti should be understood in harmony."

Pratyakṣa knowledge depends upon senses. If the object is beyond the senses, it means that it is beyond the scope of Pratyakṣa. Brahman is such an object. Hence it cannot be known through Pratyakṣa. Nor can it be known through Anumāna. There is no 'hetu' which is invariably concomitant with Brahman like smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. Then Upamāna, too, cannot operate, because its scope is limited. But as regards Āgama-Pramāṇa also, the opponent says that the Śruti statement itself viz, यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते, which means that speech, too, cannot reach Brahman, rules out the possibility of knowing Brahman through Āgama. But the Siddhānta view is that when some meaning conveyed by Veda is incompatible, the Vedic scholars seek the way of making it compatible. Although the Śruti statement quoted above is against the operation of Āgama Pramāṇa, other statements of the Śruti establish that Brahman can be known through Upaniṣadic statements. For instance the Śruti statement like "तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 3.9.26) which means 'I am asking about the Puruṣa who belongs to the Upaniṣads; implies that the Paramātman (Brahman) can be known through Upaniṣads. The statements like "आनन्दो ब्रह्म" (He who is omnisient, etc., - Muṇḍaka, 1.1.9), actually speak of Brahman. Hence, Brahman can be known only through Āgama-Pramāṇa. Both the types of statements should be taken in harmony. How can it be done ? The answer is given below :

## Śruti removes nescience; hence, Brahman is Prameya

3.2. विषयत्वनिषेधकानि वाक्यानि वाक्यजन्यवृत्तिव्यक्तस्फुरणलक्षण-फलासंभवविवक्षया प्रवृत्तानि। विषयत्वबोधकानि तु वृत्तिजन्यावरणभङ्गलक्षण-फलसंभवविवक्षया। तदुक्तं भगवद्भिः -

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अनाधेयफलत्वेन श्रुतेर्ब्रह्म न गोचरम्।

प्रमेयं प्रमितौ तु स्यादात्माकारसमर्पणात्।। इति।

न प्रकाश्यं प्रमाणेन प्रकाशो ब्रह्मणः स्वयम्।

तज्जन्यावृत्तिभङ्गत्वात्प्रमेयमिति गीयते।। इति च।

"The sentences that deny Brahman as the object of knowledge, proceed with the intention of conveying that the fruit in the form of clear revelation through the knowledge (which is the Vṛtti or modification of the internal organ, buddhi) born from the sentence is not possible (in the case of Brahman). The sentences that speak of Brahman as the object of knowledge, proceed with the intention of conveying the possibility of the fruit in the form of removal of the cover through the knowledge (Vṛtti) born from the sentence. It is said by the revered one -

"Brahman is not within the range of the Śruti , because the latter does not have the fruit of revealing what it contains. Yet Brahman is knowable because it offers its own form to the knowledge.

"It (Brahman) is not revealed by any Pramāṇa; its shine is its own. It is said to be known due to the removal of the cover of knowledge through the Pramāṇa."

Here the author tries to show the mutual connection between the Śruti statements that deny the 'Viṣayatva' of Brahman and those that accept the 'Viṣayatva' of Brahman. The former statements (sentences) are intended to convey the idea that Brahman being self luminous does not stand in need of anything to reveal it. Those sentences have not fruit in the form of revealing Brahman. वाक्यजन्यवृत्ति means 'the knowledge in the form the modification of buddhi, an internal organ, born from the sentence.' Let us take the example of the knowledge of pot. When the knowledge of the pot is born, the internal organ (buddhi)

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moves out along with the light of consciousness (Cidābhāsa) contained in it and envelops the object, i.e., the pot. By virtue of the pervasion by the internal organ, the cover of ignorance is removed. This is called 'Āvaraṇa-Bhaṅga' or 'Pratibhandhakanivṛtti'. By virtue of the pervasion by the light of consciousness the pot shines. This is called 'Sphuraṇa.' Since the pot is insentient (Jaḍa), it requires the help of other means. But in the case of Brahman, which is self-luminous like sun, the only necessity is the removal of the cover of ignorance. For instance through the Śruti statements like "Tattvam asi" (chandogya, 6.8.7), the knowledge of the Ātman is born. Then through the pervasion by the 'buddhi' there is the removal of the cover of ignorance (Āvaraṇa-Bhaṅga). When the cover of ignorance is removed, the self luminous Ātman shines itself. Since the 'Sphuraṇa' is here is by itself, there is no fruit in the form of such 'Sphuraṇa' for the knowledge born from the sentences. This is the intention with which the sentences denying the 'Viṣayatva' of Brahman proceed. The sentences accepting it proceed with the intention that they have the fruit in the form of the removal of the cover of ignorance.

Thus Brahman is beyond the range of Śruti. The Śruti cannot have the fruit in the form of the 'Sphuraṇa' in the case of Brahman which is itself of the nature of 'Sphuraṇa'. Yet Brahman is knowable by virtue of its assuming the form of knowledge itself. It is not 'Prakāśya' by any Pramāṇa, because it is 'Svayaṁprakāśa'. Yet it is knowable, because the Śruti-Pramāṇa removes the cover of ignorance.

Here the opponent objects from the point of view of the Pūrvamīmāmsā who argue that Veda does not teach what is already accomplished (Siddha) -

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## Veda does not teach Siddhārtha, Pūrvapakṣa view

3 3 ननु स्यादेष मनोरथो यदि सिद्धेऽर्थे वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं सिद्ध्येत्। संगतिग्रहणायत्तत्वात्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्य। संगतिग्रहणस्य च वृद्धव्यवहारायत्तत्वात्। वृद्धव्यवहारस्य च लोके कार्यैकनियतत्त्वात्। न ह्यस्ति संभवः शब्दानां कार्येऽर्थे संगतिग्रहः सिद्धार्थाभिधायकत्वं तत्र वा प्रामाण्यमिति। न हि तुरङ्गत्वे गृहीतसंगतिकं तुरङ्गपदं गोत्वमाचष्टे तत्र वा प्रामाण्यं भजते। तस्मात् कार्यगृहीतसंगतिकानां शब्दानां कार्य एव प्रामाण्यम्।

"If the authoritativeness of Veda in giving the meaning about what is accomplished (siddha) would be proved, then this heart's desire would have been fulfilled. The authoritativeness of 'Śabda' depends upon the knowledge of relation (between Śabda and Artha). The knowledge of that relation depends upon the usage by the elders. The usage by the elders in the world is limited to what is to be accomplished (Sādhya, Kārya). It is not possible to argue that the knowledge of relation of the words is in favour of the sense of what is 'Sādhya' (Kārya) and that they still possess authoritativeness in denoting a meaning of what is 'Siddha'. It is not possible to say that the word 'horse' (Turaṅga) which has the relation with the sense of the 'horse' can be taken as giving the sense of a 'cow'. There can be no authoritativeness for that. Hence the authoritativeness of the words which have the relation with the sense of what is 'Sādhya' (Kārya), is only with regard to the sense of what is 'Kārya'.

'Saṅgati' means the relation between the word and the sense. Children initially grasp the relation of the words with their meaning through the usage of the elders. The usage of the elders consists in the actions such as bringing the cow, taking away the cow, etc., occuring immediately after hearing the injunctive sentences like 'bring the cow', 'take away the cow', etc. Here the bringing of the cow, taking of the cow, etc., are grasped as what are to be done (Kārya). They are deposited in the mind as orders to be carried out. That being the case, there is no

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grasping of the sense of a word without relation to action. Hence the Śruti statements like "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म" (Taittirīya, 2.1.1) cannot be authoritative because they do not refer to something to be done (Kārya).

Here the opponent (Pūrvapakṣin) anticipates another objection that certain Śruti statements conveying the meaning of what is 'Siddha' are also authoritative and concludes his argument by answering it -

## "Putraste Jātah" does not teach 'Siddhārtha'; Vedānta is Karyapara

3 4 ननु मुखविकासादिलिङ्गाद्धर्षहेतुं प्रसिद्धार्थमनुमाय यत्र शब्दस्य संगतिग्रहो यथा "पुत्रस्ते जातः" इत्यादिषु तत्रावश्यं कार्यमन्तरेणैव शब्दस्य सिद्धेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यमाश्रीयते इति चेन्न। पुत्रजन्मवदेव प्रियासुखप्रसवादेरनेकस्य हर्षहेतोरुपस्थीयमानत्वेन परिशेषावधारणानुपपत्तेः। "पुत्रस्ते जातः" इत्यादिषु सिद्धार्थपरेषु प्रयोगेषु "द्वारं द्वारम्" इत्यादिवत्कार्याध्याहारेण प्रयोगोपपत्तेश्च।

शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्ध्या च न वेदान्तानां सिद्धार्थपरत्वम्। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपराणामेव वाक्यानां शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्धेः। तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः -

**प्रवृत्तिर्वा निवृत्तिर्वा नित्येन कृतकेन वा।**

**पुंसां येनोपदिश्येत तच्छास्त्रमभिधीयते।।** इति।

न चैतेषां स्वरूपपरत्वे प्रयोजनमस्ति। श्रुतवेदान्तार्थस्यापि पुंसः सांसारिकधर्माणामनिवृत्तेः। तस्माद्वेदान्तानामप्यात्मा ज्ञातव्य इति समाम्नातेन विधिनैकवाक्यतामाश्रित्य कार्यपरतैवाश्रयणीयेति सिद्धम्। ततश्च केवलसिद्धरूपे ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तानां प्रामाण्यं न सिद्ध्यतीति चेत्।

"It may be objected thus : Wherever the relation of the word is grasped by inferring the well known thing as the cause of joy on observing the signs such as the dilation of the face, etc., as, for instance, in such statements as "A son is born to

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you", there it is possible necessarily to accept the authoritativeness of the words in relation to a meaning pertaining to what is accomplished (Siddha), without reference to any sense of what is to be done (Kārya). If it is argued as above, the answer is that it is not tenable, because besides the birth of a son, many other causes for joy such as the easy delivery in the case of the beloved, etc., can be adduced and there can be no definite conclusion about it. In such usages as 'a son is born to you', etc., which are in favour of the sense about what is accomplished (Siddha), it is possible to establish compatibility by supplementing an action as in such cases as 'door, door', etc., (where an action like closing or opening is supplemented). Since the Vedānta statements are well known as Śāstra, they cannot be in favour of what is accomplished. The term Śāstra is well known as applicable to those statements only which are in favour of activity or prevention from activity (Pravṛtti or Nivṛtti). It is said by the Bhattācārya -

"That by which the human beings are taught something to be done or something to be avoided through the sentences, whether eternal or non-eternal, is said to be Śāstra.

"There is no purpose served by them, if they are in favour of conveying the nature of Ātman. There is no relief from the family (mundane) duties for the human beings even when they are adept in the meaning of Vedānta. Hence, by restoring to the meaning in conformity with the injunction contained in such a statement as "Ātmajñātavyah" (Ātman should be realised), the Vedānta statements should also be taken as in favour of teaching action only. Then the authoritativeness of the Vedānta statements with reference to Brahman which is merely something already accomplished (Siddha), cannot be established at all."

The Pūrvapakṣin rejects the possibility of taking such

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sentences as "Putraste Jātah" as referring to something 'Siddha'; by inferring it as the cause of joy as evident from the dilation of face, etc., The ground is that there are other reasons possibly for the joy so inferred and that there can be no determination regarding the exact cause. In such usages as are applicable to 'Siddha' objects, their compatibility can be established by supplementing some action as in the case of 'door, door' where the action like opening or closing can be supplied to complete the sense.

The Pūrvapakṣin argues that on the authority of Kumārila Bhatta, what pertains to 'Pravṛtti' or 'nivṛtti' is alone called Śāstra. If Vedānta is also a Śāstra, it should also conform to that requirement. Hence, the Vedānta statements should be understood as teaching some action or the other in conformity with such Vedānta statements as "Ātmajñātavyah", which enjoins the action of knowing Ātman. Hence Vedānta statements are not authoritative with regard to Brahman which is 'Siddha' object only. This is said with reference such statements as "Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma", etc.

## 4. Siddhānta view

4 2 अत्र प्रतिविधीयते - न तावत्सिद्धे व्युत्पत्त्यसिद्धिः। प्रगुन्नीतया नीत्या पुत्रस्ते जात इति वाक्यात् सिद्धपरादपि व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः। न च परिशेषावधारणानुपपत्तिः। प्रियासुखप्रसवादेरपि संभवादिति भणितव्यम्। पुत्रपदाङ्कितपटप्रदर्शनवत् प्रियासुखप्रसवादिसूचकाभावात्।

पुत्रजन्मैव तत्सूचकमिति चेत् - प्रथमप्रतीतपुत्रजन्मपरित्यागे कारणाभावात्। पुत्रजननस्यैवाधिकानन्दहेतुत्वाच्च। "पुत्रोत्पत्तिविपत्तिभ्यां नापरं सुखदुःखयोः" इति विद्यमानत्वात्। तथा चाचकथच्चित्सुखाचार्यः -

दृष्टचैत्रसुतोत्पत्तेस्तत्पदाङ्कितवाससा।
वार्ताहारेण यातस्य परिशेषविनिश्चितेः।। इति। (चि 1 15)

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"Here the answer is given. It is not correct to say that there is no grasping of meaning in the case of that which gives the meaning of what is 'siddha'. As per the aforesaid manner, the meaning is clear even from the sentence "a son is born to you" which conveys the meaning of what is 'siddha'. I should not be said that it cannot be decided about the exact cause as the causes like easy delivery in the case of the beloved, etc., are also possible. There is no indication about the easy delivery in the case of the beloved as there is indication of the birth of the son through the cloth marked with the word 'son'.

"If it is argued that the birth of the son is itself the indication of it, then it can be said that there is no reason why the birth of the son which is known earlier, should be discarded. The birth of the son is greater cause for delight. It is known through experience that there no greater joy than the birth of the son and no greater sorrow than the death of the son. So has Citsukhācārya said -

"When a person who saw the birth of a son to Caitra and came to him along with a messenger holding a cloth marked with the word son, it is decided that the cause for Caitra's delight was the birth of a son."

The Siddhāntin answers the contentions of the Pūrvapakṣin one after the other. The main contention of the Pūrvapakṣin is that the Śabda does not teach something pertaining to what is 'Siddha'. This is not correct. It is already told earlier that in such a statement as "Putraste Jātah", the meaning pertains to what is 'Siddha'. The contention that there is no ascertainment as regards that cause of joy is not possible because there could be other causes like the easy delivery in the case of the beloved (Priyāsukhaprasava), etc., cannot stand. The messenger comes to Caitra displaying a cloth on which the word 'Putrah' is marked and reports that a son was born to him. Then the birth of a son

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is certainly the cause for the excess of joy. Thus the grasping of the meaning of sentences is possible even when they convey the meaning of what is 'Siddha'. Although the idea of 'Priyāsukhaprasava' is also there, it cannot be decided as the cause for the joy here.

First the idea of 'putrajanma' occurs. It may indicate the idea of 'Priyāsukhaprasava'. Yet there is no reason why the idea of 'putrajanma' which occurs earlier, should be discarded. Here 'putrajanma' is stronger reason for joy. It is experience that supports this view. Citsukhācārya's view is quoted in support of this. The statement of the Ācārya starting with 'ista' is intended to impress that it is not proper to imagine an unknown cause for the joy when a known cause is on hand. If it is argued that the cause in the form of 'Priyāsukhaprasava' is also known, it can be contended that it is not stronger and more special than the cause in the form of 'putrjanma' as the latter is demonstrated strongly by the cloth with the mark of the word 'putrah' on it.

Then the Siddhāntin refutes the view of the Pūrvapakṣin that the idea of action should be supplemented to grasp the meaning of the sentences that covney the meaning of what is 'Siddha' -

## Kāryādhyāpara not necessary in Siddhārthavākyās

4 2 यदुक्तं सिद्धार्थपरेषु कार्याध्याहार इति तदयुक्तम्।

मुख्यार्थविषयतया सिद्धेऽपि प्रयोगसिद्धावध्याहारानुपपत्तेः।।

"As regards what is said about supplementing the idea of action in sentences conveying the meaning of what is 'siddha', it should be stated that it is not tenable. When the usage is compatible with regard to the meaning of what is 'siddha' as

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governed by the primary sense itself, there is no necessity of any supplementing".

In the sentences which convey the sense of what is 'siddha', it is possible that the usage is compatible as expressive of the primary meaning. Then there is no propriety for supplementing any other idea.

As against the Pūrvapakṣin's contention that the Vedānta statements are well known as Śāstra and that on that score they cannot be in favour of the nature of Ātman, the Siddhāntin answers -

## Avidyānivṛtti is the aim of Vedāntaśāstra

4.3 यदुक्तं शास्त्रत्वप्रसिद्ध्या च न स्वरूपपरत्वमिति तदप्ययुक्तम्। हितशासनादपि शास्त्रत्वोपपत्तेः। न च प्रयोजनाभावः। श्रुतमतवेदान्तजन्या-द्वितीयात्मविज्ञानाभ्यासेन विद्योदये संसारनिदानाविद्यानिवृत्त्युपलक्षितब्रह्मात्मता-लक्षणपरमपुरुषार्थसिद्धेः।'

"As regards what is said that the Vedānta statements cannot be in favour of the nature of Ātman on the ground that they are well known as Śāstra, it must stated that it is not tenable. The status of Śāstra can be assigned to those statements which advocate something salutary. It cannot be said that there is no use, because when the knowledge arises through the realisation of the secondless Ātman born from the hearing (Śravaṇa) and understanding (manana) of the Vedānta statements, then there will be the accomplishment of the supreme aim of man in the form of realisation of one's self as Brahman which is brought about by the removal of nescience that happens to be the cause of transmigration".

The stand of the Siddhāntin is that it is not proper to resort to 'adhyahara' (supplementing) when the usage is compatible

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as being expressive of the primary sense even in the case of that sentence which conveys what is 'Siddha'. As against this the Pūrvapakṣin has contended that the very fact that the Vedānta statements are a Śāstra rules out their possibility of conveying the nature of Ātman which is 'Siddha'. The Siddhāntin replies by saying that the very fact that they convey some salutary meaning is enough to prove them as Śāstra. Again the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that such statements do not serve any purpose. Here the Siddhāntin draws the mat from under the feet of the Pūrvapakṣin by highlighting the purpose served by those statements. Through the hearing (Śravaṇa) and understanding (manana) of the Vedānta statements, there arises the knowledge of the Ātman which is without a second. Then the nescience (Avidyā) which is the cause for transmigration is eradicated. Through this removal of 'Avidyā', there is the fulfilment of the supreme aim of human beings which is in the form of the realisation of Brahman as one's Ātman. What better use than this can be thought of for a Śāstra ?

Now the Siddhāntin rejects the possibility of the Vedānta statements becoming Vidhi or injunction by posing alternatives which cannot be maintained -

## Vedānta statments are not 'Vidhi'

4 4 न चात्र विधिः संभवति। विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथा हि - किं शाब्दज्ञानं विधेयम् ? किं वा भावनात्मकम् ? आहोस्वित् साक्षात्काररूपम् ?

नाद्यः। विदितपदार्थसंगतिकस्याधीतशब्दन्यायतत्त्वस्यान्तरेणापि विधिं शब्दादेवोपपत्तेः।

नापि द्वितीयः। भावनाया ज्ञानप्रकर्षहेतुभावस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धतया प्राप्तत्वेनाविधेयत्वात्। अप्राप्तप्रापकस्यैव विधित्वाङ्गीकारात्।

तृतीये साक्षात्कारः किं ब्रह्मस्वरूपः ? किं वान्तःकरणपरिणामभेदः ?

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नाद्यः। तस्य नित्यत्वेनाविधेयत्वात्। नापि द्वितीयः। आनन्दसाक्षात्काररूपतया फलत्वेनाविधेयत्वात्।

"Here again, Vidhi (injunction) does not occur, because it cannot stand these alternatives. They are like these - Is the knowledge of the Śabda depending on Vidhi (injunction) ? Is it in the form of understanding and meditation (Bhāvanā) ? Is it in the form of realisation (Sākṣātkāra) ?

"The first alternatives is not tenable. In the case of a person who knows the relation between the word and its meaning and who is adept in the principles of grammar and Mīmāmsā, the meaning of the word flashes without any 'Vidhi' (injunction of anyone).

"The second alternative (that feeling is the object of Vidhi) is also not tenable. Since the knowledge of the cause and effect relation between the feeling and the experience in the form of realisation (the supreme knowledge) can be obtained through the positive invariable concomitance between them (Anvaya) and the invariable concomitance of their negations (Vyatireka), there is no necessity of Vidhi in that case. It is only that which procures what is not obtained, has been accepted (by you) as 'Vidhi'.

"In the third alternative, is the realisation (Sākṣātkāra) of the nature of Brahman ? Is it some kind of mental disposition which is a transformation of the inner sense (buddhi) ? Here the first alternative is not tenable, because the nature of Brahman cannot be the object of a 'Vidhi' as it is eternal. The second alternative, too, is not tenable, because since the experience of bliss is the fruit of the realisation of Brahman, Vidhi cannot be thought of in that case".

It is argued here that in the Vedānta statements which advocate Brahman, there is no possibility of 'Vidhi'. This is

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established on the ground that none of the three alternatives can be maintained by those who find 'Vidhi' even in those sentences. The alternatives are :

1. Is the knowledge of the Śabda itself depends upon Vidhi ? 2. Is that Vidhi of the nature of understanding and meditation (Bhāvanā) ? 3. Is it of the nature of realisation (Sākṣātkāra) ?

1. The first alternative cannot stand. The knowledge of Śabda (Śabdajñāna) does not stand in need of any Vidhi, provided the reader or hearer is conversant with the relation between Śabda and Artha and learned in grammer and Mīmāmsā. Here by the term 'Nyāya', 'Jaiminīya-nyāya' should be understood.

It may be noted here that the knowledge of the Ātman should be known from the teaching of the Guru. This is in the form of Sabdabodha (Śābdajñāna). Thus it represents the aspect of 'Śrotavyah' in the Śruti statement, viz., "आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यो श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः" (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 2.4.5). In this respect, there is no necessity of 'Vidhi', as shown above. The second aspect is that of understanding and meditaion (Manana and Nididhyāsana) which happen to be the means of realisation. This is known as 'Bhāvanā'. The third aspect is the 'phala' (fruit) which is represented by 'Dṛaśṭavyaḥ' in the Śruti statement quoted above. This is known as 'Sākṣātkāra'. These two aspects are covered by the second and the third alternatives. It is shown here how those two also do not depend upon 'Vidhi'.

2. The second alternative, too, does not stand. Even through the Śabdajñāna comes through the teaching of the Guru (Śravaṇa), it is through Bhāvanā (Manana and Nididhyāsana) that the 'Brahmasaksatkara' is possible. There is no necessity of Vidhi to

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know the relation between Bhāvanā and Brahmasaksatkara. It can be ascertained through 'anvaya' (positive relation) and Vyatireka (the relation of absence of both) method. For instance, when the fire is near, cold is eradicated. When it is not near, cold is not eradicated. The first one is 'anvaya' - relation. The second one is 'Vyatireka' - relation. By these 'Anvaya - Vyatireka' relations, it is proved that the nearness of fire is the cause for the eradication of cold. Śāstra need not prescribe (make Vidhi) that for the removal of cold, fire should be near. Similarly relation between 'Bhāvanā' (Manana and Nididhyāsana) and 'Brahmasāksātkāra' is proved by experience on the basis of the 'anvaya-Vyatireka' method. When there is Bhāvanā, there is Brahmasāksātkāra. This is 'anvaya' - relation. When there is no 'Bhāvanā', there is no 'Brahmasāksātkāra'. This is 'Vyatireka' - relation. Since this is spontaneous, Śāstra need not make a 'Vidhi' for this.

3. The third alternative has two questions : (i) Is that realisation of the nature of Brahman ? (ii) Is it in the form of the transformation of a mental disposition ? Here the first alternative is not tenable, because there cannot any 'Vidhi' for something which is eternal. What is fit to be done can be subject to Vidhi. But what is non - existent like the horns of a hare (Śaśaśṛṅga) and what is eternal like 'Brahmasvarūpa' are never subject to any 'Vidhi'. The second alternative is also not tenable, because the disposition of mind in the form of blissful realisation (experience), is the 'phala' (fruit) and hence, it is not subject to any 'Vidhi'. The 'Vidhi' comes with reference to a 'phala', as the 'vidhi' about sacrifice comes with reference to a 'phala' in the form of heaven. But 'phala' itself, like the present one, does not stand in need of a 'Vidhi'.

The Siddhāntin concludes this topic -

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4 5 तस्माद् ज्ञातव्य इत्यादीनामविधायकत्वाद् ''अर्हे कृत्यतृचश्च'' (पा सू 3 3 169) इति कृत्यप्रत्ययानाम् अर्हार्थे विधानाद् अर्हार्थतैव व्याख्येया। तथा च सर्वेषां वेदान्तवाक्यानाम् उपक्रमोपसंहारादि षड्विधतात्पर्योपितत्वान्नित्यशुद्ध-मुक्तस्वभावब्रह्मात्मपरत्वमास्थेयम्।।

''Hence, 'Vidhi' should not be found in such statements as ''Jñātavyaḥ'' (Br. 2. 4. 5.). Here, according to Pāṇini's Sūtra ''अर्हे कृत्यतृचश्च'' (Aṣṭādhyāyī, 3. 3. 169), which means that ''in the sense fitness, the 'Kṛtya' and 'Tṛc' terminations are enjoined'', the 'krtya' - suffixes are added in the sense of fitness (Arhārtha) in 'Jñātavyaḥ', etc. So in the sense of fitness only, those words should be explained. That being the case, since the Vedānta statements are supported by the six grounds of 'Tatparya-Nirṇaya' such as Upakrama, Upasamhara, etc., they should be taken as in favour of the meaning of Brahman, which is eternal, pure, enlightened and free in nature''.

It should be noted here that the Kṛtya suffixes such as 'tavya', etc., should be taken in the sense of fitness (Arhārtha) but not in the sense of injunction (Vidhyartha). For instance 'Jñātavyaḥ' means 'Jñātum Arhaḥ'. Hence, Vedāntavākyas are in favour of conveying the meaning of Brahaman. Thus the authority of the Vedānta statements in favour of conveying the meaning of Brahman which is 'Siddha', is established beyond doubt.

## 5. Summary and Revision Points

5.1 This unit discusses about the authority of knowing Brahman. This has to be done because the Pūrvapakṣa view is that Veda does not teach Brahman which is something 'Siddha'. The Siddhānta meets all the arguments of the Pūrvapakṣa and

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establishes the view that Vedānta statements are in favour of 'Siddhārtha' and hence they are apt to teach about Brahman.

5.2 The Pūrvapakṣa raises the objection that there is no authority to know about Brahman. When it is urged that Veda is the authority to know Brahman, the Pūrvapakṣa contends that Veda, including the Vedānta, teach only what is Sādhya (Kārya) and as a Śāstra, it cannot teach what is siddha like Brahman.

5.3 The Pūrvapakṣa refers to the Upanisadic statments like "यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते" (from that all speech returns, i.e., cannot reach), to argue that even Upaniṣadic (Vedānta) statements rule out the possibility of knowing Brahman through Vedānta statements. The Siddhāntin shows that there are such Vedānta statements as "आनन्दो ब्रह्मेतिव्यजानात्" "यः सर्वज्ञः," to prove that Vedānta statements should be taken in harmony. The statements like "यतो वाचो" are intended to covey the idea that Brahman being self - luminous does not stand in need of anything to reveal it. The statements like "तत् त्वम् असि" are intended to remove the cover of ignorance so that the realisation of Brahman can come without hindrance.

5.4 The Pūrvapakṣa argues that the authoritativeness of Śabda depends upon the knowledge of relation between Śabda and Artha. The knowledge of that relation depends upon the usage by the elders. The usage is limited to what is 'Sādhya' or Kārya. When such a statment as पुत्रस्ते जातः is in favour of the sense of what is 'siddha', it is possible to argue that Śabda can be authoritative even when it conveys the meaning of what is 'siddha'. This is rejected by the Pūrvapakṣa on the ground that

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the birth of a son is not necessarily the cause of delight, because there may be other reasons like easy delivery on the part of the beloved, etc., for joy. In such cases it is possible to establish its authoritativeness provided the idea of some action is supplied as in the case 'door, door'. Hence, it is argued that Vedānta statments should be understood as teaching some action or the other in conformity with such statements as ''आत्मा वा अरे ज्ञातव्यः, इत्यादिः''

5.5 The Siddhānta replies by saying that in such a statement as ''पुत्रस्ते जातः'', the birth of the son is the cause of joy as the messenger carries a cloth with the mark of the word ''पुत्रः'' made on it. There may be the idea of 'Priyāsukhaprasava' in it. Yet it cannot be regarded as the cause for joy here. As regards what is said about the supplementing of the idea of action, the Siddhānta view is that there is no necessity of that because the usage is compatible with regard to the meaning of what is 'siddha' as governed by the primary sense itself.

5.6 The Pūrvapakṣa further argues that the fact of Vedānta statments being a Śāstra rules out the possibility of conveying the nature of Ātman which is 'siddha'. The Siddhānta's reply is that the very fact of their conveying some salutary meaning is enough to prove them as Śāstra. It cannot be argued that those statements are purposeless, because through hearing and understanding of them (Śravaṇa and Manana) followed by meditation (Nididhyāsana), there arises the knowledge of Ātman as not different from Brahman. There is no necessity of Vidhi for this.

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## 6. Intext Questions

6.1 Establish that Āgama (veda) is the authority to known Brahman.

**6.2 Explain :**

(i) श्रुतिरेव निषेधति वेदान्तवेद्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः श्रुतिरेव विधत्ते।

(ii) तस्मात्कार्यगृहीतसंगतिकानां शब्दानां कार्य एव प्रामाण्यम्।

(iii) न च परिशेषावधारणानुपपत्तिः।

(iv) न चात्र विधि संभवति।

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# UNIT - 2

## Śāṅkaradarśanam :

## Adhyāsa and Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Content Exposition : The world is a 'vivarta'

4.0 Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda

5.0 Revision Points and Summary

6.0 Intext questions

7.0 Assignment

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# UNIT - 2

## Śāṅkaradarśanam :

## Adhyāsa and Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda

## 1.0 Introduction

1.1 Two topics are taken up in this unit. They are : 1.Adhyāsa; 2. Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda. The first topic called Adhyāsa is the cardinal principle of Advaita Vedānta. It is the concept of error (Bhrama). For instance in इदं रजतम् (this is silver), 'idam' (this) refers to shell (Śukti) which is empirically real and 'rajatam' (silver) which is superimposed upon it is only apparently real. Thus Adhyāsa is a case of 'illegitimate transference'. The falsity of that knowledge is not realised at the moment. When a person sees silver in the shell, he does not know it to be false. But when he approches the object and picks it up, he realises that he was in error. In the error, the shell is the ground and silver is an appearence of it. Similarly, the Brahman is the ground and the whole of the universe is an appearence or Adhyāsa of it. It must be noted here that there is a higher standpoint from which empirical things are only appearances. It is in this sense that the world is not real and that Brahman is the sole reality.

1.2 The second topic is Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda. The theory of error according to Prabhākara is called Akhyātivāda. It is called Akhyātivāda because, according to Prabhākara, error is due to non-discrimination (viveka-akhyāti) between two cognitions and their objects. In 'this is silver' there are two cognitions as 'this' and 'silver'. 'This' refers to the object before us which is the shell. This cognition is perception and its object is shell. 'Silver'

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refers to the object of our memory. The cognition here is memory and its object is silver. The error consists in the absence of apprehension of the distinction between perception and memory. This view of Prabhākara is stated here only to be refuted subsequently.

## 2.0 Objectives

2.1 The entire conception of the universe as false or as appearence in Advaita is based on the Adhyāsavāda. A correct understanding of Adhyāṣavāda serves the purpose of revealing the Advaita position about the universe as a superimposition on Brahman which is the sole reality. It is in view of this supreme reality which is Brahman, the world is an appearence, while for all practical purposes it is a reality. Thus the world has Pratibhāsika reality as well as Vyāvahārika reality.

2.2 The objective of presenting Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda is to show how others look at error. This paves the way for considering other views on error. The purpose here is to show how their views are different from the Advaita view of error. The points stated by Prabhākara are subjected to scrutiny and rejected to establish the Advaita view.

## 3.0 Content Exposition : The world is a 'vivarta':

3 2 निष्प्रदेशे परमाणौ प्रदेशवृत्तित्वेनाभिमतस्य संयोगस्य दुरुपपादनतया तन्निबन्धनस्य द्व्यणुकस्यासिद्धौ द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेणारम्भवादासम्भवादचेतनायाः प्रकृतेर्महदादिरूपेण परिणामवादासम्भवाच्च ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्यानिर्वचनीयः प्रपञ्चश्चिद्विवर्त इति सिद्धम्। स्वरूपापरित्यागेन रूपान्तरापत्तिर्विवर्त इति सत्यमित्याख्यावभास इति। अवभासोऽध्यासा इति पर्यायः।

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"Conjunction (Saṁyoga) which is accetpted as occuring in the parts, cannot be maintained to occur in the atom which is without parts. Hence, diad (dvyaṇuka), etc., which depend upon conjunction cannot have existence. Then the theory of origination (Ārambhavāda) depending on the sequence of 'diad', etc., cannot be maintained. The theory of modification (Pariṇāmavāda) advocating the modification of the insentient Prakṛti into Mahat (buddhi), etc., is also not tenable. Hence, as there is neither appearence alone nor disappearence alone, the world which is indescribable is proved to be only an appearence (vivarta) of supreme consciousness (cit). 'Vivarta' means the assumption of a different form by an object without giving up its own form. Thus it is an appearance which can be called as real and false. This appearance is Adhyāsa or superimposition. The 'appearance' and 'superimposition' are synonyms".

Having established that the subject matter of Vedāntaśāstra is Brahman, it is now attempted to show that the purpose of the Śāstra is to remove 'Adhyāsa'. 'निष्प्रदेश' means 'that which has no parts'. 'Pradeśa' means 'part' - प्रदेशोऽवयवः। The atom is without parts. This is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśikas. Yet, according to their Ārambhavāda, 'dvyaṇuka' is formed by the conjunction of two atoms and 'tryaṇuka' is formed by the conjunction of three 'dvyaṇukas'. In this order the five elements, viz., earth, etc., are formed and then the world is created out of them. But the basic problem is that conjunction (Saṁyoga) occurs only in the objects with parts. The atom is partless. Hence conjunction cannot occur in the atoms. The formation of 'dvyaṇuka', etc., is out of question. Hence the Ārambhavāda and the consequent theory that the world is real cannot stand.

Similarly the theory of the Sāṅkyas that the world is a modification of Prakṛti is also not tenable. It is called 'Prakṛtipariṇāmavāda'. This theory is rejected on the ground that

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Prakṛti is insentient and that it cannot assume the forms of Mahat, etc.

The Advaita maintains that the world is an appearance of the Supreme consciousness ' Cit ' means consciousness. It is no other than supreme consciousness, which is the Brahman. 'Vivarta' means 'appearance'. 'Vivarta' is defined as the appearance of something in a different form without at the same time giving up its own form. The world is a 'vivarta' of Brahman is this sense. It is indescribable (anirvacanīya) in the sense that it appears and disappears. 'Khyati' is appearance and 'bādha' means disappearance. The world is an appearance (vivarta) in the sense that it cannot be described as exclusively real or as exclusively false or as both. 'Avabhāsa' means 'appearance'. Such an 'Avabhāsa' is Adhyāsa. Avabhāsa and Adhyāsa are synonyms. Adhyāsa is 'सत्यमिथ्याख्यावभास' - an appearance which can be called as both real and false. Hence it is 'anirvacanīya', indescribable.

## Adhyāsa and its varieties :

3.2. स चाध्यासो द्विविधः। अर्थाध्यासो ज्ञानाध्यासश्चेति। तदुक्तम् -

**प्रमाणदोषसंस्कारजन्मान्यस्य परात्मता।**

**तद्धीश्चाध्यास इति द्वयमिष्टं मनीषिभिः।।** इति।

पुनरपि द्विविधोऽध्यासः। निरुपाधिकसोपाधिकभेदात्। तदप्युक्तम्-

**दोषेण कर्मणा वापि क्षोभिताज्ञानसंभवः।**

**तत्त्वविद्याविरोधी च भ्रमोऽयं निरुपाधिकः।।**

**उपाधिसन्निधिप्राप्तक्षोभाविद्याविजृम्भितम्।**

**उपाध्यपगमापोह्यमाहुः सोपाधिकं भ्रमम्।।** इति।

तत्र स्वरूपेण कल्पिताहमाद्यध्यासो निरुपाधिकः। तदप्युक्तम्-

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नीलिमेव वियत्येषा भ्रान्त्या ब्रह्मणि संसृतिः।

घटव्योमेव भोक्तायं भ्रान्तो भेदन न स्वतः।। इति।

अत एव भाष्यकारः "शुक्तिका रजतवदवभासते, एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति" (शां.भा.) निदर्शनद्वयमुदाजहार। शिष्टं शास्त्र एव स्पष्टमिति विस्तरभियोपरम्यते। एवं च दृग्दृश्यौ द्वावेव पदार्थाविति वेदान्तिनां सिद्धान्त इति सर्वमवदातम्।।

"Adhyāsa is two-fold as Arthādyāsa and Jñānādhyāsa. It has been told-

"The appearance of one object as another due to Pramāṇa, Doṣa and Saṁskāra - this is Adhyāsa. This and its knowledge are both accepted as Adhyāsa by the learned.

"Again Adhyāsa is two-fold as Nirupādhika and Sopādhika. This is also told -

"That error which is born of ignorance arising from the agitation due to Doṣa and Karma and which is opposed to right knowledge, is Nirupādhikādhyāsa.

"That error which shoots up due to ignorance created by the agitation that occurs due the nearness of an Upādhi (adjunct), is Sopādhikādhyāsa. It is said it is eradicated by the disappearance of Upādhi.

"Here the Adhyāsa of 'I', etc., which is assumed in the case of the Ātman, is Nirupādhika. This is also said -

" Just as blue colour appears (due to illusion) in the sky, so does this world (Saṁsṛti-Saṁsāra) appear on Brahman. Like 'Ghaṭākāśa' so is this enjoyer (Ātman) mistakenly known as different (from Brahman), but not so in nature.

"That is why the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) gives two examples as 'The conch-shell is like silver' and 'one moon appears as two

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moons'. The rest is clear in the Śāstra. This is concluded at this point due to the fear of prolongation. Thus the conclusion of the Vedāntins is that Ḍṛk and Dṛsya are the two categories only. Everything is clear."

Adhyāsa is defined by Śaṅkara as "स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः (शां.भा.1.1.1). The appearance elsewhere, with a nature similar to that of recollection, of what was seen before, is Adhyāsa (super-imposition). Adhyāsa is two fold as - Arthādyhāsa and Jñānādhyāsa. Arthādyāsa consists in the appearance of one thing (say, shell) as another (say, silver). Jñānādhyāsa consists in the super-imposition of false knowledge on the Ātman. These two kinds of Adhyāsa are defined in the stanza - "प्रमाणदोषसंस्कारजन्मा, इत्यादि।"

'Pramāṇa' stands for senses, eyes, etc. Doṣa (defect) consists in far, near, etc. Saṁskāra (impression) consists in the experience that is recorded in the individual soul on seeing the objects like silver, etc., for the first time. It is well known that the illusion like 'This is silver' in the 'shell' occurs only when these three, viz., Pramāṇa, Doṣa and Saṁskāra, come together. This is a case of Arthādhyāsa. The knowledge of the same in the Ātman is Jñānādhyāsa.

From another point of view Adhyāsa is again two-fold as Nirupādhikādhyāsa and Sopādhikādhyāsa. These are defined in two stanzas heres. "दोषेण कर्मणा वापि, इत्यादि" defines Nirupādhikādhyāsa which is also called Nirupādhikābhrama. 'Doṣa' refers to the defects of the senses, etc., 'Karma' refers to the Saṁskāra. For instance, when the sky which has no colour is deemed as of blue colour, it is a case of Nirupādhikābhrama due to 'Doṣa'. When there is the superimposition 'Ahaṁkāra' on the Ātman, it is a case of Nirupādhikābhrama, because it is guided by the Saṁskāra (Karman) of the preceding 'Ahaṁkāras'. Thus when the error arises due the agitation created by either the defects of

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the senses, etc., or the previous impressions (Karman or Saṁskāra), it is called Nirupādhikādhyāsa. It is opposed to right knowledge.

Sopādhikādhyāsa is that error which arises due to the agitation created by the presence of an adjunct (Upādhi) or an extraneous object. For example, when crystal stone appears red due to the presence of a red hibiscus flower, it is a case of Sopādhikabhrama. When in the same Brahman, the notion of difference as Jīvā and Īśvara occurs, it is a case of Sopādhikabhrama, because it occurs due to the cover of 'Avidyā'. When that cover is removed that Bhrama also expires.

The first example given by Śaṅkara, viz., शुक्तिका रजतवदवभासते, is that of Nirupādhikādhyāsa. This kind of delusion that one thing (Śukti) is of the nature of another (rajata) is established in experience. The second example, viz., एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवत्, is that of Sopādhikādhyāsa. When there is the delusion of difference for the Jīvas who are not different from Brahman, it is Sopādhika. This is illustrated by one moon appearing as two. The stanza "नीलिमेव वियत्येषा, इत्यादि" should be understood in the light of the above explanation.

Advaita Vedānta accepts two categories as Drk and Dṛśya. Ḍṛk means the 'seer' and Dṛśya means the 'seen'. That which is the substratum of the superimposition of the world, i.e., the Brahman, is the Ḍṛk. It is the Cit, Supreme Consciousness. That which is superimposed is Dṛśya.

## 4.0 Prabhākara's Akhyātivāda

4 1 अत्र प्रभाकरः - शुक्तिका रजतवदवभासत इति दृष्टान्तो नेष्टः। रजतप्रत्ययस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वानुपपत्तेः। तथा हि - इदं रजतमिति प्रतीतौ शुक्तेरालम्बनत्वं पुरोदेशसत्तामात्रेणावलम्ब्यते कारणत्वेन भासमानत्वेन वा।

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नाद्यः। पुरोवर्तिनां लोष्टादीनामपि आलम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अथ कलधौतबोधकरणसंस्कारोद्बोधकारणत्वेन तद्द्वारा रजतज्ञानकारणत्वादालम्बनत्वं मन्यसे। तदपि न संगच्छते। चक्षुरादीनामपि कारणत्वेन विषयत्वापातात्। अथ भासमानतया विषयत्वमिष्यते तदप्यश्लिष्टम्। रजतनिर्भासस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वानुपपत्तेः। यस्मिन् विज्ञाने यदवभासते तत्तदालम्बनम्। अत्र च कलधौतानुभवः शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वकल्पनायां विरुध्यते। तथा चाचकथन्न्यायवीथ्यां शालिकनाथः -

**अत्र ब्रूमो य एवार्थो यस्यां संविदि भासते।**

**वेद्यः स एव नान्यद्धि वेद्यावेद्यत्वलक्षणम्।।**

**इदं रजतमित्यत्र रजतं त्ववभासते।**

**तदेव तेन वेद्यं स्यान्न तु शुक्तिरवेदनात्।।**

**तेनान्यस्यान्यथा भासः प्रतीत्यैव पराहतः।**

**अन्यस्मिन् भासमाने हि न परं भासते यतः।।**

(प्रक प 4 23 24)

"Here Prabhākara says - The analogy that the shell appears like silver is not acceptable, because the dependence on the shell for the knowledge of silver is not compatible. It is like this - In the knowledge that 'this is silver', what is ground for the dependence on the shell ? It is by the fact that it is existing in front ? Is it by virtue of its being the cause ? Is it because it appears ?

"The first alternative is not tenable, because of the contingency of a clod, etc., which are in front, becoming the object of dependence. In case you think that it (shell) is the object of dependence on the ground that it is the cause for creating the awareness of the signs reminiscent of silver and that the knowledge of silver arises through it, that is also not tenable. Since eyes, etc., are also causes, they could also

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become the objects of dependence. Again if it is considered as the object of dependence due to the fact that it appears in the knowledge of silver, then also it is not proper. It can never be maintained that the knowledge of silver depends upon the shell. That object which appears in the knowledge should be the object of that knowledge. In the illusory knowledge that 'This is silver', it is not proper to say that the experience of silver depends upon the shell.

"That is why Śālikanātha has said in his Nyāyavīthī thus -

"That object alone which flashes in the knowledge is the object of that knowledge, but any other object cannot be the object of that knowledge. The characteristic of being the object of knowing or not the object of knowing does not apply to any other object.

"In 'this is silver', the knowledge of silver flashes. That alone is the object of knowing, but not the shell because it is not known.

"Thus what is said that one object appears as another object, is rejected by the very illusory knowledge, because when one object appears, another object does not appear."

(Nyāyavīthī is the 4th Prakaraṇa of Prakaraṇapāñcikā)

As regards the concept of error, each school of philosophy has its own theory. The main theories of error are :

आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा।

तथाऽनिर्वचनीयख्यातिरित्येतत् ख्यातिपञ्चकम्।।

1. Ātmakhyāti of the Yogācāras, 2. Asatkhyāti of the Mādhyamikas, 3. Akhyāti of Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas, 4. Anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas and 5. Anirvacanīyakhyāti of the Advaitins. The first four theories are refuted by the Advaitins and

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the fifth view is established. Here Akhyātivāda of the Prābhākaras is taken up for refutation. Before refutation, the Akhyātavāda is presented here :

According to Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas, the knowledge that 'this is silver' arising in the shell, is not an error, but a matter of fact. Here it is not one knowledge, but a double cognition. 'This' constitutes perception and 'silver' is a matter of memory of what is seen before. Here in perception what is grasped is the object in front only. Due to some defect, the shell - ness (Śuktitva) in it is not grasped. Due to the fact that the object grasped is similar to silver, the memory of silver is created by the impression of silver. Thus there are two cognitions, viz., perception and Memory. Since there is no grasping of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects, error occurs here in 'this is silver'. Akhyāti consists in the non-apprehension of the difference between perception and memory and their objects.

Prabhākara's argument is that the shell cannot become the object of the knowledge of silver. He puts three questions regarding how the shell can become the object of the knowledge of silver. Firstly, is it because the object is in front ? Secondly, is it because the object is the cause ? Thirdly, is it because the object appears in the knowledge of silver ? Prabhākara shows how none of the alternatives can be maintained. The main points are :

1. If it is contended that the knowledge of silver in 'this is silver' depends upon the shell because it is seen in front, then it may argued that the knowledge may as well depend upon a clod, etc., seen in front.

2. If it is contended that the knowledge of silver depends upon the shell because it stands as the cause of that, since it is capable of bringing the memory of silver, the answer is that it cannot stand because eyes, etc., can as well be the cause.

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3. If it is argued that the knowledge of silver depends upon the shell because it appears in that knowledge, then it may be rejected by saying that the knowledge of silver cannot depend upon the shell. Whichever object flashes in a particular knowledge, that object is necessarily the object of that knowledge. In the knowledge of silver, the shell cannot be object of knowledge.

These points are covered in the stanzas quoted from the Prakaraṇa Pāñcikā of Śālikanātha.

Now it is argued from the point of view of Prabhākara that there are no causal factors for false knowledge (mithyā) :

## No causal factors for false knowledge :

4 2 किञ्च मिथ्याज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सामग्री न समस्ति। किं केवलानीन्द्रियादीनि कारणानि दोषदूषितानि वा। नाद्यः। तेषां समीचीनज्ञानजननसामर्थ्योपलम्भात्। अन्यथा समीचीनं रजतज्ञानं कदाचिदुदयमासादयेत्। न द्वितीयः। दोषाणा-मौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रसवशक्तिप्रतिबन्धमात्रप्रभावत्वात्। न हि दुष्टं कुटजबीजं वटाङ्कुरं जनयितुमीष्टे। न वा तैलकलुषितं शालिबीजमशाल्याङ्कुरजननायालम्। किन्तु स्वकार्यं न करोति। ननु दावदहनदग्धस्य वेत्रबीजस्य कदलीकाण्डजनकत्वं दृष्टमिति चेत् - तन्न स्थाने। दग्दस्यावेत्रबीजत्वेन दोषाणां विपरीतकार्यकारित्वं प्रत्यनुदाहरणात्।

न च भस्मकदोषदूषितस्य कौक्षेयकस्याशुशुक्षणेर्बह्वन्नपचनसामर्थ्यं दृष्टमित्येष्टव्यम्। अशितपीताद्याहारपरिणतौ जाठरस्य जातवेदसः शक्तत्वात्। तदुक्तम् -

अयथार्थस्य बोधस्य नोत्पत्तावस्ति कारणम्।
दोषाश्चेन्न हि दोषाणां कार्यशक्ति विघातता।।
भस्मकादिषु कार्यस्य विघातादेव दोषता।
अग्नोर्हि रसनिष्पत्तिः कार्यं जठरवर्तिनः।।

(प्रक प 4 73 - 74) इति।

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"Futher, there is no causal factor for the birth of false knowledge. Are the senses themselves the cause ? or are the defective senses the cause ? The first alternative is not tenable, because the senses are found to have the power to create the knowledge of real silver. If it were not so, the knowledge of real silver would never arise. In the same way, the second alternative is also not tenable, because the defects have only the power to prevent the natural capacity of bringing out an effect. The defective Kuṭaja seed cannot give rise to the sprout of a banyan tree. Or the paddy seed which is polluted by oil cannot give rise to a non-paddy sprout. But it cannot produce its own effect. It may be objected that the cane seed which is burnt in sylvan fire, is found to give rise to plaintain stem. Here the answer is that it is not correct, because the burnt one cannot be the cane seed and hence it cannot be taken as analogy to illustrate that the defective ones will give rise to the opposite effects.

"It should not also be assumed that the gastric fire which is caught with Bhasmaka disease, is found to have the power of digesting large quantity of food. The gastric fire has the special capacity of digesting whatever that is eaten and drunk. It is said -

"There is no cause for the birth of invalid knowledge. The defects cannot be spoken as the cause, because they can only obstruct the effect.

"The Bhasmaka is called a defect because it obstructs the effect. It is natural for the gastric fire to give rise to juices."

In order to show that there is no cause for erroneous knowledge, two questions are raised by the Prābhākaras. They are : 1) Are the senses themselves the cause ? 2) Are the defective senses the cause ? The first question cannot stand because the senses are found to give rise to valid knowledge. If this is not accepted, then valid knowledge cannot be born anytime. The second question, too, is not tenable, because the

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defects can only obstruct the natural power to give rise to its effect, but cannot give rise to any other effect. The defective Kuṭaja seed obstructs the germination of Kuṭaja plant, but cannot give rise to the sprout of a banyan tree. Similarly is the analogy of defective paddy seed. The same idea is brought out in stanzas quoted from Śālikanātha's Prakaraṇa Pāñcikā.

## No knowledge without an object :

4 3 अपि चासत्यप्यर्थे ज्ञानप्रादुर्भावाभ्युपगमे समीचीनस्थलेऽपि ज्ञानानां स्वगोचरव्यभिचारशङ्काङ्कुरसंभवेन निरङ्कुशो व्यवहारो लुप्यते। तदाह -

**यदि चार्थं परित्यज्य काचिद्बुद्धिः प्रकाशते।**

**व्यभिचारवति स्वार्थे कथं विश्वासकारणम्।।**

(प्रक प 4 66) इति।

"If the birth of knowledge is accepted even when a object is absent, there can arise a suspicion even in the case of valid knowledge that it might have arisen in the absence of an object and thus all clear activities would stop. Hence, it is said -

"If any knowledge can arise without reference to an object, the knowledge itself becomes doubtful. How can all knowledge become trustworthy ?"

If the knowledge of silver is accepted as occuring even in the absence of silver, then since the knowledge arises without an object, it is not bound by a rule that it should have an object. Even when a trustworthy person says that there is silver, there is a possibility of a suspicion that such a knowledge might have arisen without silver. The result is that the person might not have the inclination to go and pick it up. Thus every activity would be subjected to suspicion and would be dropped. This is implied by the stanza ending with the question - "कथं विश्वासकारणम्" - "How can anything be trustworthy ?"

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## Error : A combination of perception and memory :

4 4 ननु रजतगोचरैकविशिष्टज्ञानानङ्गीकारे विशिष्टव्यवहारो न सिद्ध्येत्। अतस्तत्सिद्धयेऽपि विपर्ययोऽङ्गीकार्य इति चेन्न। "इदं रजतम्" इति ग्रहण-स्मरणाभिधस्य बोधद्वयस्य व्यवहारकारणत्वाङ्गीकारात्। यद्येवमिदं शुक्तिकाशकलं तद्रजतमित्यतोऽपि विशिष्टव्यवहारः स्यादिति। तन्न। तत्रेदमिति पुरोवर्तिद्रव्य-मात्रग्रहणस्य दोषदूषितचक्षुर्जन्यत्वेनानाकलितशुक्तित्वादिविशेषितस्य। सामान्यमात्रग्रहणरूपत्वाद् रजतमिति ज्ञानस्यासन्निहितविषयस्य संप्रयोगलिङ्गाद्य-प्रसूततया सदृशावबोधितसंस्कारमात्रप्रभवत्वेन परिशेषप्राप्तस्मृतिभावस्य दोषहेतुकतया गृहीततत्तांशप्रमोषाद् ग्रहणमात्रत्वोपपत्तेः। तदप्युक्तम् -

नन्वत्र रजताभासः कथमेष घटिष्यते।
उच्यते शुक्तिशकलं गृहीतं भेदवर्जितम्।।
शुक्तिकाया विशेषा ये रजताद्भेदहेतवः।
ते न ज्ञाता अभिभवाज्ञाता सामान्यरूपता।।
अनन्तरं च रजतस्मृतिर्जाता तयापि च।
मनोदोषात्तदित्यंशपरामर्शविवर्जितम्।।
रजतं विषयीकृत्य नैव शुक्तेर्विवेचितम्।
स्मृत्यातो रजताभास उपपन्नो भविष्यति।।

(प्रक प 4 26 - 29)

न ह्यसंनिहितं तावत्प्रत्यक्षं रजतं भवेत्।
लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्चान्यस्य प्रमाणस्य न गोचरः।।
परिशेषात्स्मृतिरिति निश्चयो जायते पुनः।।

(प्रक प 4 31 - 32) इति।

"It may be objected that if you do not accept a special type of cognition (Pratyakṣa) in the case of silver, then the special usage that 'this is silver' cannot arise. Hence, in order to

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establish such a special usage, it is necessary to accept false knowledge (Viparyaya). This contention is not acceptable. For the establishment of the usage in the form of 'this is silver', a double cognition in the form of perception and memory is accepted as the ground. It may be again objected that in that case even the saying like 'this is a piece of shell and that is silver' would be a special usage. This is not tenable. Here in the sentence 'this is silver', the term 'this' refers to the grasping (i.e., perception) of only the object in front. Since it is perceived by the defective eyes, the particulars in the object such as 'shell-ness', etc., are not grasped. Hence the perception is of the object in general. In the case of the knowledge of 'silver', there is no relation between the sense (eyes) and the object silver. Hence that knowledge does not arise through perception (Saṁyoga-Sannikarṣa), inference (Liṅga), etc. It is only born of the impression of the knowledge of similarity. Hence, what remains is the consideration that it is memory. Due to a defect, that memory loses its aspect of 'remembrance' (Smṛti). Thus it is in the form of general cognition only. This is also said -

"If it is asked as to how the knowledge of silver arises without silver, the answer is that the piece of shell is grasped without distinction from silver.

"The special features of the shell, which distinguish the shell from silver, are lost sight off. Hence the shell is grasped in general as an object.

"Then the memory of silver arises. Since there is a defect of mind, the fact that it is a memory is not grasped.

"Hence the knowledge that this silver is different from the shell does not arise. Thus the appearance of silver is compatible as the memory of silver.

"The silver is not in front. Hence it is not perception. Since

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there are no factors like probans etc., it is not a case of Inference or any other Pramāṇa. Finally by what remains, it is decided that it is a case of memory."

'Viparyaya' means 'Mithyājñāna', false knowledge. There is one special knowledge about silver and it is perceptive knowledge. It is on the basis of it that the special usage is 'this is silver' arises. If the said false knowledge is not accepted, that usage cannot be established. This contention of the Siddhāntin is not accepted. It is argued that actually there are two cognitions, as accepted by all. Here it is not a case of the knowledge of shell as shell which leads to the memory of silver and further to the special usage as 'this is silver'. It is a case of two cognitions. The first one is the perceptual cognition (grahaṇa) of the object in front as subject in general without the knowledge of shellness, etc. The second one is the memory of silver (Smaraṇa) on the similarity of the object in front. Again it may be argued that even when double-cognition is accepted, it is possible to have the special usage as 'this is a piece of shell and that is silver'. This contention is also rejected. The nature of the double-cognition is shown like this : "तत्रेदमिति इत्यादि।"

'This' refers to the object in front. Due to the defect of eyes the special features of the shell such as shellness etc., are not grasped. 'Silver' refers to the memory of silver created by the similarity of the object in front. Due to the defect of mind it is not noticed that it is memory. This is known as 'Smṛtipramoṣadoṣa'. 'This' stands for the object of perception (grahaṇa) in general and 'silver' stands for the object of memory (Smaraṇa). Due to the non-apprehension of the difference between perception and memory, that constitutes the error. It is a case of 'Akhyāti' or 'bhedāgraha'. These points are summarised in the stanzas.

Here the advocate of Akhyātivāda anticipates another objection and answers it. The objection is that two cognitions

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cannot exist together. The answer is that two cognitions can remain together.

## Two cognitions can co-exist :

4.5. ननु किमिदमेकैकं व्यवहारकारणमुत संभूय। न प्रथमः। देशभेदेन प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। न चरमः। "प्रयत्नायौगपद्याज्ज्ञानायौगपद्यात्" (वै.सू.3.2.3.) इत्यादिना ज्ञानयौगपद्यनिषेधात्। अतो ज्ञानद्वयं हेतुरित्ययुक्तं वच इति चेत् - मैवं वोचः। अविनश्यतोः सहावस्थानस्यानिषिद्धत्वेन निरन्तरोत्पन्नयोस्तदुपपत्तेः। ननु रजताज्ञानाद् रजतार्थी रजते प्रवर्तनां नाम। पौरस्त्ये वस्तुनि कथं प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिति चेन्न। स्वरूपतो विषयतश्चागृहीतभेदयोर्ग्रहणस्मरणयोः संनिहितरजत-गोचरज्ञानसारूप्येण वस्तुतः परस्परं विभिन्नयोरप्यभेदोचितसामानाधिकरण्य-व्यपदेशहेतुत्वोपपत्तेः।

"It may be asked as whether the two cognitions (grahaṇa and smaraṇa) are separately the cause of that usage (as 'this is silver') or together the casue. Then the first alternative cannot be tenable, because in that case the inclination to pick up would be possible even when they are in different places. The second alternative is also not tenable. According to the Vai. Sūtra. (3.2.3) which says that "there is no simultaneity of knowledge is prohibited. Hence, it is not proper to say that two cognitions are together the cause here. If it is contended as above, the answer is not to say so. Although the togetherness of two cognitions which do not get eradicated is prohibited, there is no prohibition regarding the togetherness of two cognitions of which one is prone to eradication and the other is not so. Hence, it is possible that two cognitions which arise without a break, can stay together.

"It may be again objected : Let the aspirant for silver proceed towards silver. But how can he have inclination towards the object in front ? If it is objected as above, the answer is that it is not tenable. There is no knowledge of difference between

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perception and memory on the basis of either form or content. Hence, both the cognitions are similar to the knowledge of silver about the silver in front.

In fact the two cognitions are mutually different. Yet the consideration of common case-relation ( as 'idam rajatam') which is apt for establishing non-difference, should be regarded as the cause (for the usage 'this is silver'):"

An objection is raised from the standpoint of Advaitins. As regards the stand of the Prābhākaras that 'this is silver' is a case of double-cognition (grahaṇaa and smaraṇa), the Advaitins ask as to whether the two cognitions are separately the cause of the usage 'this is silver' or both put together constitute the cause. It cannot be said that the two cognitions are separately the cause of the usage, because in that case the inclination to pick up silver would arise even when it is known that the objects are in different places. Even when it is known that it is shell here in front, there may arise the memory of silver at home. Here also there are the sight of the shell and the memory of silver occuring separately. Hence, as in the case of error (bhrama), there should be inclination towards the shell with a view to getting silver. But this is opposed to experience. Hence, it is not proper to say that the two cognitions are separately the cause for the usage 'this is silver'.

It cannot be also said that both the cognitions are together the cause of such a usage. According to Kaṇāda, the author of Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, two cognitions cannot arise simultaneously because the efforts are not simultaneous. The Sūtra concerned is - "प्रत्यत्नायौगपद्याज्ज्ञानायौगपद्याच्चैकम्।" This Sūtra prescribes that there should be one mind for one body. If there are many minds in one body, there should be many efforts and many cognitions simultaneously. Two different limbs would make mutually opposite efforts. Two cognitions would arise through

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two different senses. Since such things are not found, it is ascertained that one body has one mind only. Hence, two cognitions being not possible together, they cannot be the cause of the usage here.

The Prābhākaras reject this contention by saying that the simultaneity of two cognitions is not prohibited when they arise without a break. What is meant here is this : According to the logicians (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas), any knowledge is of two moments (Kṣaṇas). The knowledge that arises in the first moment vanishes in the third moment. When one knowledge arises in the first moment and another knowledge in the third moment, they cannot be said to be 'nirantara' (without a break). But when one knowledge arises in the first moment and the second knowledge in the second moment, they are said to be 'nirantara'. Thus according to the Vaiśeṣikas only, two cognitions can arise in two consecutive moments. Hence, there is no prohibition for the simultaneity of two cognitions. That being the case, both the cognitions can be the cause for the usage 'this is silver'.

Another objection that is raised by the Vedāntins is : An aspirant of silver may proceed towards silver. But the question is as to how a person can have inclination towards the object in front ? If the person is prompted by the memory of silver, he can proceed towards his home where he remembers to have kept the silver in a box, but not towards the object in front of him here. This objection is answered by the Prābhākaras by saying that the two cognitions have similarity in leading to the knowledge of silver through the common case - relation between 'this' and 'silver' ('idam' and 'rajatam') leading the idea of non-difference between the object in front and the object of memory.

But the question is as to how the similarity of the knowledge of silver of this illusory situation can be found with

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the knowledge of silver of a situation where the real silver exists. This question is anticipated and answered here :

## An Analysis of Grahaṇa and Smaraṇa in Bhrama :

4.6. ग्रहणस्मरणयोः संनिहितरजतज्ञानसारूप्यं कथम्। यथा चैतत्तथा निशम्यताम्। संनिहितरजतगोचरं हि विज्ञानमिदमंशरजतांशयोरसंसर्गं नावगाहते। तयोः संसृष्टत्वेनासंसर्गस्यैवाभावात्। नापि स्वगतं भेदम्। एकज्ञानत्वात्। एवं ग्रहणस्मरणे अपि दोषवशाद्विद्यमानमपि इदमंशरजतांशयो-रसंसर्गं भेदं नावगाहत इति। भेदग्रहणमेव सारूप्यम्। तदुक्तं गुरुमतानुसारिभिः -

**ग्रहणस्मरणे चेमे विवेकानवभासिनी।**

**सम्यग्रजतबोधाच्च भिन्ने यद्यपि तत्त्वतः।।**

**तथापि भिन्ने नाभाते भेदाग्रहसमत्वतः।**

**सम्यग्रजतबोधस्तु समक्षैकार्थगोचरः।।**

**ततो भिन्ने अबुद्ध्वा च ग्रहणस्मरणे इमे।**

**समानेनैव रूपेण केवलं मन्यते जनः।।**

**अपरोक्षावभासेन समानार्थग्रहेण च।**

**अवैलक्षण्यसंवितिरिति तावत्समर्थिता।।**

**व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तुल्यस्तत एव प्रवर्तते। - इति**

(प्रक.प.4.33-36)

एवमगृहीतविवेकमापन्नसंनिहितरूप्यज्ञानसारूप्यं ग्रहणस्मरणद्वयम् अयथाव्यवहारहेतुरिति सिद्धम्।।

"It may asked here as to how can the illusory knowledge consisting of perception and memory be similar to the knowledge of silver where there is real silver. The answer is given here : Listen to the account as to how it is similar. The

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knowledge of silver which arises as regards real silver as 'this is silver' cannot grasp the absence of relation between 'this-element' and 'silver-element'. Those two elements are conjoined. Hence, the absence of relation is itself absent. There is no difference mutually either, because it itself absent. It is one knowledge only. Similarly in the case of perception and memory as in 'this is silver', the difference in the form of absence of relation between 'this-element' and 'silver-element', although existing, does not appear. The 'absence of grasping the difference' is the similarity between the two. It has been said by the followers of Guru (Prabhākara) :

"Between perception and memory the difference is not revealed. They are essentially different from the knowledge of real silver.

"Still they do not appear as different, because in both types of knowledge there is no capacity to grasp the difference. The knowledge of real silver is actually pertaining to one object (i.e., silver) only.

"These two, viz., perception and memory, are not grasped as different and are grasped generally as of one form by people.

"Since the error is clearly revealed to the eyes and since the matter is grasped in a similar manner, there is no revelation of difference between them. This has been established. The usage is similar to that (of real silver). Similar is the inclinatin.

"Thus the double-knowledge of perception and memory in which the mutual difference cannot be known and which is similar to the knowledge of real silver, is proved to be the cause of the usage in error as 'this is silver".

The objection raised by the Advaitins is this : You say that the erroneous knowledge as 'this is silver' is a case of the combination of perception and memory. Then both the types of

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knowledge, i.e., the knowledge of silver with reference to real silver and the knowledge of silver arising from the sight of the shell due to error, appear similar during the experience. How is it possible ? Here the answer given by the Prābhākaras is stated below :-

In the valid knowledge that 'this is silver' in the case of real silver, both the 'this-element' and the 'silver-element' are found. Here 'silver' is the object of knowledge while 'this' is not so. Hence, there is no relation between the two. This is technically known as ''असंसर्गग्रह''; 'graha' means 'knowledge'. When there is no relation between two objects, it can be said that there is 'asaṁsargagraha'. When the real silver is seen, the knowledge that comes is 'this is silver'. In this knowledge, there is no 'asaṁsargagraha' between 'this-element' and 'silver-element'. It means that there is 'asaṁsarga agraha'. The 'asaṁsarga agraha' is common to the knowledge of silver on seeing the shell. But the difference between them is this much : In the knowledge of silver as 'this is silver' when there is real silver, there is no 'asaṁsarga' at all, because it is one knowledge only. But in the knowledge that 'this is silver' on seeing the shell, there is 'asaṁsarga', but it is not known due to the defective situation. Thus 'asaṁsarga agraha' or 'Bhāda-Agraha' is common to both types of knowledge. This is summarised in the stanzas quoted from Prakarnapāncika.

Another objection is anticipated and answered by the Prābhākaras thus :

## The illusion that the conch-shell is yellow :

4.6. यद्येवम् अयथाव्यवहारो ग्रहणस्मरणजन्यस्तर्हि पीतः शङ्ख इत्यादौ स न सिद्धस्तत्र तयोरभावादिति चेन्न। अगृहीतविवेकयोः प्राप्तसमीचीनसंसर्गज्ञान-सारूप्यत्वे ग्रहणयोरेव व्यवहारसंपादकत्वोपपत्तेः। नयनरश्मिवर्तिनः पित्तद्रव्यस्य

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पीतिमा दोषवशाद् द्रव्यरहितो गृह्यते। शङ्खोऽप्यकलितशुक्लगुणः स्वरूपतो गृह्यते। तदनयोर्गुणगुणिनोः संसर्गयोग्ययोरसंसर्गाग्रहसारूप्यात् पीततपनीयपिण्ड-प्रत्ययावैलक्षण्याद् व्यवहार उपपद्यते। यथोक्तम् -

पीतशङ्खावबोधे हि पित्तस्येन्द्रियवर्तिनः।

पीतिमा गृह्यते द्रव्यरहितो दोषतस्तथा।

शङ्खास्येन्द्रियदोषेण शुक्लिमा न च गृह्यते।

केवलं द्रव्यमात्रं तु प्रथते रूपवर्जितम्।।

गुणे द्रव्यव्यपेक्षे च द्रव्ये च गुणकाङ्क्षिणि।

भासमाने तयोर्बुद्धिरसंबन्धं न बुध्यते।।

सत्यपीतावभासेन समे भाते मती इमे।

व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तुल्य एवमत्रापि युज्यते।।

"If the illusory usage is born from perception and memory, it is not found in such instances as 'the conch-shell is yellow', because they are not there. This objection is not relevant. When the difference between the two, viz., perception and memory, is not clear, both look like those with a real relation and the usage looks tenable through two perceptions (in 'the conch-shell is yellow'). The yellowness of the bile element in the rays of the eyes is grasped as without the object due to the defect of the eyes. The conch-shell, too, is graspd in its form without its whiteness. Although there is similarity as reagards the non-grasping of the absence of relation (Saṁsarga agraha) between these two, viz., the quality and the qualified (Guṇa and Guṇin), which are fit to be related, yet due to similarity with the yellow-coloured gold, the usage as 'the conch-shell is yellow' becomes compatible. So it is said -

"In the knowledge of the conch-shells as yellow, the yellowness of the bile residing in the eyes is grasped without the object due to the defect in the eyes.

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"In the case of the conch-shell, due to the defect in the eyes, the whiteness alone is grasped; the mere object in general appears without the specific form.

"The quality requires an object and the object, too, requires the quality residing in it. When they are found in this relation, the mind cannot grasp the relation between them.

"Both the experiences appear similar to the experience of real yellow colour. Then the usage of both the types of experience is similar".

When it is said according to the Prābhākaras that error is always of the nature of combination of perception and memory, it is possible to raise an objection by referring to an instance like "the conch-shell is yellow" which is also an error. In the case of the usage "the conch-shell is yellow", there is perception in both cases, but there is no memory. Here the answer is that although there is no combination of perception and memory in the case of the conch-shell and the yellowness, there is the combination of two perceptions. The grasping of yellow colour is one perception and that of conch-shell is the second perception. In this combination of perceptions, the natural relation of the quality and the qualified which exists between them, is not grasped due to the defect in the eyes (bile element). Here the yellowness of the bile element is alone grasped without the object (bile element). In the case of the conch-shell, the object in general is grasped without its particular form. Hence these two experiences appear similar to the experience of a real yellow - object like gold. 'asaṁsarga agraha' is common to both "पीतः शङ्खः" and 'पीतः तपनीय (सुवर्ण) पिण्डः।' These points are nicely summarised in the four stanzas quoted from the Prakaraṇa Pāñcikā.

Another objection from the standpoint of Advaitins is met by the Prābhākaras here :

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## 'This is not silver' - Explanation of Prohibition here :

4.7. नन्विदं रजतमिति भ्रान्तिज्ञानाभ्युपगमे रजतप्रसक्तेरसत्त्वान्नेदं रजतमिति निषेधः कथं कलधौताभावं बोधयतीति चेत् नैष दोषः। भेदग्रहप्रसज्जितस्य शुक्तौ रजतव्यवहारस्य निषेधस्वीकारेण कल्पनालाघवसद्भावात्। तदुक्तं पञ्चिकाप्रकरणे -

मिथ्यावादोऽपि तत्तुल्यव्यवहारप्रवर्तनात्।

रजतव्यवहारांशो विसंवादयतो नरात्।।

बाधकप्रत्ययस्यापि बाधकत्वमतो मतम्।

प्रसज्यमानरजतव्यवहारनिवारणात्।।

(प्रक.प.4.38-...) इति।

तदनेन प्राचीनयोर्ज्ञानयोः सत्यत्वे कथं भ्रमत्वसिद्धिरिति शङ्का पराकृता। अयथाव्यवहारप्रवर्तकत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः।

"It may be objected that if you do not accept erroneous knowledge like 'this is silver', how can the knowledge of prohibition of silver like 'this is not silver' convey the absence of silver because there is no silver at all there. The answer is that it is not a fault. There is brevity of thought (Kalpanālāghava) in accepting the denial of the usage that 'this is silver' in the case of the shell consequent on the non-grasping of the difference from it. It has been said in Prakaraṇa Pāñcikā -

"The idea of error (Mithyā-Bhāva or Mithyātva) consists in the usage (with reference to the shell) as being prompted by the usage similar to that (with reference to silver) by a person who is doubtful regarding the aspect of using the word 'silver'.

"The annulling factor in the knowledge of annulment (as 'this is not silver') is also meant for removing the erroneous usage (as this is silver) which is presented.

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"Hence, there is no scope for the doubt as to how the error occurs when both the earlier cognitions are true. That double-knowledge is compatible as bringing out the erroneous usage."

The objection here is this : This is a situation where the silver does not exist at all. What exists here is only the shell. Hence, the knowledge that 'this is silver' is only erroneous knowledge. If this is not accepted, where is the scope for denying that 'this is not silver' ? The rule is that there must be something accepted before it is denied or prohibited - "निषेधस्य प्राप्तिपूर्वकत्वात्". Unless the knowledge that 'this is silver' with reference to the shell in the absence of silver is not accepted as erroneous knowledge, how can you say that the statement of denial that 'this is not silver' reveals the absence of silver ?

At this point the Prabhākaras say that this is not a fault. The usage that 'this is silver' is made with regard to the shell due to the non-grasping of difference. The denial of it that 'this is not silver' is enough to deny that usage of silver with reference to the shell. The purpose of denial that 'this is not silver' is to reveal the absence of relation between 'this-element' and 'silver-element'. Once this is known, the erroneous usage does not continue. Hence due to brevity of thought, it should be accepted that the denial of silverness with reference to the shell itself results in the denial of the usage of silver here. The knowledge of denial that 'this is not silver' is the denial of the usage that 'this is silver'. There is no necessity of accepting the knowledge that 'this is silver' as 'erroneous knowledge'. According to the Prabhākaras all knowledge is valid. Error is only partial truth. Error is only non-apprehension of difference between two cognitions (Bheda-Agraha or Asaṁsargagraha).

These points are briefly made in the two stanzas quoted from Prakaraṇa Pañcikā. 'Mithyā-Bhāva' means 'Mithyātva', the

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state of being false. It is 'bhrama' or error. The knowledge represented by 'this' (idam) is true. The error lies in the form of what is memory. Although it brings out a usage which is similar to that born of right experience, yet it creates doubt at the time of practical usage, because the inclination born of it is vain. Even those who consider this as one erroneous knowledge and who accept falsity of that knowledge only on the basis of an annulling factor (i.e., absence of silver) cannot speak of the 'this-element' as false, because there is no annulling factor (Bādhaka) with regard to it. Even at the stage of the knowledge of annulment, the 'this-element' continues. The 'this-element' is not sublated because when the error is known, the person says 'this is shell'. It is only the 'memory-element' (i.e., silver) that is sublated.

Further the Prabhākaras maintain that Abhāva (negation) is not a separate category against the objection that there cannot be an experience of the absence of a thing without accepting Abhāva as a category :

## Abhāva is not a separate category :

4 7 किञ्च नेदं रजतमिति बाधकावबोधो नाभावमवगाहते। भावव्यतिरेकेणाभावस्य दुर्ग्रहणत्वात्। यद्येवमङ्ग नास्तीति प्रत्ययस्य किमालम्बनम् ? अपरथा माहाभानिकपक्षानुप्रवेश इति चेत् - मैवं भाषिष्ठाः। अभावस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीननिरूप्यत्वे अवश्याभ्युपगमनीये दृश्ये प्रतियोगिन्यदृश्ये वा स्मर्यमाणेऽधिकरणमात्रबुद्धेरेव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तावतिरिक्ताभाव-कल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्। तदुक्तममृतकलायाम् -

अत्रोच्यते द्वयी संविद् वस्तुनो भूतलादिनः।

एका संसृष्टविषया तन्मात्रविषया परा।।

तन्मात्रविषया वाऽपि द्वयी साऽथ निगद्यते।

प्रतियोगिन्यदृश्ये च दृश्ये च प्रतियोगिनि।।

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तत्र तन्मात्रधीर्येयं स्मृते च प्रतियोगिनि।

नास्तित्वं सैव भूभागे घटादिप्रतियोगिनः।।

(प्रक प 6 36 - 37) इति।

अत एव च प्राभाकरमतानुसारिभिः प्रमाणपारायणे प्रत्यक्षादीनि पञ्चैव प्रमाणानि प्रपञ्चितानि।

"Further, the knowledge of annulment that 'this is not silver' does not take 'Abhāva' (negation, as a category) into account. It is difficult to grasp negation as an object apart from what is positive (Bhāva). Here it may be asked thus (from the stand-point of Advaitins) : In that case, O gentlemen, what is the basis for the knowledge in the form of 'no' ? Otherwise, you will have to join the fold of Mādhyamika philosophers. This objection is answered by asking not to say so. It should be necessarily admitted that the knowledge of Abhāva depends upon the knowledge of the location (dharmin) and the object of reference (pratiyogin). Whether that object is visible or invisible, it is only remembered; then the usage in the form of 'not' is compatible with the observation of the location itself. Hence, there is no authority for assuming a separate category called Abhāva. It has been said in the Amṛtakalā -

"In the Prabhākara system, two types of knowledge are accepted in case of the surface of the earth, etc. One of them is pertaining to association (Saṃsṛṣṭi) and the other one pertaining to merely the surface of the earth, etc.

"Again the knowledge pertaining to merely the surface of the earth, etc., is two fold as that pertaining to the concerned object being invisible and that pertaining to the object being visible.

"Between these two, that knowledge which pertains to merely the surface of the earth, etc., is born from the memory of

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the concerned object (pratiyogin) only. That knowledge is itself regarded as the Abhāva of the concerned objects such as the pot.

"Hence, the followers of Prabhākara school have explained five Pramāṇas, perception, etc., in their consideration of Pramāṇas."

The Prābhākaras do not accept Abhāva as a separate category. Still they admit the knowledge of annulment as 'this is not silver'. They say that it is difficult to grasp 'Abhāva' apart from 'Bhāva' objects. Here the natural question is as to how do they get the knowledge of 'Abhāva' (something as 'not') without accepting Abhāva as a category. If the experience of absence is accepted with the category called Abhāva, they are falling in line with the Mādhyamika philosophers (Śunyavādins) who do not accept Abhāva as a category.

The Prābhākaras maintain their view that Abhāva is not a separate category. In 'भूतले घटो नास्ति', the knowledge of the absence of 'Ghaṭa' (pot) occurs only when the 'Bhūtala' (surface of the earth) as the qualified location (dharmin) and the 'Ghaṭa' as the concerned object (pratiyogin) are known. Hence 'Abhāva' is accepted as the property (Dharmaviśēṣa) of a location and that is not different from the form of the 'Bhūtala' itself. If the 'pratiyogin' in the form of 'Ghaṭa' were there, it could have been perceived. The absence of 'Ghaṭa' means the 'Bhūtala' only. Since 'Abhāva' is only a form of a 'location' (Adhikaraṇa), there is no necessity of accepting Abhāva as a separate category.

These points are covered in the three stanzas quoted from the chapter of Prakaraṇa Pañcikā called Amṛtakalā. Here 'saṃvit' means knowledge 'Saṃsṛṣṭi' means association as in "घटवद् भूतलम्।" 'Bhūtalamātram' means the surface of the earth without any association. The second one is agian two-fold as

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the 'Bhūtala' with the invisibility of the objects like 'Ghaṭa' and that with the visibility of such objects. The former has the memory of the objects such as 'Ghaṭa'. The form of such a 'Bhūtala' is itself 'Abhāva'.

The Prabhākaras accept only five Pramāṇas as Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda and Arthāpatti. Kaumārila Mīmāmsakas accept Anupalabdhi as the sixth Pramāṇa for grasping Abhāva.

Then the Prabhākaras anticipate a question regarding the meaning of 'Na-Kāra' and answer it :

## The meaning of 'Nakāra' :

4.9. नन्वेवमभावस्याभावे नकारस्य वैयर्थ्यमापद्येत। अनुशासनविरोधश्चापतेदिति चेत् - तदेतद्वार्तम्। एकोनपञ्चाशद्वर्णानां मध्ये कस्यापि वर्णस्याभावार्थत्वादर्शनिन वर्णस्य सतो नकारस्य तदर्थत्वानुपपत्तेः। न चैवमनुशासनविरोधः। तदन्यतद-भावतद्विरुद्धेष्वर्थेष्वनुशासनस्यैवमर्थः स्यात्। तथा हि - चेतनानां मध्ये कश्चन कस्यचिच्छत्रुः कश्चन कस्यचिन्मित्रं कश्चन कस्यचिदुदासीनस्तथैवाचेतनानामपि। तदन्यपदेन तदुदासीनो नकारार्थः। विरुद्धपदेन शत्रुर्नकारार्थः। तदभावपदेन मित्रं नकारार्थः। तथा चाब्राह्मणपद एवैतत्त्रयं प्रतीयते शूद्र इत्युदासीनो यवन इति शत्रुः क्षत्रिय इति मित्रम्। एवं सर्वत्र नञ्प्रयोगस्थले द्रष्टव्यमिति न कश्चिद-भावो भावव्यतिरिक्तः संभवति। तस्मादुक्तया रीत्या भ्रमप्रसिद्धया विवादाध्यासिताः प्रत्यया यथार्थाः प्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति सिद्धम्।

"It may be objected that if Abhāva is absent, 'Nakāra' would be in vain and it would amount to opposition to the saying of the Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana (Lexicon). This objection is set aside as without substance. When none of the syllables among the forty-nine syllables is denotative of 'negation' (Abhāva), it cannot be said that 'Na' gives that meaning. Nor there is opposition to the Lexicon, because according to the Lexicon its meaning is one of these, viz., other than that, not that and opposed to that. It is like this - Among the living beings one is an enemy of some one,

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another is a friend of some other person or some one else is neutral to somebody else. So is the case with non-living objects. By the word 'tadanya' (other than that) the meaning of 'Nakāra' should be taken as neutral. By the word 'viruddha' (opposed to that), the meaning of 'Nakāra' should be regarded as the enemy. By the word 'Tadabhāva', the meaning of 'Nakāra' should be deemed as the friend.

"Thus in the word 'Abrāhmaṇa' (non-Brahmin), these three meanings (of 'na') are conveyed - neutral as regards a Śūdra, enemy as regards a Yavana and friend as regards a Kṣatriya. It should be assumed like this in all instances of 'Nañ'. Hence, there is no category called Abhāva apart from Bhāva (positive) objects. Thus the error occurs as told earlier. The knowledge of error under discussion is valid knowledge (Pratijñā-Proposition), because it is knowledge (Hetu-statement of Probans), like the knowledge that he is possessing a staff (Daṇḍin) - (udāharaṇa - statement of analogy). This is established.

The objection here is that 'Nakāra' would be without any purpose if Abhāva (negation) is not accepted as a category. If you react by saying as to what if it does not have any meaning, it cannot stand because you will be going against the saying of Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana which prescribes the meaning of negation for 'Na' - अभावे नह्यनो नापि। The answer is that it cannot be urged that 'Na' alone gives the meaning of negation when none of the syllables among the forty-nine syllables of the alphabet gives the meaning of negation. Nakāra is like Kakāra, Gakāra, etc., it has no other meaning.

Further, this doest not amount to opposition to the Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana. 'Na' gives six meanings as noted here -

तत्सादृश्यमभावश्च तदन्यत्वं तदल्पता।

अप्राशस्त्यं विरोधश्च नञर्थाः षट् प्रकीर्तिताः।।

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Similarity, absence, another, less, not auspicious and opposition - these are the six meanings of 'Na'. Among these six, the meanings of similarity, less, not auspicious are not of the nature of negation. The other three viz., Tadabhāva (not that), 'Tadanya' (other than that) and virodha (opposed to that) are on the side of negation. These are here explained with an analogy. 'Tadanya' means 'neutrality', 'virodha' means 'enmity' and 'Tadabhāva' means 'friendship' (other than enmity). The word 'Abrāhmaṇa' means other than a Brahman, i.e., one who is neutral. It is a Śūdra. When it means 'opposed to Brāhmaṇa', it refers to the enemy like a Yavana. When it means 'not one opposed to Brāhmaṇa', it refers to a friend like a Kṣatriya. Hence, 'Na' does not give the meaning of 'Abhāva' and there is no necessity of accepting Abhāva as a separate category. Then the following inference proving that the knowledge of error is also valid knowledge, stands :

प्रतिज्ञा - भ्रमप्रसिद्धया विवादाध्यासिता प्रत्ययाः यथार्थाः।

हेतुः - प्रत्ययत्वात्।

उदाहरणम् - दण्डीति प्रत्ययवत्।

## 5.0 Revision Points and Summary

5.1 The purpose of Vedānta is to remove 'Adhyāsa'. The Ārambhavāda of the Naiyāyikas is refuted on the ground that SaṃyRga is not possible in the case of partless atoms. The Prakṛtipariṇāmavāda of the Sāṅkhyās is rejected on the ground that Prakṛti is insentient. Hence, the Advaitins accept Vivartavāda (world as appearance). The appearance or Avabhāsa is technically called Adhyāsa.

5.2 Adhyāsa is two-fold as Arthādhyāsa and Jñānādhyāsa. The appearance of one thing as another (for instance, the shell as

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silver) is Arthādhyāsa. Jñānādhyāsa cosists in the superimposition of false knowledge on the Ātman. From another point of view Adhyāsa is twofold as Nirupādhika and Sopādhika. When the sky which has no clour is deemed as of blue colour, it is a case of Nirupādhikādhyāsa (bhrama). When there is superimpositio of 'ahaṁkāra' on the Ātman, it is Nirupādhikādhyāsa. When crystal stone appears red due to the presence of hibiscus flow, it is a case of Sopādhikādhyāsa. When in the same Brahman, the notion of difference as Jīva and Īśvara due to the cover of Avidyā, it is a case of Sopādhikādhyāsa.

5.3 According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, the knowledge that 'this is silver' in the case of the shell, is not an error, but a matter of valid knowledge. Error consists in non-apprehension of the absence of relation between 'this-element' which is a case of perception (Grahaṇa) and 'silver-element' which is a case of memory (Smaraṇa). Hence, it is a case of Akhyāti or Bhedāgraha. The Prābhākara theory of error is called Akhyativāda.

5.4. The argument of the Prābhākaras is that the shell cannot become the object of the knowledge of silver. It cannot be maintained as the object either because it is in front, or because it is the cause or because it appers in the knowledge of sivler.

5.5. If the senses themselves are regarded as the cause of erroneous knowledge, then valid knowledge cannot be born any time. If the defective senses are taken as the cause, then it must be said that they only prevent or obstruct the concerned effect but cannot bring out any other effect. Hence there is no cause for erroneous knowledge.

5.6. Error is not a case of one knowledge, but a case of double-knowledge-Grahaṇa in the case of 'this' and Smaraṇa in the case of silver. In 'Grahaṇa', the shellness is not grasped and in Smaraṇa, the fact that it is a case of memory is not grasped. This is a case

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of Akhyāti or non-apprehension of difference between Grahaṇa and Smaraṇa.

5.7. Raising the question about the cause of the usage that 'this is silver', it is asked as to whether both the cognitions (Grahaṇa and Smaraṇa) are separately the cause or both of them together the cause. The first alternative is not correct, because the inclination to pick up silver would arise even when it is known that the objects are in different places. The second alternative is also not tenable, because two cognitions cannot arise together.

5.8. The Prābhākaras are of the view that two cognitions can arise together and can, therefore, be the cause for the usage 'this is silver'. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśēṣikas, any knowledge can remain for two moments. When two cognitions arise in two moments, at the rate of one at each moment, they are taken as 'nirantara'.

5.9. Another question is as to how a person can have inclination towards the object in front. If he is prompted by memory he can proceed towards home where he remembers to have kept the silver in a box. The Prābhākaras answer this by saying that the two cognitions have similarity in leading to the knowledge of silver through the common case relation (Sāmānādhikaraṇya) between 'this' and 'silver'.

5.10. It may be again asked as to how the knowledge of silver with reference to real silver and the knowledge of silver arising from the sight of the shell, appear similar in experience. The answer given by the Prābhākaras is that in the former case, there is no 'Asaṁsarga' at all between 'this' and 'silver', because there is no difference, while in the latter case, there is no 'Asaṁsarga', because it is not discerned even though it is existent. Thus the element of 'Asaṁsarga' is common to both.

5.11. In the case of an error as in the instance that 'this

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conch-shell is yellow', there is no double-knowledge consisting of grahaṇa and smaraṇa. Is it not an error? The Prābhākaras say that it is an error with the non-discrimination between two Grahaṇas. In the first grahaṇa, there is grasping of yellow colour only and in the second grahaṇa, there is the grasping of conch-shell only. There is 'Asaṁsarga-Agraha' here resulting in an error.

5.12. The Prābhākaras do not accept Abhāva as a separate category. Still they admit the knowledge of annulment (Bhādakajñāna) as 'this is not silver'. It is asked as to how do they get the knowledge of absence without accepting 'Abhāva' as a category. The Prābhākaras argue that in भूतले घटो नास्ति', the knowledge of the absence of 'Ghaṭa' occurs only when the 'Bhūtala' (the dharmin) and the 'Ghaṭa' (the pratiyogin) are known. The absence of 'Ghaṭa' means 'Bhūtala' only. Abhāva is a form of location.

## 6.0 Intext questions

6.1. Write a note on the nature and kinds of Adhyāsa.

6.2. Give an account of Prābhākara's Akhyativāda.

6.3. Write an essay on the main objections raised by the Vedāntins against Prābhākara's Akhyātivāda and formulate the answers given by the Prābhākaras to those objections.

**6.4. Explain the following :**

1. अनिर्वचनीयः प्रपञ्चश्चिद्विवर्त इति सिद्धम्।
2. दृग्दृश्यौ द्वावेव पदार्थाविति वेदान्तिनां सिद्धान्तः।
3. शुक्तिका रजतवदवभासत इति दृष्टान्तो नेष्टः।
4. किञ्च मिथ्याज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सामग्री न समस्ति।

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5. न ह्यसंनिहितं तावत् प्रत्यक्षं रजतं भवेत्।
लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्चान्यस्य प्रमाणस्य न गोचरम्।।
परिशेषात् स्मृतिरिति निश्चयो जायते पुनः।।

6. अतो ज्ञानद्वयं हेतुरित्ययुक्तं वचः।

7. भेदाग्रहणमेव सारूप्यम्।

8. किञ्च नेदं रजतमिति बाधकावबोधो नाभावमवगाहते।

9. न चैवमनुशासनविरोधः।

10. एवं सर्वत्र नञ्प्रयोगस्थले द्रष्टव्यम्।

## 7.0 Assignment

7.1. Study the Adhyāsabhāṣya of Śaṅkara and summarise the points made by Śaṅkara in it.

7.2. Study the Sānkhyakārika on Pariṇāmavāda and contrast it from Vivartavāda.

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# UNIT - 3

## Śāṅkaradarśana :

## Refutation of other theories of error

1. Introduction
2. Objectives
3. Content Exposition : Refutation of Akhyativāda, etc.
4. Refutation of Mādhyamikas Asatkhyāti
5. Refutation of Anyathākhyātivāda
5. Revision points and Summary
7. Intext Questions

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# UNIT - 3

# Śāṅkaradarśana :

# Refutation of other theories of error

## 1. Introduction

After dealing with the concept of Adhyāsa according to the Advaitins and the theory of error called Akhyativāda of the Prabhākaras, it is necessary to present the refutation of the Akhyativāda of Prābhākaras, the Asatkhyāti of Mādhyamikas, the Atmakhyati of Yogācāras and the Anyathākhyāti of Naiyāyikas. Akhyati of the Prabhākaras is explained in the previous unit. The refutation of Akhyativāda is on these lines : It is defective because the failure to distinguish between 'Grahaṇa' and 'memory' cannot lead to an illusion to such an extent as to kneel down to pick up silver. Further, the activity and speech of an intelligent person arises from apprehension but not from mere non-apprehension. The Asatkhyāti of the Mādhyamikas (the Śūnyavādins) is this : The object that is presented in an illusory cognition is totally non-existent object. For instance, the silver in the cognition of 'conch-shell as silver' is apprehended as existent although it is non-existent. This theory is refuted on the ground that the world which is absolutely non-existent and which is devoid of any true essence cannot be the object of existence. The Ātmakhyati of Vijñānavādins (Yogācāras) is on the lines that the object presented in an illusion is completely mental. It is wrongly projected as something external. For, in the 'Śuktirajatanyāya', it is the mental image of silver that manifests as an external object on being superimposed on the shell. It may be asked here - if silver is a form of cognition, how is it established ? Is it by perception ? Is it by inference ? If the first

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alternative is accepted, then it must be either the cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates it. It cannot be the perception of silver because it reveals silver which has 'this' as its substrate but not what is within. In that case, the cognition would be of the form of 'I am silver' because the cogniser is not different from the cognition. Anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas consists in taking one thing as another. For instance in 'Śuktirajatabhrānti', the shell is apprehended as silver. The illusion consists in pursuing silver where it really is not but not where it really is, i.e., in the object shell. The Advaitins argue that the view of perceiving silver elsewhere does not stand to reason because in the illusion, silver is actually presented to the perceiver thereby prompting him to pick up silver. This silver is entirely new creation by Avidyā.

## 2. Objectives

2.1. The refutation of the theories of error according to Prābhākaras, Mādhyamikas, Vijñānavādins and Naiyāyikas, is intended to clear the ground for expounding Anirvacanīyakhyāti, which is the theory of error according to Advaitins.

2.2. Another objective is to propound the Advaita view called 'Sattatraividya' and establish that Avidhya is 'Anirvacanīya'.

## 3. Content Exposition : Refutation of Akhyativāda, etc.

3.2. तदपरे न क्षमन्ते। इह खलु निखिलप्रेक्षावान्समीहिततत्साधनयोरन्यतरप्रवेदने प्रवर्तते। न च रजतमर्थयमानस्य शुक्तिकाशकलज्ञानं तद्रूपमनुभावयितुं। शुक्तिकाशकलस्य समीहिततत्साधनयोरन्यतरभावाभावात्। नापि रजतस्मरणं पुरोवर्तिनि प्रवृत्तिकारणम्। तस्यानुभवपारतन्त्र्यतयाऽनुवदेश एव प्रवर्तकत्वात्।

"Others do not tolerate these view. In this world every

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intelligent person proceeds in any action only after knowing either the desired object or the means to get it. In the case of a person who aspires for silver, the knowledge of shell cannot bring the experience of silver. The piece of shell is neither the object desired for nor the means to attain the desired object. Further, the memory of silver cannot be the cause for inclination towards the object in front, because the memory being subservient to experience, creates the inclination towards the location where the object is experienced".

In fact, in the case of a person who aspires for silver, the knowledge of the shell represented by 'this' cannot produce either the form of the object aspired for or that of the means to attain it. In that case, no intelligent person is prompted to action. Further the memory of silver cannot be the cause for the inclination to pick up the object in front. Memory is subservient to experience. It follows experience. That being the case, the person is prompted by the memory of silver proceeds to that place where he had the experience of silver earlier, but not to the object in front, i.e., the shell.

## Prābhākaras explanation of Sārūpya and its refutation

3.2. नापि भेदाग्रहो व्यवहारकारणम्। ग्रहणनिबन्धनत्वाश्चेतनव्यवहारस्य। ननु न वयमेकैकस्य कारणत्वं ब्रूमहे येनैवमुपलभ्येमहि। किन्त्वगृहीतविवेकस्य ज्ञानद्वयस्य प्राप्तसमीचीनपुरःस्थितरजतज्ञानसारूप्यस्येत्यनुक्तोपालम्भोऽयमिति चेत् - तदप्ययुक्तम्। विकल्पासहत्वात्।

तथा हि - समीचीनरजतावभाससारूप्यं भासमानं प्रवर्तकं सत्तामात्रेण वा? आद्ये विकल्पे भेदाग्रहापरपर्यायस्य सारूप्यस्य समीचीनसंनिभे इमे ज्ञाने इति विशेषाकारेण गृह्यमाणस्य प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वम्, किं वानयोरेव स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च मिथो भेदाग्रहो विद्यत इति सामान्याकारेण गृह्यमाणस्य सारूप्यस्य?

नाद्यः। समीचीनज्ञानवत्संनिभज्ञानस्य तदुचितव्यवहारप्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तेः।

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न खलु गोसंनिभो गवय इत्यवभासो गवार्थिनं गवये प्रवर्तयति।

न द्वितीयः। व्याहतत्वात्। न खल्वनाकलितभेदस्यानयोरिति, अनयोरिति ग्रहे भेदाग्रह इति च प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति। अतः परिशेषात् सत्तामात्रेण भेदाग्रहरूपस्य सारूप्यस्य व्यवहारकारणत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्।

"It may be objected that the absence of grasping of the difference (between the memory of silver and the perception of shell) is not the cause for the usage of illusion as 'this is silver'. The usage by an intelligent person always depends upon knowledge (grasping). We do not speak of each of them (i.e., Smaraṇa and Grahaṇa) as separately the cause of that usage. You (the Vedāntins) blame us on that ground (i.e., on the ground that we speak of them as separately the cause). But on the other hand we accept as the cause the dual knowledge itself in which the difference between 'Smaraṇa' and 'Grahaṇa' is not revealed and which is similar to the knowledge of real silver that is perceived. Hence, our view is not fit to be blamed. If it is argued thus, the answer is that it is not proper, because it cannot stand the alternative questions.

"The alternative questions are like these : Is that similarity with the knowledge of real silver the cause for the usage when it is known? Or is that so by its mere existnce (even when it is not known)? In the first alternative as - Is it that similarity which is not other than the non-grasping of difference and which is in its special form that 'the two cognitions (Smaraṇa and Grahaṇa) are similar to the knowledge of real silver', that is taken to be cause of erroneous usage ? Or is it that similarity which is grasped in its general form as a mere non-grasping of difference between two cognitions in form and content, that is taken to be the cause ?

"The first alternative of the first question is not tenable, because the knowledge of what is similar cannot possibly be the cause for action like the knowledge of what is real. The

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knowledge that the 'gavaya' is like a cow, cannot prompt an aspirant of cow to go towards 'gavaya'.

"The second alternative of the first question is also not tenable, because it would amount to 'Vyāghāta' (contradiction). Between 'Grahaṇa' and 'Smaraṇa', there is no possibility of the knowledge as 'between the two' when there is no knowledge of difference between them. Likewise when the knowledge of difference between them arises, there cannot be the absence of difference between them. Hence, it becomes inevitable to accept the second alternative question itself that the similarity of the actually existent but not known thing with the real silver, as the cause for action."

## The Prābhākara's explanation of Sārūpya

The Prabhākara's argue that the mere absence of knowledge cannot be the cause for any activity. Any absence of knowledge cannot be the cause for any activity, because intelligent persons are inclined to action only when they have the knowledge of something. "ग्रहणमूलको हि चेतनस्य व्यवहारः कथमग्रहमात्राद्भवेदिति भावः?" (Vāsudeva Śāstrin Abhyankar). How can the activity of the intelligent which is based on knowledge, arise merely through the absence of knowledge ? Hence the Prabhākaras do not propose either the perception (Grahaṇa) of what is denoted by 'this' (idam) alone or the memory (Smaraṇa) of 'silver' (rajatam) alone as the cause of activity, but propose the similarity of the combined cognitions of 'Grahaṇa' and 'Smaraṇa' with the knowledge of real silver. In the knowledge of real silver as 'this is silver', the 'absence of relation' (Asaṁsarga or asambandha) is not grasped. Similarly in the combination of 'Grahaṇa' as 'this' and 'Smaraṇa' as 'silver' here the absence of relation is not grasped. The 'non-grasping of the absence of

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relation' (Asaṁsarga-Agraha or Asambandhajñānābhāva) is common to both the knowledge of real silver and this is double cognition. Just as the knowledge of real silver leads to action, so does this double cognition lead to action. Hence, there is nothing wrong with their view - so do the Prābhākaras claim.

## Here the Vedāntins argue

This explanation should be rejected according to the Vedāntins because it cannot stand the alternative arguments. The view of the Prābhākaras is that similarity of the dual cognition (Grahaṇa-Smaraṇa) with the knowledge of real silver is the cause for illusion and the consequent action. As against this two questions can be asked as :

1. Is it the similarity which is known that happens to be the cause ?
2. Is it the similarity which exists without being known that happens to be the cause ?

Again the first alternative question has tow alternatives as :

1. Is it that similarity which is known in its special form that is taken as the cause ?
2. Is it that similarity which is known in its general form that is taken as the cause ?

The 'similarity' (Sārūpya) is here the knowledge that arises is on seeing the shell as silver. The special form of this knowledge is that it is similar to the knowledge of real silver. The general form of this knowledge is that although the two cognitions (Grahaṇa and Smaraṇa) are different, the difference between them is not grasped.

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The first alternative 'that the similarity which is known in its special form is the cause', is not tenable. The intelligent person would be inclined to action only when he has the real knowledge but not when he has the knowledge of similarity with a real thing. The second alternative, too, is not tenable. To say 'between them' is contradictory to 'the non-grasping of difference'. When the difference between two cognitions is not grasped, it cannot be said that they are two different cognitions. When the difference between them is known, then it cannot be said that there is no difference between them.

When both the alternatives of the first alternative question are not acceptable, it becomes inevitable to accept the second alternative question. Then it should be admitted that the mere existence of similarity without its being known is the cause for action. Just as the sense organ is the cause for knowledge, although it is not known, and just as the existing fire becomes the cause of burning, although it may not be known, so the two cognitions can become the cause of action, although the absence of difference between them is not known.

The Prābhākaras may accept this. Again the Vedāntins argue against it.

## The absence of the knowledge of difference cannot prompt

3 3 एवमेवस्त्विति चेत् - तर्हीदमिह संप्रधार्यम् - किमयं भेदाग्रहः समारोपोत्पादनक्रमेण व्यवहारकारणमस्तूतानुत्पादितारोप एव स्वयमिति। न च द्वितीयः पक्ष एव श्रेयान्। तावतैव व्यवहारोत्पत्तावारोपस्य गौरवदोषदुष्टत्वादिति मन्तव्यम्। विशिष्टव्यवहारस्य विशिष्टज्ञानपूर्वकत्वनियमेनाज्ञानपूर्वकत्वानुपपत्तेः।

"If the Mīmāṃsakas (Prābhākaras) accept the second

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alternative saying 'let it be so', then they should clarify this - whether this absence of the knowledge of difference is the cause for action by way of creating illusion (Samāropa - superimposition) or by itself without creating illusion ? It should not be thought that the second alternative itself is better on the ground that the creation of superimposition in the middle would amount to 'Gauravadoṣa' (cumbrousness). Since there is a rule that a special kind of activity should proceed from a special kind of knowledge, it is incompatible to say that it proceeds from ignorance.''

The absence of the knowledge of difference (between Grahaṇa and Smaraṇa) is itself the cause of superimposition of silver on the shell. It is that superimposition that is the cause of activity, etc. Thus it may be asked as to whether the absence of knowledge of difference is accepted as the cause of action, etc., only through superimposition or without superimposition.

The opponent may argue that the second alternative is better because to introduce a stage of superimposition in the middle as per the first alternative would amount to 'Gauravadoṣa'. This is not proper, because a special kind of activity requires as a rule a special kind of knowledge. That being the case, the ignorance in the form of the absence of the knowledge of difference cannot be cause of any activity. For instance, the usage like 'Daṇḍin' (possessor of Daṇḍa or staff) depends upon the special feature of possessing Daṇḍa by a person. Otherwise such a usage is not tenable. In the same way, the usage as 'this is silver' is plausible only when the speciality of silverness is known with reference to the object in front, but not when there is ignorance or the absence of knowledge. Hence some knowledge should be accepted as the cause for the activity or usage by an intelligent person. Here, it must be admitted that superimposition is the cause and error should be accepted as of the nature of superimposition.

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## Silver is superimposed on the shell

3 4 नन्वयं व्यवहारो नाज्ञानपूर्वक इत्यनाकालितपराभिसन्धिः स्वसिद्धान्तसिद्धार्थाद्यदि कश्चिच्छङ्केत स प्रतिवक्तव्यः।

शुक्तिकाविषयस्य ग्रहणस्यासमीहितविषयत्वेन रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वा-संभवादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां रजतज्ञानस्य समीपितविषयत्वेन प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्व-संभवाच्चेदमर्थाभिसंभिन्नग्रहविविक्तस्यापि रजतस्मरणस्य कारणत्वं वक्तव्यम्।

"If the Mīmāṃsakas take objection from the standpoint of their own doctrine without realising the view of the Vedāntins that this procedure about illusion does not proceed from ignorance, they should be answered thus :

"Since the desired object like the silver is not the object of the knowledge in the perception pertaining to the shell, there cannot be any activity on the part of an aspirant of silver on getting the knowledge of the shell. The fact that the knowledge of silver is the object of desire for an aspirant of silver, is proved by positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) instances. Hence, it should be admitted that the memory of silver leaving out the object denoted by this ('idam'), should be regarded as the cause for activity."

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas say that the usage that it is silver with reference to the shell, is due to the ignorance in the form of the non-grasping of difference between the two cognitions which are mutually different, but not due to superimposition. The Vedānta view is that such a usage is not due to that type of ignorance, but due to superimposition. Hence the Vedāntin replies the Mīmāṃsakas.

For a person to become inclined towards an object, it is necessary for him to have the knowledge of that object. If he does not have the knowledge of that object, he does not become inclined towards that object. This is proved by

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experience. Hence, a person should have the knowledge of silver first, so that he becomes inclined towards silver. Otherwise he cannot become inclined towards silver. This is proved by the positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) instances as 'इष्टवस्तुज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिः, तदभावे न ?' When there is the knowledge of silver, there is inclination towards silver, When there is no such knowledge, there is not inclination towards it at all. Hence in the illusory knowledge like 'this is silver' with reference to the shell, it should be admitted that the cause for inclination towards silver is the memory of silver.

Next it is pointed out how it cannot be said so, because once you think that you are remembering silver, the illusion is eradicated.

## If Āropa (superimposition is not accepted, there would be Vyāghātadoṣa

3 4 तच्च वक्तुं न शक्यते। जानाति इच्छति ततः प्रवर्तत इति न्यायेन ज्ञानेच्छाप्रवृत्तीनां समानविषयत्वेन भाव्यम्। तथा चेदंकारास्पदाभिमुखप्रवृत्तस्य रजतार्थिनस्तदिच्छानिबन्धनम्। अन्यथान्यदिच्छन्नन्यद्व्यवहरतीति व्याहन्येत। तथा चेदंकारास्पदं रजतावभासगोचरतां नाचरेत्कथं रजतार्थी तदिच्छेत्। यद्यरजतत्वाग्रहणादिति ब्रूयात् रजतत्वाग्रहात्कस्मादयं नोपेक्षेतेति।

"It cannot be said so. 'He knows it, aspires for it and then proceeds towards it' - in accordance with this maxim the knowledge, the desire and inclination should be pertaining to same thing. Then a person who aspires for silver proceeds towards the object which is denoted by the word 'this'. His desire is also directed towards it. Otherwise, he would aspire for one thing and proceeds towards another thing. Thus there would be the possibility of Vyāghātadoṣa (the defect called contradiction). In that case, if the knowledge of silver is not revealed through

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the word 'this', how can the aspirant of silver desire for it ? If it is replied that it is possible because there is no realisation that 'it is not silver', it can be asked as to why it should not be neglected because its silverness is not grasped."

The argument here is that the knowledge of silver which is of the nature of memory, cannot be said to be the cause of inclination towards silver. Although the knowledge and desire are of the same object, yet there is the contingency of the desire and the inclination being not directed at the same object. 'silver' is the object of desire. But it is not the object of inclination to go, because the inclination is towards the object denoted by 'this'. It is necessary to establish that the object towards which a person proceeds is the same as that which is the object of knowledge as well as desire. What is intended to be conveyed here is that the object denoted by 'this' cannot become the object towards which there is inclination to go unless there is the superimposition of the silver which is the object of desire.

If it is said by the Mīmāṃsakas that the inclination towards the object in front, denoted by this, is due to the absence of knowledge that it is different from silver, it is vitiated by the defect called Vyāghāta. It can be asked as to why it should not be neglected, since its silverness is not grasped.

## Pravṛtti in illusion is due to superimposition

3 4 युगपत्तद्भवभेदाग्रहाभेदाग्रहनिबन्धनाभ्यामुपादानोपेक्षाभ्यांमिति पुरतः पृष्टतश्चाकृष्यमाणः पुरुषो दोलायमानतया रुप्यारोपमन्तरेणोपादानपक्ष एव न व्यवस्थाप्यत इत्यनिच्छताप्यच्छमतिना समारोपः समाश्रयणीयः।

यथाह - 'भेदाग्रहादिदंकारास्पदे रजतत्वमारोप्य तज्जातीयस्योपकारहेतु-भावमनुस्मृत्य तज्जातीयत्वेनास्यापि तदनुमाय तदर्थी प्रवर्तते (भा 1 1 1) इति प्रथमः पक्षः प्रशस्यः।

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"Then due to the simultaneous occurance of the absence of the knowledge of difference and the absence of the knowledge of non-difference, there arises the contingency of the inclination to take the object and to leave it at the same time. As a result of that the person who is drawn forward and backward, is subjected to an oscillating state. This cannot be settled on the side of acceptance (of the object) unless there is superimposition of silver on the object in front. Hence, inspite of one's disinclination to accept, one should with a clear mind resort to superimposition itself.

"Hence it is said - 'Due to the absence of the knowledge of difference, the 'silverness' (idea of silver) is superimposed on the object of that nature, i.e., the silver, had formerly fulfilled his desire, an aspirant of silver infers that object as of the nature of silver and proceeds towards it'. Thus the first argument is commendable".

The Mīmāṃsakas may argue that the person is prompted to action because the object in front is not grasped as different from silver. As against this it may be urged that since the object in front is not grasped as silver, there would be no inclination to action. In that case, as regards the object in front, both the absence of the knowledge of difference and the absence of the knowledge of non-difference occur simultaneously. When they occur simultaneously, their effect also should occur simultaneously. Thus if the inclination to action in the form of picking up the object and the distance from picking up the object occur simultaneously, then the person is drawn forward and backward. This creates a state of oscillation for the person. Hence, unless superimposition is accepted, the matter cannot be settled as to whether he should proceed to the object or desist from doing so.

Then the Bhāmatī puts the argument as follows :

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भेदाग्रहादिदंकारास्पदे रजतत्त्वमारोप्य तज्जातीयस्योपकारहेतुभावमनुस्मृत्य तज्जातीयस्योपकारहेतुभावमनुस्मृत्य तज्जातीयत्वेन तदनुमाय तदर्थी प्रवर्तते।

The same can be reduced to the form of this inference :

पुरोवर्तिपदार्थ उपकारहेतुः, रजतत्वात् पूर्वानुभूतरजतवत्।

Here in the 'Pakṣa' (पुरोवर्तिपदार्थ), the 'hetu' cannot be established without superimposition.

## Pakṣa itself both Sādhya and Hetu

3.6. न च तटस्थरजतस्मरणपक्षेऽपि हेतोर्गृहीततत्वेनायं मार्गः समान इति वाच्यम्। रजतत्त्वस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वाभावात्। न च पक्षधर्मताया अभावेऽपि व्याप्तिबलाद्गमकत्वं शङ्क्यम्। व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावल्लिङ्गस्यैव गमकत्वाङ्गीकारात्। तदाहुः शबरस्वामिनः - ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यैव पुंसो लिङ्गविशिष्टधर्मैकदेशदर्शनाल्लिविशिष्टधर्मैकदेशबुद्धिरनुमानमिति। आचार्योऽप्यवोचत्-

**स एष चोभयात्मा यो गम्ये गमक इष्यते।**

**असिद्धेनैकदेशेन गम्यासिद्धेर्न बोधकः।।** इति।

(श्लो.वा.अनु.प्र.1.1.5)।

"It should not be urged that the path is the same since the 'hetu' is understood even in the case of the view which does not accept the memory of silver. This is because the 'hetu' in the form of 'silverness' cannot become the property of the 'Pakṣa' (the instance where the probans should exist). Yet you cannot argue that although the 'hetu' (probans) does not exist in the 'Pakṣa', the 'hetu' can be remembered by virtue of the 'Vyāpti' (invariable concomitance). This is because it is accepted by all that it is only that 'hetu' which happens to be the property of the 'Pakṣa' that proves the probandum (Sādhya). Thus Sabarasvamin has said - 'A person who knows the relation (between the probandum and the probans) can understand that portion of the

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'Pakṣa' which is characterised by the probandum on witnessing that portion of the 'Pakṣa' which is characterised by the probans. This is inference'. The Ācārya (kumārila) has also said-

"The 'Pakṣa' itself is understood both ways as the 'Sādhya' and 'the hetu'. The portion which is not yet proved is the 'Sādhya' while the portion which is proved is the 'hetu'. (Ślō.Vā.Anu.Pra., 1.1.5)

It is said above that the absence of the knowledge of difference (Bhedāgraha) is the case for action through the creation of superimposition, because it is not possible to have the 'hetu' in the 'Pakṣa' without superimposition. Here it may be argued by the Mīmāṃsakas that the hetu can be understood by memory itself even without superimposition. Then they can say that the inference is easy to get. (तटस्थरजतस्मरणपक्ष - By 'tatastha', what is meant is that silver which is cognised earlier and which is not superimposed).

The answer is that what you speak of as the hetu (i.e., the remembered silver) does not exist in the 'Pakṣa' in the form of what is denoted by 'this'. Thus the 'hetu' does not fulfil the condition of 'Pakṣadharmatva'. Here the answer of the Mimamsakas is that even in the absence of the 'hetu' in the 'Pakṣa', the 'hetu' can be understood by the force of the 'vyāpti' itself. The reply of the Vedāntin is that all have accepted that it is only such 'hetu' which is the property of the pakṣa that can prove the 'Sādhya'. That is what Śabarasvāmin has said. Śabarasvāmin is of view that by knowing the portion of the pakṣa which is characterised by the probans (for instance, the portion of the 'parvata' characterised by 'Dhūma'), of the Pakṣa which is characterised by the Sādhya (for instance, the portion of the Parvata characterised by 'agni') is understood. This is what is known as 'Anumāna'.

Kumārila has also said the same thing. गम्य means ज्ञाप्य,

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i.e., that which is to be proved (Sādhya). गमक means ज्ञापक , i.e., that which is the probans (Liṅga). According to Kumārila, the 'Pakṣa' is itself grasped in two ways as the 'Sādhya' and the 'hetu'. That portion of the 'Pakṣa' which is not proved (say, 'Parvata' portion with 'agni') is the 'Sādhya' and that portion of the 'Pakṣa' which is known (say, 'Parvata' portion having 'Dhūma') is the 'Liṅga'.

Then there is another objection to which the reply is given -

## 'Bhrānti' is 'Āropātmaka' : This is proved by inference

3.8. ननु भवत्पक्षेऽपि पुरःस्थितस्येदमर्थस्य परमार्थतो रजतत्वं नास्तीति न रजतत्वं धर्म्येकदेश इति चेन्न। 'यक्षानुरूपो बलिः' इति न्यायेनानुमित्याभासानुगुणस्यैकदेशस्य विद्यमानत्वात्। तथा च प्रयोगः - विवादाध्यासितं रजतज्ञानं पुरोवर्तिविषयं रजतार्थिनस्तत्र नियमेन प्रवर्तकत्वात्। यदुक्तसाधनं तदुक्तसाध्यं यथोभयवादिसंमतं सत्यरजतज्ञानम्। विवादपदं शुक्ति शकलं रजतज्ञानविषयोऽव्यवधानेन रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वाद् रजतपदसमानाधिकरणपदान्तरवाच्यत्वाद्वा वस्तुरजतवत्।

"But in your opinion also, the silverness is not a portion of the pakṣa because there is no silverness in reality in the object denoted by 'this'. If it is objected like this, the reply is that your view is not correct, because, according to the maxim 'Yakṣānurūpo Baliḥ' (the offering is according to the Yakṣa), there is 'Pakṣadharmatā' ('hetu' becoming the property of Pakṣa) in accordance with the inference. The argument of the inference to prove this is as follows -

"The knowledge of the silver under contention should pertain to the object in front, because the aspirant of silver would necessarily proceeds towards it. That which is told as the 'hetu' should prove that which is to be proved (Sādhya), like the real knowledge of silver which is acceptable to both the debators.

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The piece of shell under contention is object of knowledge, because it is object of inclination of the aspirant of silver immediately or because it is referred to by a word which stands in the same case-relation with 'this', like the real silver''.

The Mīmāṃsakas object saying that in the case of the opinion of the vedāntins that silverness is superimposed on the shell also, what appears in front denoted by 'this' is not in reality silver. Hence on that ground the 'hetu' advanced by the vedāntins is also lacking in 'Pakṣadharmatā'.

In reply to this argument, the vedāntins refer to the maxim of 'Yakṣānurūpo Baliḥ' (the offering is in keeping with the Yakṣa), and say that the 'Pakṣadharmatā' can be in accordance with the 'inference'. In the case of the object in front denoted by 'this', the Sādhya in the form of its being the cause of advantage (Upakārahetutva), is not there in the reality, but only appears so for some time. Hence it is not real. Then as regards such a semblance of a Sādhya, there is no loss if the 'Liṅga' (hetu) in the form of silver is also not real. Thus the argument can be stated thus ;

विवादाध्यासितं रजतज्ञानं पुरोवर्तिविषयम्। (प्रतिज्ञा)।

रजतार्थिनस्तत्र नियमेन प्रवर्तनात्। (हेतुः)।

यदुक्तसाधनं तदुक्तसाध्यम्, यथा उभयवादिसंमतं सत्यरजतज्ञानम्। (उदाहरणम्)।

In this argument the 'Pakṣa' is 'Rajatajñāna'. The 'Sādhya' is that the object in front is its object (Purovartiviṣaya). The 'hetu' is that an aspirant of silver would necessarily proceed towards it. The Vyāpti with Udāharaṇa is given next. In order that the object in front (i.e., the shell) becomes the object of 'Rajatajñāna', it should not be in the form of memory, but should be in the form of superimposition. The second argument is :

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विवादपदं शुक्तिशकलं रजतज्ञानविषयः। (प्रतिज्ञा)।

अव्यवधानेन रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वात्, अथवा,

रजतपदसमानाधिकरणपदान्तरवाच्यत्वात्। (हेतुः)।

वस्तुरजतवत्। (उदाहरणम्)।

In this argument the 'Śuktiśakala' is the 'pakṣa'. That it is the object of the knowledge of silver (Rajatajñānaviṣaya) is the sādhya. 'Vasturajatavat' is the 'Udāharaṇa'. Here we decide the shell in front as the object denoted by the word 'this'. This word has the same case-relation (Sāmānādhikaraṇya) with 'rajata'. Hence what appears is the 'abheda' between them. When there is 'Bhedāgraha', there should be 'Abhedāgraha'. The same is called as 'Āropa' or superimposition.

## Bhrānti is Āropātmaka - Anubhava is Pramāṇa

3.9. यदुक्तं रजतज्ञानस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वेऽनुभवविरोध इति तदप्ययुक्तम्। विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथा हि - तत्र किं रजताकारप्रतीतिं प्रति शुक्तेरालम्बनत्वेऽनुभविरोध उद्भाव्यत इदमंशस्य वा। नाद्यः। अनङ्गीकारपराहतत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। इदन्तानियतदेशाधिकरणस्य चाकचक्यविशिष्टस्य वस्तुनो रजतज्ञानालम्बनत्वमनवलम्बमानस्य भवत एवानुभवविरोधात्। इदं रजतमिति सामानाधिकरण्येन पुरोवर्तिनि अङ्गुलिनिर्देशपूर्वकमुपादानादिव्यवहारदर्शनाच्च।

"Your argument that the shell is the object in the knowledge of 'rajata' is against experience, is not tenable, because it cannot stand the alternatives. They are : Is the opposition to experience applicable when the shell is the basis for the knowledge of silver or when the silver is not the object in respect of 'this'? The first alternative is not tenable, because your objection itself cannot arise since we do not accept that the object in front in the form of the shell cannot be the basis for the knowledge of silver. The second alternative is also not

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tenable. What is opposed to experience is your very argument that the object which has the specific substratum is denoted by 'this' and which is glittering in front, is not the basis of the knowledge of silver. Moreover since there is the same case-relation as 'this is silver' (idam rajatam), the proceeding towards the object by pointing towards it with a finger, is noticed in the world''.

The experience in the form of 'this is silver' has two constituents as 'this' and 'silver'. It is impossible that the shell can be the object of knowledge in the form of silver. If the shell were to be the object, the knowledge would have been in the form of 'this is the shell'. Hence, is it against the experience when it is said that the shell is the object in this knowledge ? Or since there is no possibility of the presence of silver when the object in front is pointed out as 'this', is it against experience when the silver is pointed but is as this ? These are the two alternatives. The first alternative that the shell is the object in the form of silver, is not at all acceptable to the Vedāntins. Hence there is no scope for the first objection. In the second alternative also, although what is pointed out as 'this' is the shell itself, it appears as the silver to the person concerned. Still if the Mīmāṃsakas say that the silver is not the object of knowledge here, their opinion itself is opposed to experience. The word 'this' refers to the object in front. The shell and the silver may be mutually different. But there is no mutual difference between 'this' and 'silver'. Moreover they are presented in the same case- relation as 'this is silver'. Here the object referred to as 'this' appears as 'silver'. Hence there is no difference between them. This knowledge of 'abheda' is itself the superimposition.

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## Doṣa can produce an opposite effect

3.10. यच्चोक्तम् - दोषाणामौत्सर्गिककार्यप्रसवशक्तिप्रतिबन्धकतया विपरीतकारित्वं नास्तीति। तदप्ययुक्तम्। दावदग्धवेत्रबीजादौ तथा दर्शनात्। न च दग्धस्य वेत्रबीजत्वं नास्तीति मन्तव्यम्। श्यामस्य घटस्य रक्ततामात्रेण घटत्वनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। ननु घटोऽयं घटोऽयमित्यनुवृत्तयोः प्रत्ययप्रयोगयोः सद्भावाद् घटत्व सद्भाव इति चेन्न। अत्रापीदं वेत्रबीजमिति तयोः समानत्वात्। न च बह्वन्नपचनसामर्थ्यं जाटरस्यैव जातवेदसो न भस्मकव्याधेरिति वक्तुं युक्तम्। तस्य मन्दमल्पपचनसामर्थ्येऽपि सहसा महत्पचनस्य भस्मकव्याधिसाहयक-मन्तरेणानुपपत्तेः। अन्यथा सर्वेषां तथापत्तेः। किं च ज्ञानानां यथार्थव्यवहार-कारणत्वेऽपि दोषवशादयथार्थव्यवहारकारणत्वमङ्गीकुर्वाणो भवानेव पर्यनुयुज्यो भवति। तदुक्तं भाष्ये - यश्चोभयोः समानो दोषो द्योतते तत्र कश्चोद्यो भवतीति। अत्राप्युक्तम् -

**यश्चोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः।**

**नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे।।** इति।

"As regards what is argued that a defect can come as an obstruction to the effect, but cannot produce an opposite effect, it must be said that it is not correct, because such a power is found in the burnt seeds of cane. You should not say that there is no property of the seed in the burnt seeds of cane. In that case, just because the black pot becomes red when baked, you will have to say that it is not a pot. It may be objected that in what you say as black pot and red pot, there is the property of pot continuing because of the continuation of both the knowledge and usage. If you say so, it is not correct, because in the example also there is the knowledge and usage as the seeds of cane and the cases are common. In the same way, the capacity of digesting a large quantity of food is found in the gastric fire which is caught witht he disease called 'Bhasmaka'. It cannot be said that such a capacity of digesting more food belongs to the gastric fire itself and that it is not due to the disease called 'Bhasmaka'. When the gastric fire has the

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slow capacity of digesting a small quantity of food, if it all of a sudden begins to digest a large quantity of food, it cannot be compatible if we do not admit the help of the disease called 'Bhasmaka'. Otherwise, the gastric fire of all should work in the same way.

"Further, since you have accepted that the knowledge which is the cause of valid action, can also be the cause of erroneous action due to some defect, you are subjected to objection. That is why it is said in the Bhāṣya - when the defect is common in both the cases, which one should be objected to ? Here also it is said -

" When the defect is common to both the cases, and when the removal of the defect is common to both, it is not proper to object to one case at the time of considering the subject".

The Mīmāṃsakas have objected against the Vedāntins saying that a defect can restrain the capacity of producing effect in an object, but cannot produce another opposite effect at all. But those Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas who say that all knowledge is of valid nature, admit that such a valid knowledge itself can be a cause for erroneous usage due to a defect. In that case, the Mīmāṃsakas, who accept that just as the valid knowledge is the cause for valid usage when there is no defect, so does the same valid knowledge become the cause of erroneous usage when there is a defect, are subjected to the same objection in the same way as the vedāntins are subjected to it by the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus this is against the rule which lays down that one should raise objection against others case only when there can be no such objection against one's own case. This is import of the statements quoted.

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3.11. तथापि मामकस्यानुमानस्य किं दूषणं दत्तमासीत्। यद्यनुमानदूषणं विना न परितुष्यति हन्त कालात्ययापदिष्टता। कृष्णवर्त्मानुष्णत्वानुमानवत्। एतावन्तं कालं यदिदं रजतमित्याभादसौ शुक्तिरिति प्रत्यक्षेण प्राचीनप्रत्ययस्यायथार्थत्वं प्रवेदयता यथार्थत्वानुमानस्यापहृतविषयत्वाद् बाध्यत्वसम्भवात्।

यच्चोक्तं स्वगोचरव्यभिचारे सर्वानाश्वासप्रसङ्ग इति। तदसाम्प्रतम्। संविदां क्वचित्संवादिव्यवहाराजनकत्वेऽपि न सर्वत्र तच्छङ्कया प्रवृत्त्युच्छेद इति यथा तावके मते तथा मामकेऽप्यसौ पन्था न वारित इति समानयोगक्षेमत्वात्। तौतातितमवलम्ब्य विधिविवेकं व्याकुर्वाणैराचार्यवाचस्पतिमिश्रैर्बोधकत्वेन स्वतः प्रामाण्यं नाव्यभिचारेणेति न्यायकणिकायां प्रत्यपादि। तस्मादविश्वासशङ्कानवकाशं लभते।

"It may be asked - Yet what is it that you point out as the fallacy in our inference ? If you are not satisfied until we point out the fallacy in your inference, well, we say that it is 'Bādhita' (Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa). It is similar to the inference proving that the fire is not hot. That object which appeared upto this time as silver happens to be the shell only - this kind of perceptual knowledge reveals the invalidity of the knowledge obtained earlier. Thus the very content of the inference which is meant to prove the validity of knowledge, is evaporated. Hence the inference is 'Bādhita'.

"Then what is said earlier that if knowledge can arise without any object, man cannot have trust in anything, is also not correct. Although in some cases of knowledge, there may not be fruitful application, there is no absence of activity everywhere due to that doubt. Hence, just as in your case so in our case also, there is no harm if the path is pursued. Thus the gain and loss are common to both of us. While commenting on Vidhiviveka according to Kumārilabhaṭṭa, revered teacher Vācaspati Miśra has

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said in his Nyāyakaṇikā that the Vidhi which teaches 'Apūrvārtha', has self validity, but does not depend upon any object. Hence there is no scope for any doubt of distrust''

The Mīmāṃsakas want to know as to what is the fallacy in the inference which they had advanced. The inference in question is :

विवादाध्यासिताः प्रत्ययाः यथार्थाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्, दण्डीति प्रत्ययवत्।

Here the Vedāntins point out that the fallacy in it is called Bādhita as in ''अग्निरनुष्णः, द्रव्यत्वात्, अन्य द्रव्यवत्।'': The object which appeared as silver so far is now revealed to be the shell. Thus by perceptual knowledge, the inference is annulled (Bādhita). If in the error, 'this is silver', it is proved that the silver is not there, the inference becomes 'Bādhita' just as the inference trying to prove the absence of heat in fire becomes 'Bādhita' by 'Pratyakṣapramāṇa'.

Further, it is well known that knowledge is born from an object and then the knowledge gives rise to action or inclination to action. In the doctrine that error is the knowledge of the nature of superimposition, it should be admitted that knowledge arises even without an object. Then a doubt may arise as to whether I got the knowledge without any object in all cases. In that case there should be no inclination to action without an obstruction. Hence, it may be said against the Advaitins that it is not proper to accept any knowledge of the nature of superimposition.

Here the Advaitins reply saying that the Prābhākaras who admit the double-cognition of 'Grahaṇa' and 'Smaraṇa', are also exposed to the same objection. Although all knowledge is valid, one should necessarily admit the difference between the 'pravrtti' in the case of 'Śukti-rajata' and that in 'Satya-rajata'. In the first case, 'rajata' is not obtained and the effort is fruitless. In the second case, 'rajata' is obtained and the effort is fruitful. When

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in the former case there is no fruitfulness of action, it can be doubted that in all cases the action would be fruitless. Hence, the Mīmāṃsakas also should try hard to defend the position that efforts would be fruitful in other cases without obstruction. They may prove so by saying that in some cases the efforts would be fruitful. The Advaitins, too, could prove the same. Hence the 'gain and loss' (Yogakṣema) is similar in the case of the Mimamsakas an the Advaitins. The Advaitins argue on these line and re-assert that nature of knowledge in error is that of superimposition.

The implication of the view of Vācaspati Miśra quoted here is : In the opinion of Prābhākara's, the knowledge as 'this is silver' is case of double cognition (of Grahaṇa and Smaraṇa), but not one knowledge. In their opinion, the knowledge is self - valid. But in the opinion of Bhāṭṭas who accept 'Anyathākhyāti', how should we establish self-validity of knowledge ? In their opinion all knowledge is not valid. Vācaspati Miśra answers this question in his Nyāyakaṇikā. 'When the knowledge arises in the presence of an object, it is called 'Pramā' (valid). When the knowledge arises as if there is an object even when the object is absent, it is called 'Bhramā' (error)'. If the description of 'Pramā' and 'Bhramā' is given on the above lines, there would be an objection as above. But if we say that knowledge which pertains to something unknown (apūrva), is 'Pramā' and that which does not pertains to such a thing, is 'Bhramā', it is possible to establish self-validity of knowledge according to the Bhāṭṭas also.

## 4 Refutation of Mādhyamikas Asatkhyāti

4.1. ननु माध्यमिकमतावलम्बनेन रजतादिविभ्रमालम्बनमसदिति चेत् - तदयुक्तम्। असतोऽपोक्षप्रतिभासायोग्यत्वात्। तदुपादित्सया प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च। ननु विज्ञानमेव वासनादिस्वकारणसामर्थ्यासादितदृष्टान्तसिद्धस्वभावविशेष-

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मसत्प्रकाशनसमर्थनमुपजातम्। असत्प्रकाशानशक्तिरविद्या संवृतिरिति पर्यायाः। तस्मादविद्यावशादसन्तो भान्तीति चेत् - तदपि वक्तुमशक्यम्। शक्यस्य दुर्निरूप्यत्वात्। किमत्र शक्यं कार्यं ज्ञाप्यं वा। नाद्यः। असतः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः। न द्वितीयः। शक्यस्य कारणत्वेनानङ्गीकृतत्वात्। ज्ञानादन्यस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपलब्धेश्च। उपलब्धौ वा तस्यापि ज्ञाप्यत्वेन ज्ञापकान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थापत्तेश्च।

"It may be objected that according to the Mādhyamikas, the object which is the basis of the error as 'this is silver', is itslef non-existent (asat). The answer is that this is not correct, because what is non-existent has no capability of appearing as perceivable. Nor can there be any inclination to obtain it. It may be further objected thus : The intelligence itself which has a special nature that is evident from the analogy of the dream and that is attained through the capacity derived from the causes of the impressions, etc., has the born power to reveal even the non-existent objects. That power of revealing the non-existent objects. That power of revealing the non-existent is called by the synonyms Avidyā (nescience), 'Saṃvṛti' (cover), etc. Hence due to Avidyā, those that are not existent appear as existent.

"If it is contended as above, the reply is that it cannot said so, because it is not possible to point out the nature of such objects as are produced from such a capacity. What is the nature of the object so produced ? Is it a created object ? or is it the object that is made known ? The first alternative is not tenable, because a non-existent object cannot be the cause for the objects such as pot, cloth, etc. The second alternative is also not tenable, because Avidyā has been accepted as the cause of all objects. That one knowledge is born from another knowledge is not some thing proved by experience. If such a possibility is accepted, there would be the contingency of regress ad infinitum because that knowledge may be the effect of another knowledge, that agian of another knowledge and so on."

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The Mādhyamikas, who are otherwise known as Śūnyavādins, say that everything is Śūnya. Even the shell does not exist as an object. Such a non-existent shell is the basis of the error about silver. This contention is refuted by the Advaitins through an argument that the non-existent object has no capacity to appear as an object. Further with regard to a non-existent object, there would be no inclination to obtain it on the part of any person.

It is further argued by the Mādhyamikas that just as the objects that flash in a dream assume different forms due to the beginningless impressions (Vāsanā), etc., so the objects which are non-existent are nothing but the different forms of intelligence (Vijñāna) during the wakeful state. For the Vijñāna to appear in these forms, it is the beginningless Vāsanā that is the cause. So say the Śūnyavādins.

This is rejected by the Advaitins as not tenable. The Advaitins argue that it is not possible to discern the nature of such objects. Are they created (Kārya) or are they made known (Jñāpya) ? Hetu or cause is of two types as Kārakahetu and Jñāpakahetu. That which is the cause for the production of an object is Kārakahetu. For instance mud, water, etc., are the Kārakahētu of pot. That which is the cause for the knowledge of an object is Jñāpakahetu. For instance smoke is the Jñāpakahetu to know fire in the hill. For the objects of the world such as pot, cloth, etc., Vijñāna cannot be Kārakahetu, because, according to the Mādhyamikas the world is non-existent (asat). It cannot be Jñāpakahetu also, because Jnapaka means the cause for knowledge when something is said to be the cause of knowledge, Two knowledges as Kārya and Kārana have to be accepted. If these are accepted, one's own doctrine is contradicted. According to the Mādhyamikas, there is only one knowledge in the world. Even if differences in knowledge are accepted due to certain adjuncts (Upādhis), then there would be

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the contingency of regres ad infitum (Anavasthā). Jñāpakahetu means that cause which creates knowledge. The first knowledge is the cause for the second knowledge. That should have another cause and so on.

## Refutation of Yogācāra's Vijñānavāda

5 2 अथ एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया विज्ञानं सद्रूपमेवासतः प्रकाशकमिति कक्षीक्रियत इति चेत् - अत्र देवानां प्रियः प्रष्टव्यः पुनः। असौ सदसतोः सम्बन्धो निरूप्यनिरूपकभावोऽविनाभावो वा ? नाद्यः। असत उपकाराधारत्वा-योगेन अनुपकृततया निरूप्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। न चरमः। धूम - धूमध्वजयोरिव तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणस्य शिंशपावृक्षयोरिव तादात्म्यलक्षणस्य वा अविनाभावनिदानस्य सदसतोरसंभवात्। तस्माद् विज्ञानमेवासत्प्रकाशकमित्यसद्वादिनामयमसत्प्रलाप इत्यारोप्यमाणं नासत्।

"Then it may be argued that with a view to removing this defect, the Vijñāna of the nature of 'sat' (existence) should be accepted as the revealer of 'asat' (the non-existent). Here the dullard has to be asked. What is the type of relation between 'sat' (existence) and 'asat' (non-existence) ? Whether it is the relation of 'Nirūpya' (to be determined or ascertained or known) and the Nirūpaka that which determines or ascertains or makes known) or the relation of inseparability ? It cannot be the first one, because the 'asat' (Ghaṭa, etc.,) can be 'Nirūpya' only on the basis of being benefited (from Vijñāna) and that being not the case it cannot be so. The second one is also not tenable, because, between 'sat' and 'asat', there cannot be an inseparable relation either of the nature of 'tadutpatti' (born of it) as found between the smoke and the fire or of the nature of 'Tādātmya' (identity) as found between 'Śiṃśapā' and 'Vṛkṣa' (tree). Hence, this baseless talk of the advocates of 'asat' (speakers of untruth) that Vijñāna is the revealer of 'asat' is futile. What is superimposed upon cannot be 'asat'.

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In order to stall the defect called 'Anavasthā' (regres and infinitum), the opponent may argue that Vijñāna which is deemed as the material cause of the 'asat' such as Ghaṭa, Paṭa, etc., is the 'Jñāpaka' (revealer) of Ghaṭa, etc., and that on that ground there is no possibility of 'Anavasthā'. The opponent here is not the follower of the Mādhyamika school which advocated everything as 'Śūnya', because he accepts Vijñāna as of the nature of 'sat'. Nor is he the follower of the Yogācāras school which advocates everything as Vijñāna, because he does not accept the external objects such as Ghaṭa as of the nature of Vijñāna. He is, therefore, called 'Devānām Priya', i.e., a dullard, fool.

The Question asked here is as to what is the nature of the relation between 'sat' (Vijñāna) and 'asat' (Ghaṭādi). Whether it is the relation of the 'Nirūpya' and the 'Nirūpaka' or an inseparable relation ?

In other words the question is : Whether Vijñāna is the 'Jñāpaka' of Ghaṭa, etc., as the 'Nirūpaka' or as being related with them in an inseparable relation ? That which is 'Nirūpya' would be regarded as 'Nirūpya' when it is benefited by the 'Nirūpaka'. When the 'Nirūpaka' contributes something special (extraordinary), then it is said to do some benefit. In the case of an 'asat' object, that contribution is not possible because such an object cannot be an 'aśraya' of anything. In the same way, Vijñāna does not reveal 'Ghaṭādi' by remaining in an inseparable relation or Vyāpti. That Vyāpti could be of 'tadutpatti' type which is Kāryakāraṇa relation as between the smoke and the fire or it could be of 'Tādātmya' type as between Śiṃśapā, a kind of tree, and the treeness. Both types of 'Avinābhāva' relation are not possible in the case of 'sat' and 'asat' (Vijñāna and Ghaṭādi).

'Sat' can superimposed on something else, but not 'asat'. The superimposition of horn (Śṛṅga) on the hare (hare); but the superimposition of 'Śaśaśṛṅga' is not possible anywhere : ''शशे

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शृङ्गस्यारोपो भवेत्, न तु शशशृङ्गस्यान्यत्रारोपः।" In the former case, Śṛṅga can be found elsewhere. But in the latter case, Śaśaśṛṅga cannot be found anywhere.

[The knowledge of object can come in two ways; in a 'nirapekṣa' way (not depending on another) and in a 'Sāpekṣa' (depending on another). The Ghaṭa, Paṭa etc., are known independently of another knowledge. It is 'Nirāpekṣa' knowledge. But the knowledge of father, sister, etc., is 'Sāpekṣa', because it depends upon the knowledge of son, brother, etc., This mutual relation between two objects is called 'Nirūpya - Nirūpakabhāva].

## विज्ञानम् असद्वस्तुप्रकाशकम् - This is not tenable

4.3 ननु विज्ञानवादिनयानुसारेण प्रतीयमानं रजतं ज्ञानात्मकम्। तत्र च युक्तिरभिधीयते - यद्यथानुभूयते तत्तथा। अन्यथात्वं तु बलवद्बाधकोपनिपातादास्थीयत इत्युभयवादिसंमतोऽर्थः। तत्र च नेदं रजतमिति निषिद्धेदंभावं रजतम् अर्थान्तरज्ञानरूपमवतिष्ठते। न चेदंतया निषेधे सत्यनिदंतया च बहिरपि व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः कुतः संविदाकारतेति वाच्यम्। व्यवहितस्यापरोक्षत्वानुपपत्तावपरोक्षस्य विज्ञानस्य कक्षीकर्तव्यत्वात्। तथ च प्रयोगः - विवादपदं विज्ञानाकारः सम्प्रयोगमन्तरेणापरोक्षत्वाद् विज्ञानवदिति।

तदनुपपन्नम्। विकल्पासहत्वात्। बाधकोऽवबोधः किं साक्षाज् ज्ञानाकारतां बोधयत्यर्थाद्वा। नाद्यः। नेदं रजतमिति प्रत्ययस्य रजतविवेकमात्रगोचरस्य ज्ञानाभेदगोचरतायाम् अनुभवविरोधात्। नेदं - तदेतद्वार्तम्। प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधात्मनो बाधकावबोधस्य तत्रैव सत्त्वात्प्रतिषेधोपपत्तेः। विज्ञानाकारत्वसाधनमप्यविज्ञाकारे बहिष्ठे साक्षिप्रत्यक्षे भावरूपाज्ञाने वर्तत इति सव्यभिचारः।

"It may be objected that according to the doctrine of Vijñānavādins, the silver that appears (in the error) is of the nature of knowledge. This matter can be established thus : The object remains in the same form in which it is experienced by us. It would be otherwise only when there is a strong obstruction

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coming in the way. This is acceptable to both the parties. The silver which is of the nature of 'this' and which is rejected by the knowledge that comes later as 'this is not silver', is in the form of 'Saṃvit' (inner knowledge). You should not ask here as to how we say that the silver is only in the form of knowledge (Saṃvidākāratā) when it could remain outside also as 'this is not silver' because it is prohibited in the form of 'this'. This is because that 'Vijñāna' should be taken as internal perception as an object which is not in front cannot be the object of external perception. The inference is as given below :

"The bone of contention (i.e., silver) is in the form of Vijñāna. (Pratijñā)

Because it is perceived although there is no contact with external senses. (Hetu).

Like Vijñāna. (Udāharaṇa)

"This is not tenable, because it cannot stand alternatives. Does the knowledge of prohibition (as 'this is not silver') directly conveys the knowledge (that silver is in the form of internal knowledge) or by inference? The first alternative is not tenable, because the knowledge of prohibition as 'this is not silver' conveys only the knowledge of difference between the shell and the silver, but not the idea that what appeared earlier was the knowledge of silver. If it is taken to convey that idea also, it is against experience. Again the second alternative which intends to convey the idea that the denial of silver as the object in front itself assumes the form of inner knowledge, is also not tenable. This is because the knowledge of prohibition serves only to reject the concerned thing. Thus it prohibits only that object which is pointed out as 'this', which is an extenal object. Although Vijñāna is internal, if you try to prove it as appearing external, it would be subjected to the fallacy called 'Savyabhicāra'. The Ajñāna (nescience) of the positive nature which appears as external

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through 'Sākṣipratyakṣa', remains external only. Hence your 'Vyāpti' is subject to the fallacy called 'Savyabhicāra'."

According to the Vijñānavādins, the appearance of silver occuring in the error 'this is silver', is of the nature of knowledge. This they try to establish with the argument that the object appears in the same form in which it is grasped by us. It cannot be otherwise unless there are some strong impediments. For instance when 'hotness' of touch is experienced in water, there arises a curiosity to know whether the water is hot or the fire. It is decided that the hotness belongs to fire but not to water, because by 'anvaya-vyatireka' instances it is proved that fire is hot and water is cool. In all those cases where there is no such impediments, the object has to be decided as of the same form as it appears in the experience.

Now in 'this is not silver', the prohibition denoted by 'Nañ' (नञ्) refers to the object that is in front denoted by 'idam', but not to silver. 'Idanta' (this-ness) is prohibited in the case of silver. 'Silver-exists, but this is not silver' - if it is said like this, the 'rajatatva' (silver-ness) which is denied with reference to the external object, is by implication proved to exist as an internal knowledge. This is the idea of the opponent.

It may be urged here against the above view of the opponent : When the silver is prohibited with reference to 'idam', the existence of silver apart from reference to 'idam' is proved. This is true. As far as the absence of reference to 'idam' (Anidantā) is concerned, it can refer to that silver which is near in the form of internal knowledge in the same way as it can refer to that silver which is not near in the form of an external object. When there is the possibility of the existence of silver externally in a box in the house, how can you say that it is only in the form of internal knowledge ?

To this the opponent answers saying that since what is

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not before (vyavahita = away from the range of sight) cannot be directly perceived, it should be taken as internal knowledge only (internal perception only). In 'this is not silver', the silver is denied only with reference to 'this'; but its being an object of perception is not denied. Thus on the strength of denial, its real existence elsewhere (apart from the object referred to by 'this') should be taken as fit to be perceived. In the present case it can only in the form of internal perception, like the internal perception of happiness or sorrow. This is established by an inference : ''तथा च प्रयोगः, etc. ''

Here the hetu given is ''सम्प्रयोगमन्तरेण अपरोक्षत्वात् 'Samprayoga' means 'contact by external senses' (Bahirindriya-Sannikarṣaḥ). It is internal Pratyakṣa (Ajarokṣa) because it has no contact of the external sense.

The Advaitins reject this view by saying that it is untenable on the ground that it cannot stand the alternative questions. The questions are : Does the knowledge of denial directly reveals the form of internal perception (of silver)? Or does it reveal that through inference ? The first alternative cannot be accepted because that denial reveals only the difference between the shell and silver, but cannot refer to the knowledge-form of silver. That is in keeping with experience. The second alternative is also not tenable. The knowledge of denial denies only what is concerned at the moment, but does not proceed to reveal its knowledge-form. What is concerned here is the silver which appears so due to a defect. Thus the denial applies to the object in the place in front referrred to as this. It cannot further go by implication (inference) to prove that knowledge of silver is internal.

Furhter as regards the attempt at proving the intrenal knowledge-form of silver by advancing the hetu in the form of the absence of the contact by external organs, it is said that it is

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not proper. The Vijñānavādins do not accept an object separately as 'Jñānākāra' and 'Arthākāra'. According to them, 'Bāhyākāra' (Arthākāra) is also of the form of knowledge. Accordingly in the present case, to say that silver is of the form of internal knowledge although it appears externally, is open to the fallacy of 'Savyabhicāra'. The 'Ajñāna' which is revealed to 'Sakṣi-Pratyakṣa' cannot be internal knowledge because it is Ajñāna. Hence, if the internal form is inferred by the external form, it amounts to 'Savyabhicāra'.

## 5. Refutation of Anyathākhyātivāda

5.2. नन्वन्यथाख्यातिवादिमतानुसारेण रजतस्य देशान्तरसत्त्वेन भाव्यम्। अन्यथा तस्य प्रतिषेधप्रतियोगित्वानुपपत्तेः। न हि कश्चित्प्रेक्षावाञ्शशविषाणं प्रभवति। तदुक्तम्-

व्यावर्त्याभाववत्तैव भाविकी हि विशेष्यता।।

अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिता।।

(न्या.कु.3.2) इति।

तथा च तस्य देशान्तरसत्त्वामाश्रयणीयमिति चेत् - तदपि न प्रमाण-पद्धतिमध्यास्ते। असतः संसर्गस्यैव कलधौतस्य निषेधप्रतियोगत्वोपपत्तेः।

"It may be objected that according to the advocates of Anyathākhyāti, it should be accepted that the existence of silver is elsewhere (but not here). Otherwise there would be no corresponding object (pratiyogin) of denial at all. No intelligent person would try to deny the horns of a hare. It is said -

"The state of having the negation of that which to be excluded is the property of being the qualified in a real object. The nature of having the absence of a negation of something is the idea of being a counterpart in the case of on object.

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"Hence, it has to be neccessarily admitted that the silver is existing somewhere else. When it is contended as above, the reply is that it is beyond any valid means (Pramāṇa), because the non-existent silver can be made the 'pratiyogin' of the knowledge of denial, like the association with something non-existent".

It may be contended here thus : Let there be no establishment of silver of the nature of internal perception through the denial in the form of 'this is not silver'. But there can be the establishment of the distant silver existing in the house, etc., through this denial by implication. With this idea in mind, the opponent argues that according to the Anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas, the silver can be understood as existing elsewhere. Anyathākhyāti means the cognition of something as some other thing. The cognition of something as some other thing is possible only when that some other things exists some where. When something is absolutely non-existent, say for instance, 'Śaśaviṣāṇa', it cannot be denied at all. No wise person would try to deny 'Śaśaviṣāṇa'. The denial of silver implies that it is existing elsewhere. The stanza quoted from Nyāyakusumānjali tries establish that an object which is absolutely non-existent cannot have either 'Viśesyatva' or 'pratiyogitva'.

There are two constituents of a relation : they are pratiyogin and Anuyogin. These are respectively called Viśeṣaṇa and Viśeṣya. For instance, in 'Ghaṭavadbhūtalam', 'Ghaṭa' is the 'Viśeṣaṇa' and 'Bhūtala' is the 'Viśeṣya'. By 'Ghaṭavat', the absence of 'Ghaṭa' in 'Bhūtala' is rejected. What is rejected is 'Vyāvartya' and what rejects it is called 'Vyāvartaka'. The absence of Ghaṭa is 'Vyāvartya' and its opposite, viz., the absence of the absence of Ghaṭa (Ghaṭābhāvabhāva) is the 'Vyāvartaka'. Then the absence of the 'Vyāvartya' in the form of 'Ghaṭābhāva' which is in the 'Bhūtala' is the 'Viśeṣyata'. The absence of that object of which the absence is told is the pratiyogin. Here ther absence of 'Ghaṭābhāva' is

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stated and hence 'Ghaṭābhāva' is the pratiyogin. Thus in 'this is not silver', the real silver is the pratiyogin of denial, but not the appearance of silver. Through this the existence of silver elsewhere is established.

The Vedāntins reject this saying by arguing that it is beyond any Pramāṇa. For instance when we say 'रूपं न रससंयुक्तम्', the 'Saṁyoga' created by the same case-relation is denied. Here the imaginary 'Saṁyoga' is made the 'pratiyogin'. Similarly here also, the silver which is only imaginary, is denied. Thus the non-existent silver can be made the 'pratiyogin' of denial.

## इदं रजतम् - Is it one cognition or double - cognition ?

5.2. नन्विदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमेकमनेकं वा। न तावदाद्यः अपसिद्धान्तापत्तेरसंभवाश्च। तथा हि - शुक्तीदमंशेन्द्रियसम्प्रयोगादिदमाकारान्तः परिणामरूपमेकं ज्ञानं जायते। न च तत्र कलधौतं विषयभावमाकल्पयितुमुत्सहते। असंप्रयुक्तत्वात्तस्य। विषयत्वाङ्गीकारे सर्वज्ञत्वापत्तेः। न च चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायितया तज्ज्ञानस्य तज्जन्यत्वं वाच्यम्। इदमंशज्ञानोत्पतौ तदुपक्षयोपपत्तेः। न चापिसंस्काराद्रजतज्ञानस्य जन्म। स्मृतित्वापत्तेः। अथेन्द्रियदोषस्य तत्करणत्वम्। तदप्ययुक्तम्। स्वातन्त्र्येण तस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः। न हि ग्रहणस्मरणाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः समस्ति। तस्मादिदमंशरजततादात्म्यविषयमेकं विज्ञानं न घटते। नाप्यनेकमख्यातिमतापत्तेरिति चेत् -

उच्यते। प्रथमं दोषकलुषितेन चक्षुषेदंतामात्रविषयान्तः करणवृत्तिरुत्पद्यते। अनन्तरं तया वृत्त्या चैतन्यावरणाभिभवे सति तच्चैतन्यमभिव्यज्यते। पश्चादिदमंशचैतन्यनिष्ठा अविद्या रागादिदोषकलुषिता कलधौताकारेण परिणमते। इदमाकारान्तःकरणपरिणामावच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठा कलधौतगोचरपरिणामसंस्कारसचिवा कलधौतज्ञानाभासाकारेण परिणमते।

तौ च रजतवृत्तिपरिणामौ स्वाधिष्ठानेन साक्षिचैतन्येनाव्यवधानेन भास्येते। तथा च सवृत्तिकाया अविद्यायाः साक्षिभास्यत्वाभ्युपगमे वृत्त्यन्तरवेद्यत्वाभावान्नानवस्था। यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवृत्तिरविद्यावृत्तिश्चेति द्वे इमे ज्ञाने तथापि

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विषयाधीनं फलम्। ज्ञातो घट इति विषयावच्छिन्नतया फलप्रतीतेः तद्विषयश्च सत्यमिथ्याभूतयोरिदमंशरजतांशयोरन्योन्यात्मकतयैकत्वमापन्नः। तस्माद्विषया-वच्छिन्नफलस्याप्येकत्वाज्ज्ञानैक्यमपचर्यते। तदुक्तम् -

शुक्तीदमंशचैतन्यस्थिताविद्या विजृम्भते।

रागादि दोषसंस्कार सचिवा रजतात्मना।।

इदमाकारवृत्त्यक्तचैतन्यस्था तथाविधा।

विवर्तते तद्रजतज्ञानाभासात्मनाप्यसौ।।

सत्यमिथ्यात्मनोरैक्यादेकस्त द्विषयो मतः।

तदायत्तफलैकत्वाज्ज्ञानैक्य पुपचर्यते।। इति।

पञ्चपादिकायामपि 'फलैक्याज्ज्ञानैक्यमुपचर्यते' इत्यभिप्रायोण 'सा चैकमेव ज्ञानमेकफलं जनयति' (प.पा.पृ.9.प.15) इत्युक्तम्।

"It is objected here with a question as to whether the knowledge as 'this is silver' is one or more than one. The first one, however, is not at all possible, because it is opposed to your own doctrine and also because it is impossible. This can be explained thus : The part of 'this' which is in the form of the shell has contact with the senses. Hence, it becomes one knowledge which has transformed in the internal sense (Antaḥkaraṇa) in the form of this. The silver cannot be the object of this knowledge, because there is no relation whatever between the silver and the eyes. If it is argued that something comes to the range of knowledge even without contact with senses, everybody should be regarded as omniscient. It is not proper to show that the knowledge of silver is born from the senses by demonstrating a 'Vyāpti' (invariable concomitance) between the eyes and the knowledge of silver through positive and negative instances. This is because the function of the eyes is exhausted in producing the knowledge pertaining to 'this', and the knowledge of silver is not revealed by it. The knowledge of silver does not arise through

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impressions (Saṁskāra) also, because in that case, that knowledge should be accepted as memory. It is also not proper to say that the defects of the senses are responsible for such an appearance of silver, because they cannot be the cause of the erroneous knowledge on their own. There is no other way apart from the two cognitions, one born of senses (Grahaṇa) and another born of impressions (Smaraṇa). Therefore, it cannot be said in any way that the identity between the part of 'this' and the part of 'silver' is one and the same knowledge (cognition). Again it cannot be the knowledge of the nature of more than one cognitions, because it would amount to the acceptance of the Akhyātivāda.

**Answer to this : The appearance of silver is due to the transformation of the inner sense :**

''If it is contended as above, the answer is given here : Firstly, the transformation of the inner sense in the form of 'this' takes place through the eyes which are marred by defects. Then through that transformation, the cover of the consciousness is removed. Then the consciousness itself is manifested in the form of 'this'. Thereafter the nescience (Avidyā) which is in the conscious of the nature of 'this' becomes polluted by the defects of attachment, etc., and gets transformed into the form of 'silver'. The 'Avidyā' residing in the consciousness which has transformed into the inner sense assuming the form of 'this', mixes with the transformation of the inner sense (Vṛtti) which has transformed into silver-form and becomes transformed into the form of the appearance of silver.

''Both the transformation of silver and the transformation of inner sense (Vṛtti) reveal themself without any impediments through the witness consciousness (Sākṣi-caitanya) which is their respective basis. In this way, if it is accepted that the 'Avidyā' which is associated with the transformation of inner sense, is

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revealed through the witness consciouness (Sākṣi-Caitanya), that error cannot be known through any other function (Vṛtti). Hence there is no question of 'Anavasthā'.

## Bhrānti is one Jñāna : This is Aaupacārika

"Although the transformation of the inner sense (in the form of 'this') and the transformation of 'Avidyā' (in the form of 'silver') are two forms of knowledge, the fruit (result) is dependent on the object itself. For instance, when we say 'we know the pot', the fruit in the form of the knowledge (of pot) is manifested along with the pot which is the object (of knowledge). In that case, the reality in the form of 'this' and the falsity in the form of 'silver' are one only because they are mutually related. Hence, since the object (of knowledge) is one only, the knowledge depending on it is also one. This is said metaphorically (Upacāra). Thus it is said -

"The 'Avidyā' residing in the consciousness transformed into the form of 'this' with reference to the shell, assumes the form of silver due to the influence of the defects such as attachment, hatred, etc.

"The 'Avidyā' residing in the consciousnes endowed with the transformation into the form of 'this', transforms itself into the form of the experience of silver.

"Since reality and falsity are of one nature, their object, too, is one only. Since the knowledge depending on the object is one only, the knowledge that 'this is silver' is said to be one only.

"In Pāñcapādikā also it is said thus : 'since the fruit is one only, the knowledge is also metaphorically regarded as one only'. With this idea it is said that 'it is one knowledge and it gives rise one fruit only".

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## The objection

Again it is objected through a question : 'This is silver' - Is the knowledge of this one or more than one ? If it is said tht it is one, it would go against the Siddhānta view - 'Apasiddhāntāpatti'. It is also impossible. The Advaitins also accept it as the case of double-knowledge not in the same way as the Akhyāti, but in a different way as 'Antaḥkaraṇavṛtti' (in the form of 'this') and 'Avidyāvṛtti' (in the form of 'silver'). The part of 'this' which is of the form of the shell, enters through the senses (eyes) and the inner sense transforms into the form of 'this'. This transformation of the inner sense is regarded as 'vrtti' or 'knowledge'. In such a knowledge, the silver is not the object, because the silver is not really existing there and thus cannot be the object of senses. If it is regarded as the object of knowledge inspite of its absence, then everyone should be regarded as omniscient.

Then it is not proper to argue that the knowledge of silver is born from the senses by demonstrating a 'Vyāpti' through 'anvaya' and 'vyatireka' instances thus : Before contact with the eyes, the knowledge of silver does not arise. This is a vyatireka instance. When the contact with the senses is established, the knowledge of silver arises. This is an 'anvaya' instance. With these 'anvaya' and 'vyatireka' instances, it cannot be established that the knowledge of silver is born from the eyes. This is because the function of the eyes is exhausted in producing the knowledges of 'this' and it cannot proceed to give the knowledge of silver. It cannot also be argued that the defects of the sense is responsible for it. Hence 'Grahaṇa' and 'Smaraṇa' have to be accepted. Hence 'this' and 'silver' are not belonging to one knowledge. You cannot accept this, because, if you do so, you will be accepting 'Akhyātivāda' itself.

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## Refutation of objection :

## Appearance of Rajata : Result of Antaḥkaraṇavṛtti :

Firstly. due to defects in senses, the knowledge of the object in front is not grasped as the shell. Hence the transformation of the inner sense (Antaḥkaraṇavṛtti ) is in the form of 'this' only. This 'Vṛtti' removes the cover of the consciousness which obstructs the manifestation of the consciousness characterised by 'this-ness'. Then the consciousness manifest in the form of 'this' itself. The consciousness does not manifest itslef in the form of silver. This is because the cover of the consiousness in that regard is not removed due to defects. The non-manifestation of the consciousness characterised by the aspect of 'this' in the form of the shell and the non-manifestation of the same as the transformation of the inner sense as the shell in its form are both 'Avidyā'. Both these forms of 'Avidyā' (इदमंशावच्छिन्न - चैतन्य and इदमाकारवृत्तवच्छिन्न - चैतन्य) get mixed up due to defects. Such an 'Avidyā' which is in the form of the consciousness characterised by the aspect of 'this' (without the idea of shell), being disturbed, transformed into the form of 'silver' due to the impression of silver created by the characteristics like glittering (Cākacakya), etc., similar to it in the object in front (i.e., denoted by 'this'). The Avidyā in the 'Vṛttyavaccahinacaitanya', transforms itslef into the form of silver with the aid of the impression created by the 'Vṛtti' (transformation of the inner sense) grasping the 'silver'. This double-transformation reveals itself through the Sāksicaitanya forming its basis. The same is called as Arthādhyāsa and Jñānadhyāsa.

Although this double - transformation (Antaḥkaraṇavṛtti and Avidyāvṛtti - with reference to 'idam' and 'rajatam') is not one knowledge. Since both refer to the same object, it should be regarded as one knowledge. This is only metaphorical. These ideas are again brought out in the three stanzas quoted above.

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# 5 Revision points and Summary

## 1. Refutation of Akhyātivāda of the Prābhākaras

A person who aspires for silver cannot proceed on the basis of the knowledge of 'this' nor through memory of 'silver'.

2. The Prābhākaras argue that they are not proposing either 'Grahaṇa' or 'Smaraṇa' as the cause of activily, but are proposing the similarity of the combined cognitions with the knowledge of real silver as the cause of activity. They ask : What is wrong in this ?

Here the Advaitins argue that the above view is not tenable because it cannot stand the alternatives as : 1) Is the similarity which is known that happens to be the cause ? or 2) Is it the similarity which exists without being know that happens to be the cause ? Real knowledge prompts an intelligent person to action, but not the similarity with it. Hence the first alternative cannot stand. To say 'between them' is contradictory to 'the non-grasping of differnce'. This is also the reason why the first alternative cannot be accepted. The second alternative has to be accepted. The two cognition can become the cause for action, although the absence of difference between them is not known.

3. The Mīmāṃsakas (Prābhākaras) might accept the second alternative above. The Advaitins pose an objection by asking them to explain whether this absence of the knowledge of difference is the cause for action through 'Āropa' or by itslef. The Prābhākaras say : The introduction of 'Āropa' in the middle would amount to 'Gaurava-Doṣa'. Hence, absence of the knowledge of difference is itself the cause.

This view is rejected by the Advaitins on the ground that a special kind of activity requires as a rule a special kind of

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knowledge. Absence of the knowledge of difference, which is an ignorance, cannot be cause of any activity. Hence, superimposition should be admitted here.

4. Advaitins argue that for a person to become inclined towards an object, it is necessary to have the knowledge of that object. Without the knowledge of an object he cannot proceed towards it. This is proved by experience. The Prābhākaras say that in the illusory knowledge like 'this is silver', the cause is the memory of 'silver'. Then the Advaitins reply that once you thing it to be a memory, the illusion is eradicated.

5. The object denoted by 'this' cannot be the object towards which there is inclination to go to pick it up unless there is the superimposition of the silver which is the object of desire. If it is argued that the inclination towars the object in front is due to the absence of knowledge of its difference from silver, then the argument is open to the defect of 'Vyāghāta'.

6. The 'hetu' in the form of 'Bhedāgraha' is the cause for action only through superimpositon. Otherwise, its 'Pakṣadharmatā' cannot be established. Without 'Pakṣa dharmata', the 'hetu' cannot prove the Sādhya through 'Vyāpti' alone.

7. It is against experience when it is said that the shell is the object of experience in this errorneous knowledge as 'this is silver'. Although what is pointed as 'this' is the shell itself, it appears as the silver to the person concerned due to superimposition.

8. The Prābhākaras object saying that a defect can restrain the capacity of producing effect in an object, but cannot produce another opposite effect. Advaitins argue that the above view is not correct because such a power is found in the burnt seeds of cane.

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### 9. Refutation of Mādhyamikas' Asatkhyāti :

The Mādhyamikas say that everything is 'Śūnya'. The shell is non-existent as an object. Such a non-existent shell is basis of the error about silver. This contention is refuted by the Advaitins through an argument that non-existent object has no capacity to appear as an object. Further there would be no inclination towards such an non-existent object for anybody.

### 10. Refutation of Vijñānavāda :

Vijñānavādins argue that the appearance of silver occuring in the error 'this is silver', is of the nature of knowledge (Vijñāna). The object appears in the same form in which it is grasped by us. It cannot be otherwise unless there are some strong impediments. Their contention is : When the silver is prohibited with reference to 'idam', the existence of silver apart from reference to 'idam' is proved. It can be in the form of internal perception, like joy or sorrow, or in the form of silver in the box in the house.

The Advaitins reject this view by saying it cannot stand alternative questions viz., 1) Does the knowledge of denial directly reveals the form of internal perception ? Or does it reveal that through inference.

### 11. Refutation of Anyathākhyātivāda

The opponent argues that according to the Anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas, the silver can be undestood as existing elsewhere. Anyathākhyāti means the cognition of something as some other thing. The cognition of something as some other thing is possible only when that some other thing exists some where. When something is absolutely non-existent, say 'Śaśaviṣāṇa', it cannot denied at all. The Advaitins reject this view by arguing that it is beyond any Pramāṇa. As against the view of

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the Naiyāyikas that an absolutely non-existent object cannot become either Viśeṣya or pratiyogin, the Advaitins say that the non-existent silver can be made the pratiyogin of denial.

12. When the question as to whether 'idam rajatam' is one knowledge or double-knowledge, the Advaitins argue and establish that it is a double - knowledge of a different type appearing like one - knowledge due to the object which is one. Is it one knowledge then ? That it is one knowledge is only metaphorical.

## 7. Intext Questions

7.1. Refute the Akhyātivāda according to the Advaitins.

**7.2. Answer the following questions :**

(1) Explain 'Sārūpya' according to Prabhakaras.

(2) What are the alternatives set against the Prābhākara view of 'Sārūpya' by Advaitins ?

(3) Why 'Āropa' should be accepted according to the Advaitins ?

(4) How the Advaitins prove that Bhrānti is 'Āropatmaka' ?

7.3. Refute the Asatkhyativāda of the Mādhyamikas.

**7.4. Write short notes on :**

(1) Refutation of Anyathākhyāti

(2) Anavasthādoṣa

(3) Bādhitadoṣa

(4) Vijñānavāda

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7.5. **Explain the following :**

(1) न खलु गोसन्निभो गवय इत्यवभासो गवर्थिनं गवये प्रवर्तयति।

(2) व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावल्लिङ्गस्यैव गमकत्वाङ्गीकारात्।

(3) यदुक्तं रजतज्ञानस्य शुक्तिकालम्बनत्वेऽनुभविरोध इति तदप्ययुक्तम्।

(4) न च दग्धस्य वेत्रबीजत्वं नास्तीति मन्तव्यम्। श्यामस्य घटस्य रक्ततामात्रेण घटत्वनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्।

(5) हन्त कालात्ययापदिष्टता। कृष्णवर्त्मानुष्णत्वानुमानवत्।

(6) असतोऽपरोक्षप्रतिभासायोग्यत्वात्।

(7) शक्यस्य दुर्निरूपत्वात्।

(8) तस्माद्विज्ञानमेवासत्प्रकाशकम् इत्यसद्वादिनाम् अयमसत्प्रलाप इत्यारोप्यमाणं नासत्।

(9) ननु विज्ञानवादिनयानुसारेण प्रतीयमानं रजतं ज्ञानात्मकम्।

(10) अन्यथा तस्य प्रतिषेधप्रतियोगित्वानुपपत्तेः।

(11) न चापि संस्काराद्रजतज्ञानस्य जन्म। स्मृतित्वापत्तेः।

(12) तद्विषयश्च सत्यमिथ्याभूतयोरिदमंशरजतांशयोरन्योन्यात्मकतया एकत्वमापन्नः। तस्माद्विषयावच्छिन्नफलस्यापि एकत्वाद् ज्ञानैक्यमुपचर्यते।

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# UNIT - 4

## Śāṅkaradarśana - II

## Sattā-Traividyā, Avidyā, Māyā and Avidyā

1. Introduction
2. Objectives
3. Contact Expositon : Sattātraividyā
4. Revision points and summary
5 Intext questions
6 Assignment

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# UNIT - 4

# Śāṅkaradarśana - II

# Sattā-Traividyā, Avidyā, Māyā and Avidyā

## 1 Introduction

1.1. Sattātraividyā means 'threefold reality', which stands for Pāramārthika Sattā or true reality, Vyāvahārika Sattā or empirical reality and Prātibhāsika Sattā or apparent reality. The first one is one only and that is Brahman. The second one is in the form of knowledge other than illusory knowledge. The third one is illusory knowledge. In the case of illusion and ordinary knowledge, the difference is not that in the former there is no objective conterpart while in the latter there is an objective counterpart, because even in the case of illusion there is an objective counterpart. Objects of illusion are not common to several or general. For instance the serpent which a person sees in the dark where there is only rope is special to him and may not be seen by others. It may therefore be described as 'private' or personal to him, while objects of common knowledge are public, because they are cognised by others also. A second difference between them is that while an object of illusion lasts only as long as the knowledge lasts, that of ordinary knowledge is more enduring.

1.2. Avidyā is neither the characteristic nature of Brahman nor an entity different from Brahman. It is neither real nor absolutely unreal. If it is the characteristic nature (Svabhāva) of something else, then whether it is identical with it or different from it, it is a reality and cannot be called Avidyā. If, on the other hand, it is absolutely unreal, then it is like the sky-flower and can serve no

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practical purpose which in fact it does. It is, therefore, indescribable (Anirvacanīya). Avidyā and Māyā are the same. Here the nature of Avidyā is discussed in detail.

## 2 Objectives

2.1. The discussion about Sattātraividyā is intended to give a clear idea of reality. It aims to establish that the ultimate reality is Brahman only and other realities are only relative.

2.2. The concept of Avidyā is most important in Advaita. Its nature is unique in Advaita. Unless that uniqueness is grasped, the real nature of the world will not be clear. Unless the nature of this world is grasped, there will be no release from it. Hence, the discussion about Avidyā aims to depict the nature of the world from which the Ātman aspires get released.

## 3 Contact Expositon : Sattātraividyā

3.1. ननु शुक्तिकामस्तके भाव्यमानस्य कलधौतस्य तत्रैव सत्यत्वाभ्युपगमे नेदं रजतमिति निषेधः कथं प्रभवेदिति चेत्, न। प्रातिभासिकसत्यत्वेऽपि व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वाभावेन प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ प्रतियोगित्वसम्भवात्। तदुक्तं पञ्चपादिकाविवरणे - त्रिविधं सत्त्वम्। परमार्थसत्वं ब्रह्मणः। अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यं सत्त्वं मायोपाधिकमाकाशादेः। अविद्योपाधिकं सत्त्वं रजतादेरिति। अन्यत्राप्युक्तम् -

कालत्रये ज्ञातृकाले प्रतीतिसमये तथा।
बाधाभावात्पदार्थानां सत्त्वत्रैविध्यमिष्यते।।
तात्विकं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं व्योमादेर्व्यावहारिकम्।
रूप्यादेरर्थजातस्य प्रातिभासिकमिष्यते।। इति।
लौकिकेन प्रमाणेन यद्बाध्यं लौकिकेऽवधौ।
तत्प्रातिभासिकं सत्त्वं बाध्यं सत्येव मातरि।।

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वैदिकेन प्रमाणेन यद्बाध्यं वैदिकेवधौ।

तद्व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वं बाध्यं मात्रा सहैव तत्।। इति च।।

"If it is objected as to how the prohibition as 'this is not silver can arise, when the existence of silver is accepted as understood in the shell, the answer is that it is not tenable. Although it is a case of apparent reality, it is not that of empirical reality. Hence, it is possible to make it an objective conterpart of prohibition in the place where it exists. It is said in the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa -

The realtiy is three-fold. Brahman is the true reality. Since the ether, etc., which are born from Māyā, have practical utility, they have empirical reality. The silver in 'this is silver' whose adjunct is Nesciece, has apparent reality. It is said elsewhere also -

"It is accepted that objects have threefold reality, because there is no cognition of denial in the case of the knowledge of those objects during three times (past, present and future), in the empirical state and at the time of error.

"Brahman's is the true reality. The ether, etc., belong to empirical reality. The objects such as 'silver' (in this is silver'), belong to apparent reality.

"That reality which exists until it is denied by worldly means of knowledge (perception, etc.) during the experience of that knowledge, is apparent reality.

"That reality which persists until the knowledge of Veda arises and which gets denied by Vedic authority, is called empirical reality".

**The objection here is this :** The silver is accepted in the place where the shell exists by the modification of Avidyā as silver. At the moment its reality cannot denied.

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**The answer is this :** The prohibition that 'this is not silver' is grasped in the place where the shell exists. Here it is not possible to consider the silver as the objective counterpart (pratiyogin) of prohibition, because the silver which is of the nature of the modification of Avidya exists for sometime. Yet the silver never existed there as having any practical utility. Hence such silver which has an empirical reality can be the objective counterpart of prohibition. Although the silver of the nature of apparent reality (Prātibhāsika) cannot be the 'pratiyogin' of prohibition, the silver of the nature of empirical reality (Vyāvahārika) can be the 'pratiyogin' of prohibition. The silver may have 'Prātibhāsika satyatva', but it cannot have any 'Vyāvahārika satyatva'.

## Sattā is three-fold

Advaitins accept three kinds of reality as Pāramārthika, Vyāvahārika and Prātibhāsika. Brahman alone is Pāramārthika Satya (true reality). That which has practical utility (Arthakriyākāritva), is said to be Vyāvahārika Satya (empirical reality). That which is of the nature Avidyā is said to be Prātibhāsika Satya (apparent reality). These three are explained in the stanzas quoted.

लौकिकावधौ = व्यवहारकाले। The idea this is silver is denied at the 'Vyavahārakāla' only through the Pramāṇas such as Perception (Pratyakṣa). वैदिकावधौ = तत्त्वमस्यागमेन आत्मैक्यसाक्षात्कारकाले। The objects of the world such as ether are Vyāvahārika Satya, because they are not denied at the time Vyāvahāra, i.e., practical utility. But they are denied at the time when there is the realisation of the unity of Ātman through the Śruti teachings such as 'Tattvam asi'. At that time there is not even the slightest appearance of duality (dvaita).

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## Avidyā is 'Anirvacanīya'

3.2. ततः ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्या भ्रान्तिगोचरस्य मायामयस्य रजतादेः सदसद्विलक्षणत्वलक्षणमनिर्वचनीयत्वं सिद्धम्। तमेवोचच्चित्सुखाचार्यः -

प्रत्येकं सदसत्वाभ्यां विचारपदवीं न यत्।

गाहते तदनिर्वाच्यमाहुर्वेदान्तवादिनः।। (चित्सु.पृ.79)इति।

"Then since there is no way of harmonising appearance and knowledge of denial ('Khyāti' and 'Bādhajñāna'), the silver which appears in illusion and which is made up of nescience, should be accepted as indescribable ( Anirvacanīya) on the ground that it is different from both existence and absence of existence. The same is told by Citsūkhācārya :

"That which cannot enjoy the status of thinking separately as 'existent' and as 'non-existent', is said to be indescribable (Anirvacanīya) by the Vedāntins".

At the time of illusion, an object appears. It cannot be said to be absolutely absent (non-existent) - 'asat' - like the horns of a hare. Later at the time of denial, that knowledge of silver is denied that 'this is the shell only, but not the silver'. Hence it cannot be said to be absolutely existent - 'sat'. Thus the object 'silver' in the illusory knowledge is different from both 'sat' and 'asat' (Sadasadvilakṣaṇa). The same is called 'Anirvacanīya-khyāti'. The same idea is brought out by the stanza of Citsūkhācārya.

## Māyā and Avidyā are one and the same

3.3. ननु मायाविद्ययोः स्वाश्रयव्यामोहहेतुत्वतदभावाभ्यां भेदस्य जागरूकत्वेनाविद्यामयत्वे वक्तव्ये मायामयत्वोक्तिरारोप्यस्य अयुक्तेति चेत् - तदयुक्तम्। अनिर्वचनीयत्वतत्त्वाभासप्रतिबन्धकत्वादिलक्षणजातस्य मायाविद्ययोः समानत्वात्।

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किञ्चाश्रयशब्देन द्रष्टोच्यते कर्ता वा ? नाद्यः। मन्त्रौषधादि-निमित्तमायादर्शिनस्तस्य व्यामोहदर्शनात्। न द्वितीयः। विष्णोः स्वाश्रितमाययैव रामावतारे मोहितत्वेन तत्र मायावित्वस्या-प्रयोजकत्वात्। बाधनिश्चयमन्त्रादिप्रतीकारबोधयोरेव प्रयोजकत्वात्। अपरथा पङ्ग्वन्धवत्कर्तापि व्यामुह्येत।

"It may be objected thus : There is a difference between Māyā and Avidyā on the ground that the former creates illusion in its substratus (Brahman) and the latter does not so. Hence, your saying that the object of superimposition (Āropya) is the result of the modification of Māyā instead of saying that it is the result of the modification of Avidyā, is not proper.

"The answer is that above contention is not proper. So far as the characteristics such as indescribability, obscuring of real nature, causing obstruction, etc., are concerned, they are common to both Avidyā and Māyā.

"Further what is the meaning of 'Āśraya' (substratum) ? Is it the observer (Draṣṭṛ) that is called so ? Or is it the creator (Kartṛ) that is called so ? The first alternative is not tenable, because even those people who observe the Māyā created through Mantra, herb, etc. The second alternative is also not tenable, because since in his incarnation as Rāma Viṣṇu is found to have been deduced by his own Māyā itself, it cannot be said that it does not delude the creator of Māyā. It is only in the case of those in whose case obstruction is certain and those who know the preventives for Mantra, herbs, etc., that the knowledge of illusion does not come. Otherwise even the creator of Māyā would be also deluded like the blind man and the lame man".

**The opponent argues :** Māyā and Avidyā are different. Māyā deludes its substratum (Brahma), while Avidyā does not do so. This is the difference between them. Hence, you should have said that the object of superimposition (say, silver) is the result of

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the modification of Avidyā. Instead of saying so, you have said that it is the result of the modification of Māyā.

**The answer is :** The above contention is wrong. Māyā and Avidyā are not different. The characteristics such as indescribability, obscuring the real nature, etc., are common to both. Further it deludes both the observer of Māyā and the creator of Māyā. Hence, there is no difference between Māyā and Avidyā.

Further the magician who creates Māyā is not deluded by Māyā since he knows the preventive measure is there, the substratum of Avidyā is also not deluded. Thus Māyā and Avidyā are not differnt.

## Avidyā has Āvaraṇaśakti and Māyā has Vikṣepaśakti

3.4. न चेच्छानुविधाननुविधानाभ्यां तयोर्भेद इति भणितव्यम्। मायास्थले मणिमन्त्रौषधादिप्रयोगवदविद्यास्थलेऽपि द्विचन्द्रकेशोण्डुकादिविभ्रमनिमित्ताङ्गुल्यवष्टम्भादावपि स्वातन्त्र्योपलम्भात्। अत एव तत्र तत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिभाष्यादिषु मायाविद्ययोरभेदेन व्यवहारः सङ्गच्छते। क्वचिद्विक्षेपप्राधान्येनावरणप्राधान्येन च मायाविद्ययोर्भेदे तद्व्यवहारो न विरुध्यते। तदुक्तम् -

माया विक्षिपदज्ञानमीशेच्छावशवर्ति वा।

अविद्याच्छादयत्तत्त्वं स्वातन्त्र्यानुविधायि वा।। इति।

"Māyā follows the desire of the doer and Avidyā does not do so. Thus there is no clear difference between them. This contention is also not tenable. Just as in the case of Māyā, it is produced by the talisman, incantation, herb, etc., so in the case of Avidyā also, it is produced on its own accord by the movement of fingers which is the cause for creating the illusion of two moons, Kēśoṇḍuka, etc. Hence, Māyā and Avidyā are said to be one only in Śruti, Smṛti, Bhāṣya, etc. In some places, difference between them is drawn by saying that it is Māyā when

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'Vikṣepaśakti' is predominant and it is Avidyā when 'Āvaraṇaśakti' is predominant. This does not contradict what is said above. It is said -

"Māyā is that which is dependent on the desire of the Lord and which has 'Vikṣepaśakti', while Avidyā is that which assumed independence and which has 'Āvaraṇaśakti'.

**अत एव तत्र तत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिभाष्यादिषु मायाविद्ययोरभेदेन व्यवहारः सङ्गच्छते।**

In Śruti - "भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः"(श्वे.उ.1.10)

In Smṛti - "तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते।

योगी माययममेयाय तस्मै विद्यात्मने नमः।। "

In Bhāṣya - "अविद्या माया अविद्यात्मिका मायाशक्तिः।"

**क्वचिद् ..... भेदे तद्व्यवहारो न विरुध्यते।**

Ajñāna (Nescience) has two powers (Śakti), viz., Āvaraṇaśakti and Vikṣepaśakti. For instance, in the appearance of the shell as silver, Āvaraṇaśakti obscures the shell which exists there in front. Thus it is the 'obscuring power' of Ajñāna. In the same instance, Vikṣepaśakti makes the silver to appear there although it is not there. Thus it is the power to draw in something else. Here when the Vikṣepaśakti is predominant, it is called Māyā. Although there is difference between Avidyā and Māyā on this difference in intention and on the difference in names, there is no fundamental difference between them.

## Avidyā : What is the Pramāṇa to establish it ?

3.5. नन्वविद्यासद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् ? अहमज्ञो मामन्यं च न जानामीति

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प्रत्यक्षप्रतिभास एव। ननु ज्ञानाभावविषयोऽयं नाभिप्रेतमर्थं गमयतीति चेत्, न तावदनुपलब्धिवादिनश्चोद्यमेतत्। परोक्षप्रतिभासहेतुत्वात्तस्याः। अयमपि परोक्षप्रतिभास एवेति चेत्, न तावल्लिङ्गशब्दानुपपद्यमानार्थजन्यः। ज्ञातकरणत्वात्तेषाम्। न चैतत्सामग्रीकाले ज्ञातमस्ति, अनुभूयते वा।

अनुपलब्ध्या जन्यत इति चेत्, न तावत् इयमज्ञाता करणम्। प्रत्यक्षेतरस्य ज्ञातकरणत्वनियमात्। नापि ज्ञातैव करणम्। अनुपलब्ध्यनवस्थानात्। न च यथा परेषामभावग्रहणे योग्यानुपलब्धिः सहकारिणी तथा न करणमिति शङ्क्यम्। ज्ञानकरण इव सहकारिणि ज्ञातत्वनियमाभावात्। अस्तु वा तथा ज्ञेयाभावग्रहणे करणम्। ज्ञानाभावग्रहणे करणं न भवत्येवेति वक्ष्यते।

"(Objection) What is the authoriy (Pramāṇa) to prove the existence of Avidyā ? (Answer) The direct experience that 'I am ignorant, I do not know either myself or another' is the authority. (Objection) since this experience has the absence of knowledge as its content, it does not lead to the view of your choice [that Avidyā is of the nature of something positive (Bhāvarūpa)]. (Answer) Not so; those who do not accept 'Anupalabdhipramāṇa' should not object like this, because 'Anupalabdhi' is the cause of the knowledge of the nature of indirect cognition. (Objection) Why should we not say that the knowledge 'I am ignorant' is also indirect.

(Answer) It is not correct, because it is not born from any of the Pramāṇas such as Anumāna, Śabda, Arthāpatti. This is because these Pramāṇas produce the knowledge another object only when their invariable causes (Karaṇa) are known. But at the time (when the experience as 'I am ignorant' arises), that special cause is neither known or experienced.

"If it is argued that this absence of knowledge (Jñānābhāva) is born from Anupalabdhipramāna, it cannot also be a Pramāṇa without being known. It is a rule that all Pramāṇas other than Pratyakṣa cannot be Pramāṇa unless their special cause is known. Further they are not Pramāṇa merely with their special causes

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known, because Anupalabdhi would be subject to the defect called regres ad infinitum (Anavasthā). You should not think that 'we, too, accept Anupalabdhi as the cause of knowledge just as the Naiyāyikas accept it as the auxiliary cause when Abhāva is being directly perceived'. There is no rule that the auxiliary causes should be known just as the special cause of knowledge is required to be known. Let it be so. It will be told in future that the very special cause of the absence of what is to be known (Jñeyābhāva) cannot be the special cause of the absence of knowledge (Jñeyābhāva).

The Pūrvapakṣin raises an objection by asking as to what is the authority for the existence of Avidyā is the direct perception about ignorance as 'I am ignorant'. Here what is experienced is the Avidyāśakti which is of the nature of dullness and which pervades inside and outside. This ignorance is not in the form of absence of knowledge; but it is of positive form, because it is the cause of some positive effect.

Again it may be objected thus : What appears as 'I am ignorant' is only the absence of knowledge. Ignorance is not anything other than that. Hence, it cannot prove that ignorance is positive.

The answer is that those who do not accept Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa should not object like this, because that Pramāṇa does not bring out direct perceptive experience. (It brings only indirect knowledge). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaitins accept Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa to know Abhāva. The knowledge of the absence of Ghaṭa as 'there is no Ghaṭa on the surface of the earth' (Bhūtale Ghaṭo Nāsti), is born through Anupalabdhipramāṇa. It is only an indirect (Parokṣa) experience but not a direct (Pratyakṣa) experience. Since Abhāva cannot be directly perceptive knowledge according to them, the perceptive knowledge like 'I am ignorant' cannot be the absence of knowledge.

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It may be further objected as to why it cannot be regarded as indirect knowledge. To this the answer is that it cannot be said so, because it will have to be accepted that it can be grasped through any of the Pramāṇa like Anumāna. But infact it does not arise through Anumāna, Śabda or Arthāpatti. Anumāna, Śabda or Arthāpatti operates only when the efficient cause is known. There may be smoke. But when it is not known, it cannot lead to the inference of fire. In the same way, Śabda cannot give rise to knowledge to a deaf man. Similarly in an instance of Arthāpatti also, unless the fact that the fat Devadatta does not take food during day-time is known, the idea of his taking food during night-time cannot arise at all. In the instance of 'I am ignorant', there is no possibility of the knowledge of probans, etc.

It may be again objected by saying that it can arise through Anupalabdhi itself. Unless the absence of Ghaṭa on the earth is known through the non-existence of Ghaṭa there, the absence of the knowledge of Ghaṭa cannot arise through Anupalabdhi. It cannot be argued that when the non-existence of Ghaṭa is known, it is the cause for the knowledge of the absence of Ghaṭa. As against this, it may be asked as to how the absence of Ghaṭa is known. The non-existence of Ghaṭa is itself the knowledge of the absence of Ghaṭa. If it is said to arise through the Anupalabdhipramāṇa in order to get the knowledge of the non-existence of an object, another Anupalabdhi is required. to know that Anupalabdhi, another Anupalabdhi is necessary and so on. Thus it leads to Anavasthā (regres ad infinitum).

Further the opponents may contend that like the Naiyāyikas, we accept proper Anupalabdhi as the auxiliary cause when Abhāva is perceived. योग्यानुपलब्धि means : If the ghata were there, it would have been certainly seen. In such a case, the Naiyāyikas would say that such an Anupalabdhi could be a cause whether it is known or unknown. Hence, in the experience of Abhāva, there is no contingency of Anavasthā of Anupalabdhi, because the sense

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is the principal cause. This argument is not tenable. What we are now considering is that Anupalabdhi becomes the cause only when it is known. In that case, there is no similarity with the Naiyāyika view. Hence, 'I am ignorant' is a case of direct positive knowledge.

Let Anupalabdhi be the case, whether known or unknown, in the case of those who accept it as a Pramāṇa. But it cannot grasp the absence of the knowledge of an object in general. This is said here -

## 'I am ignorant' - this does not reveal the absence of knowledge in general.

3.6. प्रत्यक्षाभाववादे तु प्रत्यक्षेण तावद्धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानयोः सतोरात्मनि ज्ञानमात्राभावग्रहणं न भूयात्। घटवति भूतले घटाभावस्यैव ज्ञानमात्राभावस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। तयोरसतोस्तु सुतराम्। कारणाभावात्। अतोऽपि योग्यानुपलब्ध्या वा फललिङ्गाद्यभावेन वाऽऽत्मनि ज्ञानमात्राभावग्रहणं दुर्लभमिति परमतेऽप्ययं न्यायः समानः। तदेवमात्मनि प्रत्यक्षेण वाऽन्येन वा ज्ञानमात्राभावस्य ग्रहणमशक्यमिति स्थितम्।

"Even in the opinion of the Naiyāyikas who accept Abhāva as perceived by direct perception, it cannot be said that there would be the grasping of the absence of the knowledge in general in the Ātman when there are the knowledge of the Ātman as the 'dharmin' and that of the object as the 'objective counter-part' of knowledge. It is not possbile to grasp the absence of knowledge in general in the Ātman just as the absence of Ghaṭa cannot be grasped on the surface of the earth where the Ghaṭa exists. If it is said that both the types of knowledge are absent, it is absolutely impossible to say that it is a case of the perception of the absence of knowledge in general. There is no cause at all for such a knowledge. Hence, due to the absence of Yogyānūpalabdhi or due to the absence of the probans in the

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form of a fruit, it is not possible to grasp the absence of knowledge in general in the Ātman. The same is the case with the opponent's view. Thus it is not possible to grasp the absence of knowledge in general in the Ātman either through perception or through any other means of knowledge. This view stands''. The Naiyāyikas who do not accept Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa, say that Abhāva is perceived and that perception has the absence of knowledge as its object. This view is rejected by the Advaitins.

The Advaitins ask here as to whether the absence of the knowledge in general is the object of perception or the absence of special knowledge is the object of perception. This is asked in the case of 'I am ignorant'. Here, since in 'I am ignorant' both the Ātman as the 'dharmin' and 'the absence knowledge' as the objective counterpart (pratiyogin) are present, it cannot be said that the absence of the knowledge in general is revealed. Hence, it is not the object of perception. If it is argued that there is neither the knowledge of the 'dharmin' nor the knowledge of the objective counterpart, then it is absolutely impossible to say that 'I am ignorant' is a case of the perception of the absence of knowledge. This is because the knowledge of the substratum (adhikaraṇa or dharmin) as well as the knowledge of the objective counterpart are the cause for the knowledge of Abhāva.

Thus, as told above, in the presence as well as in the absence of the knowledge of the 'dharmin' and the 'pratiyogin', it is not possible to grasp the absence of the knowledge in general. Hence, it is not possible to grasp the absence of the knowledge in general either by Anupalabdhi or by inference. It is only when the probans in the form of the fruit of knowledge exists that the inference is possible. Since such a probans is not found here it is not possible to infer the absence of knowledge in general. The same is the case with regard to others, i.e., the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.

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The second alternative as to whether the absence of special knowledge is the object of perception, is also shown to be untenable here -

## 'I am ignorant' - this does reveal the absence of special knowledge also

3.6. ननु ज्ञानविशेषाभावः प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यताम्। न तावत्-स्मरणाभावः। अभावग्रहणे प्रतियोगिस्मरणस्य कारणत्वात्। नाप्यनुभवाभावः। तस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्।

नन्वात्मनि घटानुभवाभावः प्रत्यक्षविषयस्तर्हि 'अहमज्ञः' इति ज्ञानसामान्यवचनो जानातिर्ज्ञानविशेषेऽनुभवे लक्षणया वर्तनीयः। लक्षणा च सम्बन्धेऽनुपपत्तौ च सत्यां वर्तते। सम्बन्धस्तावदनुभवत्व-ज्ञानत्वयोरेकव्यक्तिसमावेशो व्याप्यव्यापकभावो वा विद्यत एव। अनुपपत्तिं तु न पश्यामः। नन्वनुभवाभावे प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमेयलाभः। तेनैव तस्यार्थवत्ता सिद्ध्यति। सत्यम्। प्रयोजनमेतन्नानुपपत्तिः। अन्योन्याश्रयात्।

"Then you may say that the absence of special knowledge is revealed by perception. That is not tenable. It is not a case of absence of memory, because in the grasping of Abhāva, the cause is the memory of the objective counterpart. It is also not a case of absence of experience (cognition), because it is unavoidable.

"It may be contended that the absence of the knowledge of ghaṭa could be the object of perception. Then the answer is that in the experience as 'I am ignorant', the root 'Jñā' which gives the meaning of knowledge in general, will have to convey the experience of special knowledge through Lakṣaṇā (secondary function). Lakṣaṇā operates only when there is incompatibility of the primary relation. Here the relation is either the association of the idea of experience and that of knowledge with the same knowledge or the relation of what is pervaded and what pervades (Vyāpya and Vyāpaka). We do not see any incompatibility.

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"It may be again objected that in the absence of experience, the perception gets its object of knowledge and that thereby the pupose (of Lakṣaṇā) is proved. The answer is that it may be so, but the purpose of showing incompatibility of the primary sense is not served, because there is the contingency of mutual dependence (Anyanyāśraya)."

The opponent argues here that in the cognition as 'I am ignorant', what appears is the absence of the special knowledge. Leaving out the knowledge of the objective couterpart and the substratum, the absence of other forms of knowledge is revealed.

The answer is this : The special knowledge should be in the form of either memory or experience. According to the first alternative, you will have to say that 'I am ignorant' means that I have the absence of knowledge in the form of memory. But that is not possible. In the knowledge of absence (abhāva), the knowledge in the form of memory of the objective counterpart is necessary as the cause for the knowledge of the objective counterpart. It is said that it is of the nature of memory only; then how can it be the absence of memory.

It cannot also be the absence of experience. When there is an experience as 'I do not know anything', how can we say that there is the absence of experience'. 'The absence of special knowledge' means 'the absence of the special knowledge of external objects like Ghaṭa, etc.' In that case, in order to get such special knowledge from the root 'Jñā' which gives the meaning of knowledge in general, it is necessary to resort to Lakṣaṇā. For the operation of Lakṣaṇā, there should be incompatability of primary sense and the relation between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning (to be taken). Although there is a relation between the primary sense and the secondary sense in the form of 'Sāmānādhikaraṇya' (same case -

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relation) between the primary meaning of 'Jñā' (as knowledge or in the form of Vyāpya (special knowledge) and Vyāpaka (knowledge in general), yet there is no incompatibility of the primary sense. Hence, Lakṣaṇā cannot be resorted to.

Then it may be asked thus If Lakṣaṇā is not resorted to here, What is it that is conveyed by the perception as 'I am ignorant'? If you say that it is the absence of the knowledge in general, then it cannot be possible. Then something as 'Prameya' (to be known) should be told in order to fulfil the purpose of peception. When Lakṣaṇā is accepted, it is possible to put forward the absence of some special knowledge as the purpose. Hence Lakṣaṇā has to be accepted here.

The answer is that it is open to the defect of mutual dependence (Anyonyāśraya). For the operation of Lakṣaṇā, it must be first decided that what is intended in the cognition 'I am ignorant' is a special knowledge. Hence the ascertainment of the matter has to be done through Lakṣaṇā and Lakṣaṇā depends upon the ascertainment of the matter. Thus the defect of mutual dependence is unavoidable.

## 'I am ignorant' - Explanation of Prohibition (Nañ)

3.8. नन्वहमज्ञ इत्यत्र नञ् आत्मनि ज्ञानमात्राभावं न ब्रूते। ज्ञानवति तस्मिन् तदभावात्। नाप्यनुभवाभावात्। ज्ञानोक्तेस्तदनभिधायकत्वात्। नैरर्थक्यं च न युक्तमित्यनयैवानुपपत्त्या लक्षणेति चेत् - उक्तलक्षणैवाविद्या तदर्थोऽस्तु। सन्देह इति चेन्न। असमत्वात् कोटिद्वयस्य। अन्यत्र हि प्रतियोगि निवृत्तिर्नञर्थः। अत्र तु प्रतियोगिव्याप्यनिवृत्तिरिति।

"It may be objected thus : The prohibition (negation) contained in 'I am ignorant' does not reveal the absence of knowledge in general in the Ātman, because there is the knowledge that 'there is no knowledge' and the absence of knowledge in general cannot be said in the case of Ātman

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(Jñānavān). It does not also reveal the absence of experience, because the root denoting knowledge does not convey the meaning of special knowledge. The statement 'I am ignorant' cannot be said to be without any purpose. Hence, since there is incompatibility, is it not necessary to accept Lakṣaṇā?

"The answer is here in the form of the argument that Avidyā of the aforesaid characteristic (Anirvacanīya) is itself the meaning of negation. If it is again contended that the knowledge would be of doubtful nature, the answer is that it is not so, because the two extremes are not similar. In some cases, the negation comes in the sense of the retirement of the objective counterpart. Here (in 'I am ignorant') it comes in the sense of the experience pervaded by the objective counterpart."

Here the objection is on these lines : The indeclinable 'Naṅ' gives the meaning of negation (Abhāva). Here the negation cannot be said to be that of knowledge in general. Since the perceptive knowledge in the form of 'I am ignorant' exists, the absence of knowledge in general is absent. Nor there is the absence of special knowledge, because the root 'Jñā' cannot convey the special knowledge. For instance, nobody could say generally that 'this village is desolate (without people)' to convey the particular idea that 'Devadatta' does not exist in the village. Further it cannot be said that the statement 'I am ignorant' does not serve any purpose, because it is used by a same person. Thus in the case of 'I am ignorant', it is not possible to decide what kind of knowledge (whether general or particular) is intended (to be denied). Hence, due to this incompatibility, Lakṣaṇā can operate.

The answer is given thus : While explaining the incompatibility on the ground of not being able to ascertain the nature of knowledge, you hae touched upon the point of indescribability (anirvacanīyatva). The indescrible nature of knowledge which you

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refer to is itself the nature of Avidyā. That Avidyā is itself the meaning of 'Nañ'. There is no necessity of taking the trouble of showing the incompatibility to account for the operation of Lakṣaṇā.

The objection is again raised on these lines : Let that incompatibility which is of the nature of indescribableness, be Avidyā. But that itself is the meaning of 'Nañ' is not decided. That is the doubt.

The answer to this objection is that doubt occurs only when the two extremes are equal. Here the two extremes are not equal. In 'the earth without ghaṭa', the 'Nañ' conveys the meaning of the absence of Ghaṭa which is the objective counter-part. In 'I am ignorant', however, then 'Nañ' does not give the meaning of the absence of the knowledge which is the objective counterpart, but gives the meaning of the absence of the special knowledge pervaded by it.

Thus the extreme of the meaning of Abhāva requiring the operation of Lakṣaṇa, is weaker than that exteme of the meaning of Avidyā. He who puts forward the view of doubt, accepts Avidyā and 'Nañ' as conveying that sense. Hence there is no controvercy about it. There is no doubt at all.

## The 'Nañ' in 'Ajñā' conveys the sense of Avidyā

3.9. जानातिसमभिव्याहृतस्य नञः क्वचिदुक्तलक्षणाविद्या-विषयत्वसिद्धिमन्तरेण न सन्देह इत्यवश्यंभावेन सैव जानाति-समभिव्याहृतस्य नञः सर्वत्र तद्विषयत्वमवगमयति। विलुम्पति ज्ञानाभावकोट्यन्तरमिति क्व सन्देहावकाशः ? तदेवं लक्षणाहेत्वभावे अनुभवाभावोऽप्यात्मनि न प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति परिशेषादुक्तलक्षणा अविद्यैव 'अज्ञः' इति प्रतिभासस्य विषय इति स्थितम्।

अस्तु वा ज्ञानाभावप्रतिभासः। अयमभावश्च प्रतियोगी यत्र निषिध्यते न ततः तत्वान्तरमन्यदधिकरणभावात्। माभूदन्यभावत्व-

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मन्याभावत्वं तु स्यात्। ननु तदपि विरुद्धम्। सत्यं, सति भेदे। स च प्रमाणात्। तच्च सति प्रतियोग्यभावाधिकरणतस्तत्त्वान्तरे।

ननु घटवति भूतले घटाभावमितिव्यवहृती स्यातामिति चेत् - मा भूतामेते प्रतियोगिना सहानुभूयमानेऽधिकरणे। प्रतियोगिस्मरणे सत्यननुभूयमानेऽधिकरणे तु स्याताम्। एवमप्युपपत्तौ न तत्त्वान्तर-विषयत्वं कल्प्यम्। काऽनुपपत्तिरिति चेद्बाधकाभावस्तावदुक्त एव। बाधकं तु कल्पनागौरवमेव। तथा हि - तत्वान्तरत्वं तावदेकं कल्प्यम्। तस्यापरोक्षत्वायेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः कल्प्यः। स च संयोगादिर्न भवतीति संयुक्तविशेषणत्वादिः कल्प्य इत्यतो वरमुक्तलक्षणस्याधिकरणस्य व्यवहारविषयेऽङ्गीकारः। सति चैवं ज्ञानाभावे सत्यपि प्रतियोगिस्मृतौ सत्यामनुभूयमानमधिकरणं ज्ञातैव। स च न केवलमन्तःकरणम्, जडत्वात्। नापि केवल आत्मैव, अपरिणामित्वाद् गुणत्वाच्च। अत उभयोरभेदाध्यासः। आत्माध्यासश्चोक्तलक्षणाऽविद्यात्मेत्यायातम-विद्यायामेवाहमज्ञ इति प्रतिभासः प्रमाणमिति।

"It should be necessarily accepted that there is no doubt as long as the denial which is expressed through 'nañ' coupled with the root 'Jñā', does not prove Avidyā of the aforesaid nature. Hence, that very Avidyā reveals that the denial coupled with the root 'Jñā' is pertaining to Avidyā. When the view that the absence of knowledge is a case of direct perception is slipping away, where is the scope for doubt ? Thus in the absence of the cause for the operation of Lakṣaṇā, the absence of experience is not grasped directly in the Ātman. Then what remains is Avidyā of the aforesaid nature only. That itself becomes the object of experience in the form of 'I am ingorant'. This is proved.

"It may be objected thus : Let what appears there (i.e., in 'I am ignorant') is the absence of knowledge (but not Avidyā which is positive nature). But this absence (Abhāva) is not different from that principle of substratum wherein the knowledge which is the objective counterpart is denied.

"Let that absence of an object (in form of substratum) be not something else as that of positive nature. But the absence

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(Abhāva) is something from it (substratum). Even this would be opposed to your doctrine. Yes, what you say is true, only when the difference (between Ātman - the substratum and the absence of knowledge - the object residing - Ādheya) is accepted. That (difference - bheda) is proved by the Pramāṇa and that Pramāṇa operates only when an object other than the substratum and the absence of the objective counterpart exists. ( But there is no such an object).

"It may be further objected thus : Then let there be valid knowledge and its usage as regards the 'Ghaṭa' and the absence (Abhāva) of 'Ghaṭa' in the surface of the earth where the 'Ghaṭa' exists. The answer is that in such a substratum where its experience as the substratum occurs, they, i.e., knowledge and usage, cannot occur. But they can occur in that substratum where there is the memory of the objective counterpart. It should not be said that the absence (Abhāva) becomes a subject of another principle. If it is asked as to what is the harm in accepting it, then we have already answered by saying that there is no Pramāṇa for its rejection. The Pramāṇa for its rejection is the prolixity of assumption (Kalpanāgaurava). It is like this - something as another principle has to be assumed. In order to show that it is perception, the contact of the senses has to be assumed. That contact of the senses is not of the nature of conjunction. Hence it is necessary to assume the relation of the qualified and the qualification with the surface of the earth which is conjuncted with the object (Saṃyukta). Instead of all these assumptions, it is better to accept that the substratum itself the object of the usage about the absence (Abhāva). If this is accepted, even when there is the rememberance of the objective counterpart through the absence of knowledge, there is the experience of the substratum and that is in the form of the knower. It is not merely the inner sense, because it is insentient. It is not merely the Ātman, because the Ātman is that which does not undergo change and

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that which is not endowed with gunas. Since there is non-difference between the two (inner sense and Ātman), it is a case of Adhyāsa (Superimposition). This Adhyāsa of Ātman is in the form of Avidyā of the aforesaid nature. Hence, it is proved that the experience in the form of 'I am ignorant' is authority for 'Avidyā'."

## जानातिसमभिव्याहृतस्य नञः, इत्यादि

The point of contention is it is doubtful as to whether the meaning of 'Nañ' is Avidyā which is of the nature of positive experience or Abhāva of the nature of negative experience. It is urged against this that it cannot be a case of 'doubt'. Doubt occurs when the two extremes are equal. But here the two extremes are not equal. In 'अघटं भूतलम्' (example of Abhāva), the disappearance of the objective counterpart in the form ot 'Ghaṭa' is revealed. In 'अहमज्ञः', the disapperance of the objective counterpart in the form of knowledge in general, but only the disappearence of special knowledge is revealed. Hence, Lakṣaṇā has to be restored to in the case of 'Abhāvārtha'. Hence the case of 'Abhāvārtha' is weak, while the case of 'Avidyā' is strong. Even that person who puts forward the 'doubt', accepts Avidyā and 'Nañ' as denoter of that (Avidyā). Then there is no controversy at all. Nor there is doubt.

In "अहमज्ञः", the 'nañ' (denial) is coupled with the root 'jna'. Hence, its meaning as 'Avidyā' immediately occurs to the mind. Its meaning as 'Abhāva' does not so occur. Hence, it is as good as last. Where is the scope for doubt ?

If there was incompatibility, then Lakṣaṇā would have operated. Since there is no incompatibility, there is no operation of Lakṣaṇā. Thus the direct perception in the form of "अहमज्ञः" is a matter of Avidyā. This is proved. उक्तलक्षणा अविद्या - means

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Avidyā of the aforesaid characteristic, i.e., 'Anirvacanīya', indescribable.

## अस्तु वा ज्ञानाभावप्रतिभासः, इत्यादि

In the experience in the form of "अहमज्ञः", it may be said that the absence of knowledge (ज्ञानाभाव) alone appears. Since, as told before, there are impediments such as the remembrance of the objective counterpart (pratiyogin), etc., it is better to consider that 'Abhāva' as of the nature of the substratum (Adhikaraṇa). Hence, the absence of knowledge is only of the nature of Ātman which is its substratum.

It may be objected thus : मा भूदन्यभावत्वम्, इत्यादि। Even it it said that 'Abhāva' is of the nature, will have to be considered as of negative nature as the 'Ādheya'. Thus to consider the same object as 'Bhāvarūpa' and 'Abhāvarūpa' is contradictory.

The reply is this : It is contradictory only when the difference between the 'Adhikaraṇa' and 'Ādheya' is made. During the deep sleep state (Suṣupti) which is the cause for the experience in the form of "अहमज्ञः", there is nothing other than Ātman. Hence there is no question of difference between the 'Adhikaraṇa' and the 'Ādheya'. Nor there is any contradiction.

Another objection : ननु घटवतिभूतले इत्यादि। If 'Abhāva' is said to be the nature of 'Adhikaraṇa', there should be consideration of 'Ghaṭābhāva' and 'Ghaṭābhāvavyavahāra' even when there is 'Ghaṭa' on the surface of the earth (Bhūtala).

The answer is : मा भूतामेते प्रतियोगिना, इत्यादि। It may asked here as to whether such an objection is raised when the 'Ghaṭa' is on the 'Bhūtala' or when the 'Ghaṭa' is remembered. When the 'Ghaṭa' is on the 'Bhūtala', its direct perception itself rules out its 'Abhāva'. During the time of remembering 'Ghaṭa', the

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idea of 'Ghaṭābhāva' comes. Since the memory of the objective counterpart (Pratiyogin - Ghaṭa) is necessary for the knowledge of 'Abhāva', it becomes only auxiliary to it. Hence, there is no possibility of saying 'Jñānābhāva' in the case of the experience in the form ot 'अहमज्ञः'.

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**एवमप्युपपत्तौ न तत्त्वान्तरविषयत्वं कल्प्यम्।**

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Thus there is compatibility (upapatti) between the experience of 'Abhāva ' and the 'Vyavahāra' as 'Nāsti' on the basis of that experience of 'Abhāva '. Hence there is no necessity of assuming another principle or another 'Abhāva '. What is the harm if such a principle is thought of. It is already said that there is no authority of any 'Bādhaka'. Kalpanāgaurava or proxility of assumptions is the 'Bādhaka' here. Another principle of 'Abhāva ' is to be assumed. It should be shown as Pratyakṣa. For that 'Indriyasannikarṣa' is to be assumed. In the case of 'घटाभावद् भूतलम्', the absence of 'Ghaṭa' is the qualification (Viśeṣaṇa) and 'Bhūtala' is the qualified (Viśēṣya). The 'Bhūtala' has the contact with the eyes. Instead of assuming all these, it is better to consider the 'Adhikaraṇa' as the object of Abhāva .

Then even when the Pratiyogin (Ghaṭa) is remembered through the absence of the knowledge (of Ghaṭa), there is the experience of the 'Adhikaraṇa' (Bhūtala) and it is in the form of the 'Jñātṛ' (known) only. 'Jñātṛ' means the 'Āśraya' of the modification in the form of the object (Viṣayākāraparināma). That modification cannot be of merely the inner sense (Antaḥkaraṇa), because it is insentient. It cannot of merely the Ātman, because the Ātman is not subject to modification. That modification can occur when there is 'Abhedādhyāsa' between Ātman and Antaḥkaraṇa. That Adhyāsa is of the nature of 'Avidyā' only. Thus 'Avidyā' is of the nature of positive experience (Bhāvarūpa).

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## Avidyā proved by Inference

3 10 अनुमानं च - विवादपदं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्व-विषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकमप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्। अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावदिति।

"The inference is - The knowledge of Pramāṇa which is the matter under contention (Pakṣa) has another object before it - another object which is different from the Antecedent negation of knowledge, which obscures the object of knowledge, which retires through knowledge and which exists in the place where the knowledge exists - (Sādhya); because that knowledge reveals something which is so far not revealed (Hetu); like the lamp lit for the first time in darkness (revealing a pot) - (Udāharaṇa)."

In the four 'Viśeṣaṇas', 'sva' stands for 'Pramaṇājñāna'. Such an object (vastvantara) as is qualified by the four 'Viśēṣaṇas' is Avidyā. No other thing is endowed with such characteristics. Hence, through this Anumāna, Avidyā is proved. For instance in an instance of Pramāṇajñāna like "अयं घटः", what exists before the Pramāṇajñāna is Avidyā (Nescience). In view of the Pramāṇajñāna, it is another object (Vastvantara). Since it can be removed by Pramāṇajñāna, it is 'Svanivartya'. Since it resides in the place where Pramāṇajñāna exists - 'Svadeṣa-Ghaṭa'. The 'Svadeṣa' here is the Ātman. Since it obscures the object of Pramāṇajñāna (Ghaṭa), it is 'Svaviṣayāvaraṇa'. It is regarded as other than the Antecedent Negation (Prāgabhāva) of the Pramāṇajñāna.

If anything other than Avidyā were to be of these characteristics, then this inference would become negligible and Avidyā would not have been proved by this. There is no such a thing. If any one of the above 'Viśeṣaṇas' were to be left out in the 'sadhya-part', something other than Avidyā would be proved.

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But no 'Viśēṣaṇa' is left out. Hence Avidyā is proved by the inference.

The Viśeṣaṇas are here significant -

## Significance of the Viśēṣaṇas in the Hetu proving Avidyā

(Dalaprayojana)

3.11. वस्तुपूर्वकमित्युक्ते आत्मवस्तुपूर्वकत्वेनार्थान्तरता। तदर्थं वस्त्वन्तरेति। तथापि विषयभूते वस्त्वन्तरेऽर्थान्तरता। तदर्थं स्वदेशगतेति। अदृष्टादिकं प्रत्यादेष्टुं स्वनिवर्त्येति। उत्तरज्ञाननिवर्त्यं प्रथमज्ञानं निवर्तयितुं स्वविषयावरणेति। प्रागभावं प्रतिक्षेप्तुं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तेति। स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तपूर्वकमित्युक्ते विषयेणार्थान्तरता। तदर्थं विषयावरणेति। तादृशमन्धकारं व्यासेद्धुं स्वनिवर्तेति। विषयगतामज्ञानतां निराकर्तुं स्वदेशगतेति। मिथ्याज्ञानमपोहितुं वस्त्वन्तरेति। धारावाहिकविज्ञाने व्यभिचारं व्यासेद्धुमप्रकाशितेति। मध्यवर्तिप्रदीपप्रभायां साध्यसाधनवैधुर्यप्रतिरोधाय प्रथमोत्पन्नविशेषणम्। सौरालोकव्याप्तदेशस्थप्रदीप प्रभाप्रतिक्षेपायान्धकारेति।

"If only 'Vastupūrvaka' (proceed by an object) were given, 'Arthāntaratā' (the state of having another object) would have been possible with the precedence of the object like the Ātman. Hence the Viśeṣaṇa 'vastvantara' (another object) is given. Then 'arthāntaratā' could be possible with another object in the form of the object of knowledge like ghaṭa. Hence to avoid it, the visesana 'Svadeśagaṭa' is given. In order to prevent 'Adṛṣṭa' (destiny in the form of dharma and adharma), the Viśeṣaṇa 'svanivartya' is given. To prevent the knowledge arising in the first moment which is removed by the knowledge of the subsequent moment, the Viśeṣaṇa 'Svaviṣayāvaraṇa' is given. In order to prevent the Antecedent Negation, the Viśeṣaṇa 'Prāgabhāvavyatirikta' is given.

"If only 'Svaprāgabhāvavyatiriktapūrvaka' (preceded by something other than the Antecedent Negation Pramāṇa Jñāna)

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were to be given, 'Arthāntaratā' would have been possible with 'Viṣaya' (object of knowledge like Ghaṭā). Hence to avoid it the Viśeṣaṇa 'Viṣayāvaraṇa' is given. In order to avoid such 'Andhakāra' (which is 'Viṣayāvaraṇa'), the Viśēṣaṇa 'svanivartya' is used. In order to avoid the 'Ajñātatā' (absence of knowledge) in the object of knowledge like Ghaṭā, the Viśeṣaṇa 'Svadeśagata' is given. In order to avoid false knowledge (Mithyājñāna), the Viśeṣaṇa 'vastvantara' is used. In order to avoid the transgression into 'Dhārāvālukajñāna' (incessant or continuous knowledge - stream of consciousness), the Viśeṣaṇa 'Aprakāśita' is given. In order to remove the idea of the absence of 'Sādhyasādhana' (Sādhya and Sādhana) in the lusters of the intermediary lamps, the Viśeṣaṇa 'prathamotpanna' is used. In order to avoid the lustre of the lamp which is placed in a place pervaded by the sun's light, the Viśeṣaṇa, 'Andhakāra' is used."

वस्तुपूर्व - वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वक = If only 'Vastupūrvaka' were given as a Viśeṣaṇa, then Ātman being self-evident (Svataḥsiddha), it would have given rise to the 'Doṣa' called 'Siddhasādhana' (proving what is already proved). Then Ātman would have been proved instead of Avidyā which is intended to be proved. It would have been a 'Doṣa' called Arthāntara. If 'vastvantarapūrvaka' is given as the Viśeṣaṇa, it would mean that it is other than Ātman, which is no other than Avidyā.

वस्त्वन्तरपूर्व - स्वदेशगत = If merely 'vastvantarapurvaka' were told, then since the 'Pramāṇa Jñāna' has to depend on the 'Viṣayā' (like Ghaṭā) only, it also arises with the predence of the 'Viṣayā' other than the Ātman. Hence the 'Doṣas' advanced above, viz., 'Siddhasādhana' and 'Arthāntara', occur here also. Hence to avoid them, the Viśeṣaṇa 'Svadeśagata' is given to 'vastvantarapūrvaka'. It means that the 'vastvantara' should be in the same place where the 'Pramāṇa Jñāna' arises. Since the objects such as 'Ghaṭā' are external and the 'Pramāṇa Jñāna' is internal, the knowledge

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of Ghaṭā, etc., is avoided here. Avidyā, however, resides in the Ātman wherein the 'Pramāṇa Jñāna' arises.

स्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वक - स्वनिवर्त्य = If merely 'Svadeśagaṭa-vastvantarapūrvaka' were told, then 'Adṛṣṭa' (destiny) being the cause in general for all effects and residing in the Ātman itself, the 'vastvantara' would be 'Adṛṣṭa' also. Then the same defects occur. Hence to avoid such a contingency, the Viśeṣaṇa 'svanivartya' is given. 'Adṛṣṭa' is not removed by 'Jñāna'. But 'Avidyā' is removed by 'Jñāna'.

स्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वक - स्वविषयावरण = If only 'Svanivartya - Svadeśagata - Vastvantarapūrvaka' were to be the 'Viśeṣaṇa', then the same 'Doṣas' occur. When one knowledge arises and another knowledge follows, the first one disappears, because two knowledges cannot exist simultaneously in the Ātman. Hence, that knowledge which is removed by a subsequent knowledge, amounts to that knowledge which arises first and resides in the Ātman and from which the Pramāṇa Jñāna arises. Then the same defects called 'Siddhasādhana' and 'Arthāntara' occur. Hence, to avoid them, the Viśeṣaṇa 'Svaviṣayāvaraṇa' is used. One knowledge does not obscure another knowledge. It is Avidyā that covers or obscures the object of knowledge.

स्वविषयावरण - स्वनिवर्त्य - स्वदेशगत - वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वक - स्वप्राग-भावव्यतिरिक्त = If merely 'Svaviṣayāvaraṇa ..... pūrvaka' were to be the 'Viśeṣaṇa', then the same defects occur. Before the rising of the 'Pramāṇa Jñāna', its Antecedent Negation (Prāgabhāva) is in the Ātman. When the 'Pramāṇa Jñāna' arises, its 'Prāgabhāva' is lost. It also obscures the object of knowledge. Hence the Viśeṣaṇas 'Svaviṣayāvaraṇa', 'svanivartya', etc., apply to the 'Prāgabhāva'. Hence the 'Viśeṣaṇa' 'Svaprāgabhāvavyatirikta' is necessary. Then it would be 'Avidyā' only.

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## Dalaprayojana in a different way

स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तपूर्वक - स्वविषयावरण = If only 'Svaprāgabhāva ..... pūrvaka' is given, then since it includes 'Ghaṭā', etc., which appear in the 'Pramaṇājñāna', it amounts to the 'Doṣa' called 'Arthāntara'. Hence to avoid it, the Viśeṣaṇa, 'Svaviṣayāvaraṇa' is used. Since the 'Viṣaya' does not obscure the 'Viṣaya', that which obscures something other than the 'Viṣaya' should be 'Avidyā' only.

स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणपूर्वक - स्वनिवर्त्य = If only 'Svaprāgabhāva ..... pūrvaka' is used, then since darkness also obscures the object, the same defects occur. Hence to avoid them, the Viśeṣaṇa 'svanivartya' should be given. Through knowledge, it is the Avidyā that is removed but not the darkness.

स्वप्रागभाव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यपूर्वक स्वदेशगत = If only स्वप्रागभाव ..... निवर्त्य is employed, then the Viśeṣaṇas are applicable even in the case of 'absence of knowness' (ajñātatva) residing in the objects such as 'Ghaṭā'. When the 'Ghaṭā' is known, there is the experience like 'I know Ghaṭā'. Thus it is clear that there is 'jñātatva' (attribute of knownness) in the 'Ghaṭā'. When the 'Ghaṭā' is not known, there is the experience that 'I do not know 'Ghaṭā'. Thus there is 'Ajñātatva' in the 'Ghaṭā'. This is other than 'Ghaṭājñānaprāgabhāva', covers or obscures 'Ghaṭājñāna' and gets removed by 'Ghaṭājñāna'. Hence to avoid such a contingency, the Viśeṣaṇa 'Svadeśagata' is given. Since 'Ajñātatva' is in the 'Ghaṭā' and the 'Ghaṭājñāna' is in the Ātman, the Viśeṣaṇa, 'Svadeśagata' does not apply to 'Ajñātatva'.

स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतपूर्वकवस्त्वन्तर = If only 'Svaprāgabhāva ..... Svadeśagata' is used, it applies to 'Mithyājñāna' also. When we understand that 'it is a serpent' on seeing a rope, it is 'Bhrāntijñāna'. This is 'Rajjujñāna-Prāgabhāva', 'Rajju-Āvaraṇa', 'Rajjujñānanivartya' and

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'Rajjujñānadeśagata' (i.e., Ātman). Hence to avoid this contingency, the Viśeṣaṇa 'vastvantara' is employed. This 'Bhrāntijñāna' is not in the form of a 'vastu'. What is real is 'vastu', what is 'Mithyā' is not a 'vastu'.

स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्व- (Sādhya) and 'प्रकाशकत्व' (hetu) - अप्राकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्व = When an object is continuously seen for some time, for all that time its knowledge occurs continuously. This knowledge is called 'Dhārāvāhikajñāna'. Here what is known first is known throughout. One knowledge is preceded by another knowledge. Hence in this 'Dhārāvāhikajñāna' the 'Sādhya' like 'Svaprāgabhāva ..... pūrvakatva' does not exist. Then the 'hetu' becomes vitiated by 'Vyabhicāra'. Hence the adjective 'Aprakāśitārthaprakāśakatva' is given in the 'hetu'.

About the Udāharaṇa अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् = The 'Dīpaprabhā' which is subsequently born is not that which is initially born. Hence the 'Udāharaṇa' would be without 'Sādhya'. The intermediary 'Dīpaprabhā' is preceded by darkness (Andhakāra). Hence it would be 'prakaśitārthaprakāśaka' but not 'Aprakāśitārthaprakāśaka'. Then the 'Udāharaṇa' is without the 'hetu' (Sādhaka). It is necessary that both 'Sādhya' and 'Sādhana' should be both present in the 'Udāharaṇa'. Hence, the Viśeṣaṇa 'prathamotpanna' is given in the 'Udāharaṇa'.

अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् = The initially lit 'Dīpaprabhā' not only reveals what is not revealed (Aprakāśitārthaprakāśaka) but also is preceded by darkness (Andhakārapūrvaka). Since the 'Dīpaprabhā' in the sunshine is neither 'Aprakāśitārthaprakāśaka' nor 'Andhakārapūrvaka'. Then the Udāharaṇa would be without 'Sādhya' and 'Sādhana'. Hence the Viśeṣaṇa 'Andhakāra' is given in the 'Udāharaṇa'.

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## No Doṣa in Avidyāsādhaka-Anumāna

3.12. न च ज्ञानसाधके प्रमाणे व्यभिचारः शङ्कनीयः। विप्रतिपन्नं प्रत्यसत्त्वनिवृत्तिमात्रस्य प्रमाणकृत्यत्वात्। तदुक्तं देवताधिकरणे कल्पतरुकारैः "अनुमानादिभिरसत्वनिवृत्तिः क्रियते" इति।

ननु साधनविकलो दृष्टान्त इति चेन्न। प्रकाशशब्देन तमो विरोधाकारस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। तदुक्तं विवरणविवरणे सहजसर्वज्ञ-विष्णुभट्टोपाध्यायैः - न चात्र पक्षदृष्टान्तयोरेकप्रकाशरूपानन्वयः शङ्कनीयः। तमो विरोध्याकारो हि प्रकाशशब्दवाच्यः। तेनाकारेणैक्य-मुभयत्रापि" इति। नरेन्द्रगिरिश्रीचरणैस्त्वित्थमुक्तम् - "अप्रकाशित-प्रकाशव्यवहारहेतुत्वं हेत्वर्थः। तस्य चोभयत्रानुगतत्वान्नासिद्ध्यादिः" इति।

''It should not be doubted that there is 'Vyabhicāra' in the Pramāṇa which is intended to prove some knowledge, because the purpose of the Pramāṇa is to remove the idea of non-existence of an object in the case of a person who is doubtful about its existence. It is said by the author of Kalpataru in the Devatādhikaraṇa as - The idea of non-existence of a thing is re-moved by inference, etc.' If it is objected that there is no hetu (probans) at all in the illustration (Udāharaṇa), the answer is that it is not correct, because by the word 'Prakāśa' what is intended is 'opposition to darkness'. The same is said by Sahajasarvajña Viṣṇubhaṭṭōpādhyāya in his Vivaraṇavivaraṇa as - Here both 'Pakṣa' (Jñāna) and 'Udāharaṇa' (Dīpaprabhā) are not revealers in the same way and hence it should not be doubted that they are not related. The word 'Prakāśa' is interpreted as 'opposition to darkness'. In this way, there is identity between the two (Pakṣa - Jñāna and Udāharaṇa - Dīpaprabhā). Sri Narendragiri Śrīcaraṇa has said thus - The meaning of Hetu is it is the cause for making an unknown object fit for the process of knowing. There is no occasion for imagining the defects of 'Asiddhi', etc., since it is common to both 'Prakāśa' and 'Jñāna'.''

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## Objection : Vyabhicāradoṣa

The 'indriya' is the means of perception because it is the instrument of knowledge. Similarly 'Liṅgaparāmarśa' (consideration of the hetu) which is the means to 'Anumiti' is the Pramāṇa (instrument of knowledge) in Anumāna (inference). Śabda is the Pramāṇa in vebal testimony because it is the means to understand the meaning. Here in all these cases there is 'hetu', which is the means of revealing something unknown through the revelation of the object of knowledge that happens to be the fruit of the respective Pramāṇas. But there is no 'Sādhya' in the form of 'vastvantarapurvakatva' here in the 'Pakṣa'. Hence there is 'Vyabhicāradoṣa' (absence of 'Sādhya' is 'Vyabhicāra').

Answer : विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति, इत्यादि। The purpose of the Pramāṇa is to remove the 'idea of non-existence' about an object from the mind of a person who is in doubt about its existence. That is all what the Pramāṇa does. The Pramāṇa does not proceed to reveal such an object. The revealer of such an object is the knowledge which arises through the Pramāṇa. Hence there is no 'Vyabhicāra'.

## Another Objection : About the Dṛṣṭānta (Udāharaṇa)

The objection is that the 'Dṛṣṭānta' is without 'hetu'. Dīpaprabhā is by itself not the revealer of objects. It is the knowledge that is the revealer of objects. 'Prakāśa' means the revelation of an object. The 'Prabhā' only removes the darkness and renders assistance to the senses. Thus the 'Prabhā' is not the revealer of the object. Hence, it has no 'hetu' and it cannot be a 'Dṛṣṭānta'.

The answer to it : प्रकाशशब्देन, इत्यादि। Here by the word 'Prakāśa', the revelation of an object is not meant. What is meant

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by it is only the removal of darkness. The 'Antaḥkaraṇa-Vṛtti', which is called 'Jñāna', too, removes the darkness in form of the cover that obscures the object. The 'Prabhā' removes the external darkness. The revelation of the object is only through the pervasion of the 'Cidābhāsa' in the intellect. Thus the removal of darkness is common to both the 'Pradīpa' (Dṛṣṭānta) and 'Vṛttijñāna' ( Pakṣa). As per usage the term 'Prakāśayati' applies to both 'Jñāna' and 'tejas' in the world. Hence, the idea of using the word 'Prakāśa' in the sense of 'Jñāna' and 'Prabhā' (which are 'Pakṣa' and 'Dṛṣṭānta') is similar.

The purpose of the 'hetu' is the removal of the impediment to 'Prakāśa' (revelation of an object). This element is common to both the 'Pakṣa' (Jñāna) and the 'Dṛṣṭānta' (Pradīpa). Jñāna removes the obstacle to the revelation of an object and 'Dīpa' removes the obscuring darkness.

## Avidyā : Proved by Śabdapramāṇa

3.13. श्रुतेश्च। "भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः" (श्वे. 1-10) इत्यादिका श्रुतिः।

तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते।

योगी मायाममेयाय तस्मै विद्यात्मने नमः।। इति च।।

एतेनैतत्प्रयुक्तं, यदुक्तं भास्करेण क्षपणकचरणं प्रमाणशरणे "भेदाभेदवादिनां भावरूपमज्ञानं नास्ति किन्तु ज्ञानाभाव इति। तथा च भास्करप्रणीतशारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यग्रन्थः - "यदेव पररूपदर्शनं सैवाविद्या" इति। भावरूपाज्ञानानभ्युपगमे जीवेश्वरादि विभागानुपपत्तेः। न च भाविकः परमात्मनोंऽशो जीव इति वाच्यम्।

"निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम्" (श्वे. 6-19) इत्यादि श्रुतिविरोधात्।

''Śruti is also the authority to prove Avidyā. 'And in the end all this Māyā is reverted' - (Śvē. 1.10) - so goes the Śruti.

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"I salute him (Brahman), who is of the nature of knowledge, who is not knowable and by whose residence in the heart the Yogin crosses over the endless Māyā.

"With this alone the statement of Bhāskara under the impact of Jainas that there is no neiscience of the positive nature according to the Bhedābhedavādins, but that of the nature of absence of knowledge, is refuted. Thus in his 'Śarīraka-mīmāṁsābhāṣya', Bhāskara has said that the 'non - revelation of Brahman is Avidyā'. If the positive Avidyā is not accepted, the difference between Jīva and Īśvara would be incompatible. It should not be argued that the Jīva is the real portion of the Paramātman, because it would be opposed to the Śruti which says - that the Brahman is partless, actionless, calm, faultless and without attachment."

भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः - The term 'Viśvamāyā' refers to 'Avidyā'. Through the meditation on Brahman at the time of liberation, Avidyā is totally removed. The stanza 'तरत्यविद्या' etc., refers to the same. Through this the view of Bhāskara that 'Avidyā' is 'Abhāvarūpā' (Jñānābhāvarūpā) is also refuted.

न च भाविकः परमात्मनोंशो जीवः - 'Bhāvikaḥ' means 'Satyaḥ'. It should be argued that the Jīva is the real (vāstavika) 'Aṁśa' of Brahman like the thread is the real 'Aṁśa' of a cloth. As against this view, the Śvetāśvataraśruti says that Brahman is "Niṣkala, Niṣkriya, Śānta, Niravadya and Nirañjana". निष्कलम् = निर्गताः कलाः (अंशाः) यस्मात्तत् निष्कलम् (निरवयवम्). It is without parts. That is why it is निष्क्रियम् क्रियारहितम्। That is why it is शान्तम् - अपरिणामि। It also means 'ऊर्मिषट्करहितम्' free from the six 'Ūrmis', viz., बुभूक्षा, पिपासा, शोक, मोह, जरा and मृत्यु। निरवद्यम् - faultless, रागादिदोषशून्यम्। निरञ्जनम् - धर्माधर्माद्यसम्बद्धम्, unattached to merit or sin. Thus this Śruti is clearly opposed to the view that the Jīva is a real 'Aṁśa' of Brahman.

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3.14. केचन शाक्ताः - शक्तिं मायाशब्दार्थभूतां जगत्कारणत्वेनाङ्गीकृतां सत्यामभ्युपेत्य मातुलिङ्गगदाखेटविधारिणी महालक्ष्मीस्तस्याः प्रथमावतार इति वर्णयन्ति। सा च कालरात्रिः सरस्वतीति द्वे शक्ती उत्पाद्य ब्रह्माणं पुरुषं श्रियं च स्त्रियमुत्पादयामास। स्वयं मिथुनं जनयित्वा स्वसुते अप्याह - अहमिव युवामपि मिथुनमुत्पादयतमिति। ततः कालरात्रिर्महादेवं पुरुषं स्वरां स्त्रियं च जनयामास। सरस्वती च विष्णुं पुरुषं गौरीं च स्त्रियमुदपादयत्। ततश्चादिर्विवाहम-करोदकारयच्च। एवं ब्रह्मणे स्वरां, विष्णवे श्रियं, शिवाय गौरीं दत्वा, शक्तियुक्तानां तेषां सृष्टिस्थितिसंहाराख्यानि कर्माणि प्रत्यपादयदिति। तदेतन्मतं श्रुत्यादिमूलप्रमाणविधुरतया स्वोत्प्रेक्षामात्रपरिकल्पितमिति स्वरूपव्याक्रियैव निराक्रियेत्युपेक्षणीयम्। ततश्चानिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्याविलसितः प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रतीयमानः प्रमातृत्वादिप्रपञ्चः इत्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन।

"Some Śāktas accept Śakti who happens to be denoted by Māyā, as the cause of the world and describe Mahālakṣmi who holds pomegranate fruit, club and shield as the first incarnation of Śakti. She (Mahālakṣmi) created two Śaktis called Kālarātri and Sarasvatī and further created a man called Brahman and a woman called Śrī. She herself got born as a pair and advised her daughters to create pairs like herself. Then Kālarātri created a man in the form of Māhādeva and a woman in the form of Svarā. Sarasvatī created a man called Viṣṇu and a woman called Gaurī. Then Mahālakṣmi married and celebrated the marriages. Thus Svarā was given to Brahman, Śrī to Viṣṇu and Gaurī to Māhādeva in marriage and assigned to them, who were thus endowed with Śaktis, the functions of creation, protection and annihilation respectively.

"Since there is no support of the authorities such as Śruti for the above view, it is only created by imagination. Hence it can be rejected by explaining its nature in the above manner (as imaginary). With this idea, the view can be neglected. Then the world in the form of variety as the knower (Pramātṛ), etc., which appears in the Pratyagātman, is nothing but the grand

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display of Avidyā that is indescribable and beginningless. Enough of prolixity''.

स्वरूपव्याक्रियैव निराक्रिया इत्युपेक्षणीयम् - Some one called Caitra says 'I am going'. Then Maitra immediately on hearing that statement repeats 'Presently I am going' without either prompting or prohibiting Caitra. The imitation of what is said by Caitra is only indicative of prohibition on the part of Maitra. The same idea is applicable here. The above account is rejected on the ground that it is an imaginary story.

When Avidyā is thus established, it is proved that this world which is rooted in it is nothing but false. As per the maxim 'सति प्रमेये प्रमातृत्वम्' - When there is something to be known (Prameya), there is the knower, it is only when the world which is the 'Prameya' is proved false, then all things such Pramātṛa (knower), etc., depending on it, are also proved as false. Finally the 'Nirviśeṣatva' of the Ātman is proved.

## Saṁsāra is Avidyākalpita

3.15. ननु किमर्थं प्रमातृत्वादीनामविद्यकत्वं निगद्यते। ब्रह्मज्ञानेन निवर्तनाय जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावाय वा ? न प्रथमः। शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादेव सत्यस्यापि ज्ञानेन निवृत्तेरुपपत्तेः। उपलम्भाच्च। तथा हि -

'सेतुं दृष्ट्वा विमुच्येत ब्रह्महा ब्रह्महत्यया' इत्यादिना पापं सनीस्रस्यते। विषयदोषदर्शनेन रागो दन्दह्यते। तार्क्ष्यध्यानेन विषं शम्यते। एवं कर्तृत्वादिबन्धः पारमार्थिकोऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानेन निवर्त्येत। न चरमः। औपाधिकस्य जीवभावस्योपाधिनिवृत्या निवृत्तौ ब्रह्मभावसम्भवात्। तस्माद्बन्धस्याविद्यकत्ववाचोयुक्तिः सावद्येति चेत् - नैतदनवद्यम्। सत्यस्यात्मवत् ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वमन्तरेण शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादपि तदसिद्धेश्च। शास्त्रमपि -

'लोकावगतसामर्थ्यः शब्दो वेदेऽपि बोधकः'

इति न्यायेन लोकावलोकितां पदशक्तिं पदार्थयोग्यतां

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चोररीकृत्य प्रचरतीति। अपरथा 'आदित्यो यूपः' (तै.ब्रा. 2-1-5), ' यजमान प्रस्तरः' (तै.सं. 1-7-4), इत्यादि वाक्यस्तोमस्य यथाश्रुतेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यापत्तेः। वैदिकाः क्रियायाः समक्षक्षयितया पारत्रिकफलकरणत्वान्यथानुपपत्या अपूर्वाङ्गीकरणानुपपत्तिश्च।

''(Objection) : Why do you say that the variety such as Pramātṛa etc., are created by Avidyā ? Is it with the idea that it should be removed by the knowledge of Brahman ? Or is it with the idea that the individual soul to become the Brahman ? The first alternative is not tenable, because the knowledge not only removes 'Mithyā' (what is false) but also removes the true object. This is proved by the Śrutis.

''Thus by the statements which means that 'on seeing the bridge (Setu - built by Śrīrāma), he who has done 'Brahmahatyā' would be relieved of the sin of 'Brahmahatyā' etc., speak of the slipping away of sins. Through the realisation of the defects in the objects, passion gets totally burnt. Through contemplation on Garuḍa, the poison is pacified. Thus the bondage as the doer, the knower, etc., is removed by the spiritual knowledge, although it is real.

''The second alternative is also not tenable, because when the adjunct is removed, the state of Jīva which depends upon the adjunct is removed and the state of Brahman is attained. Hence it is wrong to say that the bondage is created by Avidyā.

''(Answer) : If it is objected as above, the answer is that your argument is not free from defects. If bondage is real like Ātman, it cannot be removed by knowledge. Unless the bondage is accepted as false, it cannot be removed merely by the acceptance of the authority of the Śāstra. The Śāstra says thus : There is a maxim that 'the word which has attained its meaning in worldly parlance gives the same meaning in Veda'. As per this maxim the Śāstra, too, accepts the power of the word and its capacity to reveal the knowledge of objects as found

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in the wordly usage and conveys its teachings. If it were not so, then the wordly usage and conveys its teaching. If it were not so, then the statements like 'Āditya is the sacrificial post', 'sacrificer is the stone' etc., should be regarded as authority in the same meaning which they are literally conveying. Then the Vedic rites get eradicated before our eyes. The other wordly fruits such as heaven cannot be attained and on that ground there would be no authority (ground) for accepting 'Apūrva'.

## Bondage is not created by Avidyā : Objection

It is asked here as to why the knower, etc. is created by Avidyā. Is it for the purpose of its removal by the knowledge of Brahman? What is false is alone removed, but not what is true. Hence perhaps it is said that all these are "Avidyākalpita" (Avidyā = Avidyākalpita). 'Avidyākalpita' means 'false'. The argument that it is for the purpose of its removal by 'Brahmajñāna' cannot stand, because even that which is true can be removed through the authority of Śāstra. There is a Śruti statement as "ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" (Muṇḍaka, 3.2.9). It clearly teaches that 'he who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman itself'. Accordingly the knowledge of Brahman reveals the 'Brahmabhāva' of the Ātman. The 'Brahmabhāva' is only when the adjuncts of Jīva are removed. It is said -

"घटे नष्टे यथा व्योम व्योमैव भवति स्वयम्।
तथैवोपाधिविलये ब्रह्मैव ब्रह्मवित्स्वयम्।।"

(Ātmopanisad, 1.16)

"Just as when the 'ghaṭa' is lost, the space in it is space itself, so when the adjuncts are lost the knower of Brahman is Brahman itself."

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Then even when the adjuncts such as mind, etc., are real, they are said to have been removed through Brahmajñāna on the authority of the Śruti statement quoted above. Without the removal of adjuncts the Jīva cannot attain the 'Brahmabhāva'. Even the real ones like 'Brahmahatyādoṣa', 'Rāga' and 'Viṣa' are removed respectively by the sight of the bridge of Rāma, the revelation of the defects of objects and the meditation on Garuḍa. Similarly even the real adjuncts like mind, etc., are removed by Brahmajñāna. For that purpose, there is no necessity of showing them as false (i.e., Āvidyaka).

Secondly, it may said that they are shown to 'Āvidyaka' with the purpose of the Jīva's realisation of 'Brahmabhāva'. When the adjuncts such as 'Pramātṛ' (knower), etc., of the Jīva are real, then Jīva should be necessarily 'Saviśeṣa' and then it cannot be identical with 'Niraviśeṣa Brahman'. This is also not teriable, because 'Jīvabhāva' is that which is endowed with adjuncts. When the adjuncts are removed, it is Brahmabhāva itself. There is no necessity of showing them as 'Āvidyaka' or false. Hence, it is not correct to say that the bondage is 'Āvidyaka' or false.

Answer : नैतनवद्यम् - The answer to this objection is your argument is not without defects. If the adjuncts of Jīva such as mind, etc., are real, they can never be removed by any kind of knowledge whatever. It is with the idea of the falsity of the adjuncts that the Śāstra advocates the removal of adjuncts. If the bondage is not false, its removal is not possible through the authroity of any Śāstra. When any Śāstra statement is not in accordance with that 'yukti', it has to interpreted in such a way as to conform to the 'yukti' as above. Take the examples of "आदित्यो यूपः", "यजमानः प्रस्तरः।". Literally they are against 'yukti'. 'Tādātmya' between 'Āditya' and 'Yūpa' is impossible. Hence the Śruti is not 'Pramāṇa' in that sense. But it is 'Pramāṇa' in the sense that the 'Yūpa' has the similarity with 'Āditya' by virtue of

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its shining surface. Similarly in the case of "यजमानः प्रस्तरः" the stone is similar to Yajamāna by virtue of its importance.

वैदिक्याः क्रियायाः ..... अपूर्वाङ्गीकरणानुपपत्तिश्च।

The Śruti statements like "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत", prescribe 'svarga', etc., as the aim of Yāga. This Yāga is in the form of an action. The action is transitory. It cannot continue until the heaven is attained. Hence, there cannot be cause and effect relation between 'Yāgakriyā' and 'Svargaprāpti'. That is why, Apūrva (destiny) which is born of such 'Kriyā' and which lasts until 'Svargaprāpti', has to be accepted. This is in conformity with what is found in the world. If the Śrutis are taken in its literal sense, the assumption of 'Apūrva' would have been unnecessary. Hence on the basis of what is found in the world, the Śruti statements have to be interpreted.

## Avidyā is Mithyā : Inference

3 16 लोके च शुक्तिव्यक्तितत्त्वाभिव्यक्तावपनीयमानस्थारोपितस्य मिथ्यात्वदृष्टौ तद्दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भे नात्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कार विद्यापनोद्यस्याविद्यकस्य बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वानुमानसम्भवात्। विमतं मिथ्या अधिष्ठानतत्त्वज्ञान निर्वर्तत्वात्, शुक्तिकारूप्यवदिति।

न च विमतं सत्यं, भासमानत्वादिति प्रतिप्रयोगे समानबलतया बाधप्रतिरोधः। प्रतिरोधभियाऽन्यतरदोषत्वसम्भवादिति वदितव्यम्। मरुमरीचिकोदकादौ सव्यभिचारात्। अबाधितत्वेन विशेषणान्न दोष इति चेत् - मैवं भाषिष्ठाः। विशेषणासिद्धेः।

तत्रेदं भवान् पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्। कतिपयपुरुष कतिपयकाला-बाधितत्वं हेतुविशेषणं क्रियते, सर्वथा बाधवैधुर्यं वा ? न प्रथमः।

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते।। (वा.प. 1-34)

इति न्यायेन त्रिचतुरप्रतिपत्तृप्रतिपादितस्यापि प्रतिपत्त्रन्तरेण प्रकारान्तरमुररीकृत्य प्रतिपादनात्। नापि चरमः। सर्वथा

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बाधवैधुर्यस्यासर्वज्ञदुर्ज्ञेयत्वात्। यद्येवं, हन्त, तर्हि ज्ञानात्मनोऽपि सत्यत्त्वं नावगम्यत इति चेत् - मैवं मंस्थाः। 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा' (छा. 6-8-7) इत्यागमसंवादगतेः। न च प्रपञ्चेऽप्ययं न्याय इति मन्तव्यम्। तादृशस्यागमस्यानुपलम्भात्। प्रत्युताद्वितीयत्वं श्रावयन्त्याः श्रुतेः प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्व एव पक्षपातात्।

ननु कल्पनामात्रशरीरस्य पक्षसपक्षविपक्षादेः सर्वसुलभत्वेन जयपराजयव्यवस्थया कथं प्रथेत। कात्र कथन्ता ?

'एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मनो नाधिका मतिः' (श्लो. वा. 1-1-2) इति न्यायेन त्रिचतुरकक्ष्याविश्रान्तस्य तत्तदाभासलक्षणानालिङ्गितस्य दूषणभूषणादेस्तत्र कथाङ्गत्वाङ्गीकारात्।

"In the wordly usage also, when the real nature of the shell is known, what is superimposed on it (rajatatva) is proved to be false through it. On the strength of this illustration (Dṛṣṭānta) only, it can be proved that the bondage which is created by Avidyā that can be eradicated by the knowledge in the form of the realisation of the principle of Ātman (as Brahman), is also false. This is proved by the following inference :

"The bondage which is the object of discussion, is false (Pratijñā).

Because it is removed by real knowledge (Hetu).

Like the shell - silver illusion. (Udāharaṇa).

"It should not be assumed that in the opponent's inference that the object of discussion (bondage - world) is real, because it appears to us, like its existence, it is proved that the world is not false. It should not also be said that it cannot be decided as to which one is correct or which one is wrong because both the inferences are equal strength, because there would be the contingency of 'Vyabhicāradoṣa' as regards the water of the mirage in the desert.

"It may be objected here that there would be no

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'Savyabhicāradoṣa' in the 'hetu' in the form of 'appearance' (Bhāsamānatva) if the objective 'Abādhita' (unsublated) is given to it. The answer is that it should said so, because the adjective itself would be 'asiddha' (annulled).

"He we have question which you may kindly answer. What is meant by the adjective 'Abādhita' which you want to give with the 'hetu' called 'Bhāsamāna'. Does it mean that it is 'Abādhita' for some people at some point of time ? Or does it mean that it is 'Abādhita' at all times ? The first alternative is not tenable, because, according to the maxim that - 'even though a matter is ably proved by efficient debators through 'Anumānapramāṇa', the same matter can be proved otherwise by the other equally efficient debators', - even when three or four persons propound and prove something, others can propound and prove quite the opposite of it.

"The second alternative is also not tenable, because we are not omniscient and none of us can realise that is not 'Bādhita' at all times. It may be again contended that we cannot similarly realise the reality of Ātman of the nature of knowledge also. The answer is that it should not thought of like that, because it can be known through the co - ordination (samanvaya) of the Śruti statements such as 'It is reality, it is Ātman' (तत्सत्यं स आत्मा). It cannot be again argued that the same procedure can be followed in the case of the reality of the world also, because there is no Śruti statement to that effect anywhere. Instead of that, the Śruti is especially interested in propounding the principle that Brahman is also real and through that it is proved that the world is false.

"Again it may be asked as to how can the argument be continued because it is not possible to decide the success or failure when the 'Pakṣa', 'Sapakṣa' and 'Vipakṣa' depend upon only imagination. The answer is that it is not a big problem,

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because as per the rule that 'the intellect cannot proceed beyond three or four steps', the argument ceases in three or four steps. Within that, it is free from the characteristics of Hetvābhāsa, etc., In such an argumentation we consider the proving of one's view and refutation of the opposite view as a part 'Kathā' - discussion."

The Anumāna : In the case of शुक्ति - रजत illusion, the 'rajatatva' (silverness) is proved to be false, when the reality of 'Śukti' is realised. In the same way, Avidyā causing bondage which is removed by the realisation of Ātman, is also false. The inference is accordingly thus :

विमतं मिथ्या (प्रतिज्ञा), अधिष्ठानतत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वात् - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - (हेतुः), शुक्तिकारूप्यवत् (उदाहरणम्)।

It may be argued here that the opponents can adduce a counter argument thus :

विमतं सत्यं, भासमानत्वात्

It is argued that it is equally strong. How to decide ? One inference proves the falsity of the world and the other proves the reality of the world. Both are for the moment equally strong. It cannot be decided either way. Such an argumentation is called 'Satpratipakṣa' (a Doṣa) in the Nyāya terminology.

Answer : The Siddhāntin answers this argument by adducing the 'Dṛṣṭānta' of the desert and the mirage. Although there is no reality as regards the appearence of mirage in the desert, yet there is 'Bhāsamānatva' as the 'Hetu'. Hence the second inference which tries to prove the reality of the world is vitiated by 'Savyabhicāra' (Doṣa). The 'hetu' is there, but the Sādhya in the form of reality of mirage is not there. But the first inference which tries to prove the falsity of the world (bandha) is correct.

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Objection : Again it may be argued that the inference can become valid, if the 'Viśeṣaṇa' in the form of 'Abādhitatva' is given to 'Bhāsamānatva'. Since in the instance of the desert and the mirage there is 'Bhāsamānatva' without the 'Viśeṣaṇa abādhitatva', there is no vyabhicāradoṣa in the argument of 'abādhitatva' is given as the 'Viśeṣaṇa' to 'Bhāsamānatva'.

The answer is by way of asking as to what is meant by 'Abādhitatva'. Is it in the case of some people at some time ? Or is it in the case of all people at all times ? The first alternative cannot stand, because even if something is proved efficiently by some persons, the opposite of it can be proved by others equally efficiently, as per the Vākyapadīya statement quoted above. The second alternative also cannot stand, because we are not omniscient and as such we cannot know 'Sarvatha Bādhavaidhurya', i.e., the absence of 'Bādha' at all times.

Objection : How can we know the reality of Ātman then ? (We are not omniscient). The answer is that there are Śruti statements like 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा' to prove the falsity of the world (bandha) and that conclusion can be drawn by their 'samanvaya' (co-ordination). The same cannot be said about the reality of the world, because there is no Śruti in favour of that.

It may be further asked, when the Pakṣa, Sapakṣa, Vipakṣa, change according to one's point of view, it is not possible to either use or refute any argument with a sense of definiteness. Here the answer is that any argument cannot proceed beyond three or four steps. If, for instance, we take the argument regarding the relation between Jīva and Īśvara, one 'Pakṣa' tries to prove 'bheda'. It that is refuted, it amounts to the Pakṣa proving 'abheda'. It that 'abheda' is refuted, the argument will have to rest again in 'Bheda'. A third 'Pakṣa' of 'Bhedābheda' can arise. If the fourth 'Pakṣa' which opposes 'Bhedābheda' arises, it will culminate either in 'Bhedā' or in 'abhedā'.

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Then there will be no fifth 'Pakṣa'. This is in accordance with the Nyāya -

''एव त्रिचतुरज्ञानदजन्मनो नाधिका मतिः''.

## Śriharṣa : All Pramāṇas apply to Vyavahāra only

3 17 अत एवोक्तं खण्डनकारेण - व्यावहारिकीं प्रमाणसत्तामादाय विचारारम्भः (खं.ख. पृ. 44) इति। न च भेदग्राहिभिः प्रमाणैरद्वैतश्रुतेर्जघन्यतेति शङ्क्यम्। ब्रह्मणि पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वेन तदावेदिकायास्तत्वावेदनलक्षणप्रामाण्यायाः श्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकप्रमाणभावानां प्रत्यक्षादीनां च विभिन्नविषयतया परस्परं बाध्यबाधकभावासम्भवात्। तदुक्तं तेनैव -

तदद्वैतश्रुतेस्तावद्बाधः प्रत्यक्षतः क्षतः।
नानुमानादि तं कर्तुं तवापि क्षमते मते।।
धीधना बाधनायास्यास्तदा प्रज्ञां प्रयच्छथ।
क्षेप्तुं चिन्तामणिं पाणिलब्धमब्धौ यदीच्छत।।

(खं.खा. 1-20,24)

तस्मात्तत्वज्ञानेन निवर्तनायास्य बन्धस्याज्ञानकल्पितत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। यत उक्तम् - 'यतो ज्ञानमज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम्' इति।

''Hence, Śriharṣa, the author of Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakādya has said - The argumentation about 'Tattva' proceeds on the basis of the existence of the worldly Pramāṇas. It should not be considered that the Śruti statements proving 'Advaita' are secondary as compared to those proving 'Dvaita'. Since Brahman is the ultimate truth, the Veda which teaches it, is the authority to teach that 'Tattva'. The Pramāṇas such as Pratyakṣa remain as authorities within the sphere of worldly transaction. Thus the veda which teaches Advaitha and the Pramāṇas such as Pratyakṣa are pertaining to different objects and hence, there is no mutual controversy between them. He has told this also -

''Hence there is no scope for the consideration that the

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Śruti teaching Advaita can be refuted by the Pramāṇas like Pratyakṣa. In your view also, there is no possibility of Inference, etc., being the means of refuting Śruti.

"O wise ones, like those who want to throw the Cintāmaṇi (desire - yielding gem) in the hand to the ocean, you are using all your mental capacities to refute the Śruti which teaches Advaita.

"Hence it should be accepted that the mundane existence created by Avidyā is false, because it can be eradicated by the spiritual knowledge. It is said - "Since the knowledge is the remover of ignorance".

Here Śriharṣa argues that the Pramāṇas, Pratyakṣa, etc., pertain to worldly transactions only. The Advaitaśrutis and Pratyakṣādipramāṇas apply to different things. Therefore there is no mutual controversy between them. The Ślokas quoted above are very significant. They bring out the idea that what is stated by Śruti cannot be refuted by Pratyakṣa and other Pramāṇas, which apply only to worldly matters. Instead of wasting one's mental resources in trying to reject the precious gem Cintāmaṇi in the form of Advaita, one should realise its importance and try to achieve the final end of life. Since it is eradicated by knowledge, the mundane existence is false only. It is the knowledge which removes 'Abhāva', i.e., Avidyā.

## No eradication of Pāpa by mere Setudarśaṇa

3 18 यदुक्तं ' सत्यस्यापि दुरितस्य सेतुदर्शनेन निवृत्तिरुपलभ्यत इति' तदयुक्तम्। विहितक्रियानुष्ठानेन जनितस्य धर्मस्याधर्मनिवर्तकत्वध्रौव्यात्। ' धर्मेण पापमपनुदति' (म.ना. 22-1) इति श्रुतेः। ' प्रमाणवस्तुपरतन्त्रशालिन्या दर्शनक्रियायाश्चोदित-पुरुषप्रयत्न-तन्त्रत्वाभावेन विधानासम्भवात्।

'ब्रह्महत्यां प्रमुच्येत तस्मिन् स्नात्वा महोदधौ'। इत्यादि स्मृतिविहितब्रह्मचर्याङ्गसहितदूरतरदेशगमनसाध्यब्रह्महननानिवृत्तिफलकसेतु

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स्नानप्रशंसार्थत्वात्। यस्य हि दर्शनमात्रेणैव दुरितोपशमः किमुत स्नानेन। अन्यथा दूरगमनानर्थक्यं प्रसजेत्। तत्र खरादीनामप्यनर्थनिवृत्तिरापतेत्। अन्धस्य न स्याच्च। ननु,

**अग्निचित्कपिला राजा सति भिक्षुर्महोदधिः।**

**दृष्टमात्राः पुनन्त्येते तस्मात्पश्येत नित्यशः।।**

इति क्वचिद्दर्शनक्रियाया अपि विधानं दरीदृश्यत इति चेत् - मैवं वोचः। तत्राप्यनयैवानुपपत्त्याग्निचिदाद्यर्घ्यपरिचर्यादावेव तात्पर्यावधारणात्।

यच्चोक्तं विषयदोषदर्शनाद्रागो स दन्दह्यत इति। तत्र विषयदोषदर्शनेन विरोधभूतानभिरतिसंज्ञकवैराग्यैकप्रादुर्भावाद्रागनिवृत्तौ तददर्शनमात्रमिति न व्यभिचारः। यदपि तार्क्ष्यध्यानादिना विषादि सत्यं विनश्यतीति तन्न श्लाघ्य। तत्रापि मन्त्रप्रयोगादिक्रियाया एव विषाद्यपनोदकत्वात्। ध्यानस्य प्रमात्वाभावाच्च।

यदवाद्यौपाधिकस्य जीवभावस्योपाधिनिवृत्या निवृत्तौ ब्रह्मभावोपपत्तेर्न तदर्थमर्थवैतथ्यकथनमिति। तदपि काशकुशावलम्बन-कल्पम्। विकल्पासहत्वात्। किमुपाधेः सत्यत्वमभिप्रेत्य, मिथ्यात्वं वा ? न प्रथमः। प्रमाणाभावात्। नापरः। इष्टापत्तेः। तस्मादाविद्यको भेद इति श्रुतावद्वितीयत्वोपपत्तयेऽभिधीयते न तु व्यसनितया।

''As regards what is said that 'even the real sin is eradicated by the sight of Śrī Rāmā's bridge', it should be said that it is not proper, because it is certain the Dharma which is born of the performance of the prescribed rites removes the Adharma (sin). The Śruti declares that 'the sin is removed by Dharma'. The action of 'Darśana' (seeing) depends upon the Pramāṇa and the Viṣaya (object). It does not depend upon the efforts of man who is performing the rites. Hence it is not proper for the Śruti to enjoin it.

''Then as regards what is said that 'one becomes free from the sin of Brahmahatyā, if one takes bath in the great ocean', it should be said that this Smṛti statement is intended to convey the praise of bath at the setu which has the fruit in the form of removal of the sin of Brahmahatyā due to fact that one goes to a

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distant place through the practice of celebacy (brahmacarya). When the sin is removed by a mere sight of the setu, should we espcially about the bath in that holy place ? Otherwise, going so far would be taken as relieved of sin. Moreover a blind man cannot attain that fruit.

"It may be objected that the mere action of seeing is prescribed in such a situation, as it is said that the sight of the sacrificer who maintains fire, the tawny cow, the king, the chaste lady, the wandering mendicant and the ocean, eradicates sin and it is prescribed that they should be worshipped.

"The answer is that it should not said so, because even in those instances, the incompatibility is pointed out and proved that the sacrificer, etc., should be rendered service to get relieved of sin. That is the import.

"As regards what is said that attachment towards the objects is eradicated through the sight of defects in them, it must be said that through the sight of the defects in the objects there arises 'disinterest' (anabhirati) in them and then attachment towards them is removed. Hence there is no occasion for the defect called 'Vyabhicāra'. In fact the attachment does not come within the range of sight. It is not proper to say that poison is removed by the meditation on Garuḍa, because there also the employment of Mantra, etc., removes the effect of poison, etc., Meditation is not valid knowledge.

Objection : "The state of Jīva is that which is produced by adjuncts. If the adjuncts are removed, the state of Jīva also comes to an end. Hence it is not necessary to say that the world is false.

Answer : This kind of statement of the opponent is like the attempt of a drowning person to hand on to the tender Kuśa grass, because it cannot stand the alternative questions. Would

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you reject the falsity of the world by accepting the adjuncts (Upādhis) as true ? Or would you do so by accepting the Upādhis as false ? The first alternative cannot be tenable, because there is no authority for that. The second alternative is also not tenable, because you will be accepting our view itself. Hence, it is only with the intention of advocating that Śruti teaches Advaita that we have accepted that the difference is only created by Avidyā but not with any preconceived notion."

Here the instances given by the opponent to prove that even real things can be removed by certain means, are shown to be defective. It is established that the world is 'Āvidyaka' or false and that it is eradicated by the realisation of Ātman.

## Avidyā is Anadi (beginningless)

3 19 यदि वस्तुतः सर्वोपद्रवरहितमात्मतत्त्वं तर्हि कथङ्कारं देहादिरूपं कारागारं कारङ्कारं पुनःपुनस्तत्र प्रविशति। तदतिफल्गु। अविद्यया अनादित्वेन दत्तोत्तरत्वात्। अतो निवृत्त्युपाय एवान्वेषणीयः प्रेक्षावता। न तु विस्मयः कर्तव्यः। ततश्च तत्त्वमस्यादिविद्यया तदविद्यानिवृत्तौ निरतिशयानन्दात्मलाभरूपपरमपुरुषार्थः सेत्स्यति। तथाचापस्तम्बस्मृतिः। 'आत्मलाभान्नपरं विद्यते' इति। (आ सू 1 1)

"Objection : If at all the principle of Ātman is free from all kinds of afflictions, then why does it creates a prison in the form of the body and enter it again and again.

Answer : Your question is meaningless; we have already answered it by accepting Avidyā is beginningless. Hence, the wise person should search for the means of relief from bondage. One should not feel astonished. Hence, through the knowledge 'that thou art', the Avidyā is eradicated and the ultimate aim of man in the form of the self realisation consisting in the limitless bliss is attained. Apastambasmṛti has said that 'there is nothing higher than the realisation of the Ātman'."

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## The illustration of a prince

3 20 नन्वसौ नित्यलब्धः। न हि स्वयमेव स्वस्यालब्धो भवति। सत्यम्। किन्त्वनादिमायासम्बन्धात् क्षीरोदकवत्समुदाचारवृत्तितां न लभते। तथा च यथा शबरादिभिर्बाल्यात् स्वसुतैः सह वर्धितो राजपुत्रस्तज्ञातीयमात्मानमवगच्छन् बन्धुभिर्य एवम्भूतो राजा स त्वमसीति बोधिते स्वरूपे लब्धस्वरूप इव भवति, तथा वेश्यास्थानीययानाद्यविद्यया स्वभावान्तरं नीत आत्मा मातृस्थानीयया तत्त्वमसीत्यादिकया श्रुत्या स्वभावं नीयते। एतदाहुस्त्रैविद्यवृद्धाः -

नीचानां वसतो तदीयतनयैः सार्धं चिरं वर्धित-
स्तज्ञातीयमवैति राजतनयः स्वात्मानमप्यञ्जसा।
संवादे महदादिभिः सह वसन् तद्वद्भवेत्पूरुषः
स्वात्मानं सुखदुःखजालकलितं मिथ्यैव धिङ्मन्यते।
दाता भोगकरः समग्रविभवो यः शासिता दुष्कृतां
राजा स त्वमसीति रक्षितृमुखाच्छ्रुत्वा यथावत्स तु।
राजीभूय जयार्थमेव यतते तद्वत्पुमान्बोधितः
श्रुत्या तत्त्वमसीत्यपास्य दुरितं ब्रह्मैव सम्पद्यते।।

"Objection : The Ātman is eternal. Nothing is not attainable to itself.

Answer : It is true. But due to beginningless Avidyā (Māyā) it remains like the mixture of milk and water and as such does not realise its nature clearly. A prince who grows along with the hunters like their children, thinks of the persons of that community as his dear relatives. But once he was advised by his real relatives that he was a prince. On hearing it he realises his real nature. Similarly the Ātman, who assumes a different nature due to the influence of a harlot in the form of beginningless Avidyā, learns about his real nature through the mother in the form of the Śruti saying 'that thou art'.

"The elders of the Vedic tradition say -

"A prince who grows for a longtime in the company of

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ordinary people with their children, understands that he, too, belongs to their class. Similarly the Jīvātman who holds transactions with Mahat (buddhi) and other principles, thinks of himself as merged and caught falsely in the net of pleasure and sorrow.

"All this is false. You are really the king who is the giver, who is the enjoyer, who is endowed with all wealth and who is capable of punishing the guilty. Thus on hearing these words by the guards, the prince realises his princely status and makes efforts for success. Similarly the Jīvātman gets the advice from the Śruti that he is the Brahman, discards his sin and becomes the Brahman."

The 'Rājaputra-Vṛttānta' clearly brings out the plight of the Jīvātman due to the influence of Avidyā and its enlightenment through the teaching of Vedānta.

## Abheda of Jīvātman and Paramātman

3 21 एतेनैतत्प्रत्युक्तं - यदुक्तं परैः किं द्वयोस्तादात्म्यमेकस्य वा ? नाद्यः। अद्वैतभङ्गप्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः। असम्भवात् इति। तत्र अविद्यापरिकल्पितभेद-निवृत्तिपरत्वेन तत्त्वमस्यादितादात्म्यवादप्रामाण्योपपत्तेः। तौ च पर्यनुयोग-परिहारावग्राहिषानाम् मनीषिभिः।

न द्वयोरस्ति तादात्म्यं न चैकस्याद्वयत्वतः।

अप्रामाण्यं श्रुतेरेव नारोपध्वंसमात्रतः।। इति।

"With this the objection which the opponents had raised is answered.

The objection was this : Is it non-duality between two things or is it non-duality of one object only ? The first alternative is not tenable, because it would refute 'non-duality'. The second alternative is also not tenable, because it is impossible to speak of non-duality of one object only. (This objection has been

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refuted by the story of a prince). Since the doctrine that the difference created by Avidyā is removed. is accepted, it is established that the non-duality (Abheda) (between Jīvātman and Paramātman) spoken by the Śruti statements like 'Tat tvam asi' (that thou art) is authoritative. The learned people have referred to both the above question and answer like this -

"Since the principle is one only, there is no question of non-duality between two objects. Similarly non-duality is not found in the single object. Since the Śruti itself speaks of the removal illusion, it cannot be said that the Śruti is not an authority."

If duality is accepted between Jīvātman and Paramātman, the 'non-duality' spoken in the Śruti would be unauthoritative. When there is duality at all, there is no question of prohibiting it. Hence there is no place at all for the Śruti which speaks of non-duality. If it is objected as above, the answer is that purpose of the Śruti is to refute the duality that is created by illusion.

## Jijñāsādhikaraṇa : Conclusion

3 21 ततश्च तत्त्वमसीति तत्त्वम्पदार्थश्रवणमननभावनाबलभुवा साक्षात्कारेणानाद्यविद्यानिवृत्तौ सच्चिदानन्दैकरसब्रह्माविर्भावः सम्पत्स्यत इति ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञास्यत्वं प्रथमसूत्रोक्तं युक्तम्।

अज्ञातं विषयो ब्रह्म ज्ञातं तच्च प्रयोजनम्।

मुमुक्षुरधिकारी स्यात्सम्बन्धः शक्तितः श्रुतेः।। इति।

"Then through the realisation created through the hearing, knowing and concentrating on the significance of the words, 'Tat' (that) and 'Tvam' (thou), the beginningless Avidyā is reverted and the Brahma-hood which is characterised by existence, intelligence and bliss, is realised. Hence Brahman should be regularised as the object of enquiry and what is stated in the first Sūtra of Brahmasūtra is tenable.

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"Brahman which is the object of enquiry, is unknown. The purpose served is the knowing of Brahman. The seeker of liberation is the Adhikārin (eligible aspirant) and the Śruti has the relation with the power to reveal the object."

The discussion of the Jijñāsādhikaraṇa leads to the conclusion that Brahman is 'Jñeya' and the knowledge of Brahman serves a 'prayojana'. Hence, it is established that Brahman 'Jijñāsya'. Then the Anubandhacatuṣṭaya of the Śāstra (viz., Viṣaya, Prayojana, Adhikārin and Sambandha) is stated. The Brahman is the Viṣaya. 'Brahmajñāna' which is liberation, is the Prayojana. The seeker of liberation is the Adhikārin. The Sambandha is that of the revealer and the revealed between श्रुति and ब्रह्मन्।

## Janmādyadhikaraṇa of Brahmasūtra

3 22 जन्माद्यस्य यतः (ब्र.सू. 1-1-2) इति द्वितीयसूत्रे ब्रह्म स्वरूपलक्षणतटस्थलक्षणाभ्यां न्यरूपि। तत्र स्वरूपान्तर्गतत्त्वे सति व्यावर्तकं स्वरूपलक्षणं -' सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म ' (तै. 2-1-1) इत्यादिवेदान्तैः प्रतिपादितम्। तस्य सत्यज्ञानाद्यात्मकस्य रूपान्तर्गतत्वे सति व्यावर्तकत्वात्। तटस्थलक्षणं ' यतो वा इमानि' (तै. 2-1) इत्यादीनि वाक्यानि निरूपयन्ति जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वेन। तदुक्तं विवरणे

" जगज्जन्मस्थितिध्वंसाः यतः सिध्यन्ति कारणात्।

तत्स्वरूपतटस्थाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यते।। " इति।

"That from which the world is born, etc.' - With this second Sūtra the nature of Brahman has been explained with a Svarūpalakṣaṇa and Taṭasthalakṣaṇa. Svarūpalakṣaṇa is that which brings out what is in the nature of an object and which also differentiates it from another object. "Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma" is the Svarūpalakṣaṇa of Brahman, because it is consisting of Satya, Jñāna and Ananta which constitute the nature of Brahman and at the same it differentiates Brahman

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from what it is not. Taṭasthalakṣaṇa is - "Yato Vā Imāni Bhūtāni Jātāni, Yena Jātāni Jīvanti, Yatprayanti Abhisaṁviśanti, Tadvijijñāsasva, tad brahma" - These Śruti statements describe Brahman as the cause of the origination, protection and annihilation of the world. This is told in the Vivaraṇa -

"That is Brahman, which is revealed through the Svarūpalakṣaṇa and Taṭasthalakṣaṇa and which is described as the cause of the origination, maintenance and annihilation of the world."

Vivaraṇa = Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa of Śrī Prakāśātma Yati.

## Śāstrayōnitvādhikaraṇa

3 23 शास्त्रयोनित्वात् (ब्र.सू. 1-1-2) इति तृतीयसूत्रे प्रथमवर्णकेन षष्ठीसमासमाश्रित्य सर्वज्ञत्वं प्रत्यपादि। द्वितीयवर्णकेन बहुव्रीहिसमासमभ्युपगम्य ब्रह्मणो वेदान्तप्रमाणत्वं प्रत्यज्ञायि।

" 'Śāstrayōnitvāt' - This is third Sūtra of the Brahmasūtra. According to the first explanation depending on the dissolution of the compound as Śaṣṭhī Tatpuruṣa - (शास्त्रस्य योनिः), the omniscience of Brahman is advocated. According to the second explanation depending on its dissolution as a Bahuvrīhi compound - (शास्त्रं योनिः यस्य तत्), it is established that Vedānta is the authority to know Brahman."

Śāstra is defined as -

प्रवृत्तिश्च निवृत्तिश्च पुंसां येनोपदिश्यते।
तद्धर्माश्चोपदिश्यन्ते शास्त्रं शास्त्रविदो विदुः।।

Śāstra is that which teaches what is to be done and what is to be avoided by the people and which inculcates their duties. Brahman is the origin of all Śāstra. Hence, Brahman omniscient. The second meaning is clear.

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## Samanvayādhikaraṇa

3 24 तत्तु समन्वयात् (ब्र.सू. 1-1-4) इति चतुर्थे सूत्रे प्रथमवर्णकिन वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यं प्रत्यपादि। द्वितीयवर्णकिन वेदान्तानां प्रतिपत्तिविधिशेषतया ब्रह्मप्रतिपादकत्वं प्रत्यक्षेपि। दिङ्मात्रमत्र प्रदर्शितम्। शिष्टं शास्त्र एव स्पष्टमिति सकलं समञ्जसम्।

" 'Tattu Samanvayāt' - This is the fourth Sūtra of the Brahmasūtra. In this Sūtra, it is propounded that Brahman is the purport of the Upaniṣadic statements. This is one interpretation. In another way, it is refuted that the Upaniṣadic statements speak of Brahman as subordinate to Upāsanā. Here some guidance is given. Other details are explained clearly in the Śāstra (Vedānta). Thus everything is proper."

Here the refutation is of the view of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā thinkers who say that Upaniṣadic statements speak of Brahman as subservient to Upāsanā and that they are also 'Karmapara'.

## 4 Revision points and summary

4.1 Paramārthasatta (Brahman), Vyāvahārikasatta (Vyomādi) and Prātibhāsikasattā (Rajatādi in Śukti-Rajatādi). That which has practical utility is Vyāvahārika and that which is of the nature of Avidyā (Mithyā) is Prātibhāsika.

4.2 Avidyā is Anirvacanīya. At the time of illusion an object appears. It cannot be said to be absolutely non-existent (asat) like the horns of a hare. It cannot be said to be absolutely existent (sat). It is 'Sadasadvilakṣaṇa' and hence, 'Anirvacanīya'.

4.3 Māyā and Avidyā are one and the same, because the characteristics such as 'Anirvacanīya', 'Tattvābhāsa-pratibandhakatva', etc., are common to both.

4.4 Ajñāna has two Śaktis (powers) called Āvaraṇaśakti and

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Vikṣepaśakti. Āvaraṇaśakti is the obscuring power, for instance, it is found in the appearence of shell as silver. Vikṣepaśakti makes something which is not there to appear. For instance, it makes silver which is not there to appear. When there is the predominance of Āvaraṇaśakti , it is called Avidyā and when there is the predominance of Vikṣepaśakti, it is called Māyā. Inspite of this difference, there is no fundamental difference between the two.

4.5 What is the authority to prove the existence of Avidyā ?

The authority for the existence of Avidyā is direct experience as 'Aham Ajñaḥ' (I am ignorant). It is in the form of positive knowledge, but not in the form of 'Abhāva' of knowledge.

4.6-7 'Aham Ajñaḥ' - this does not reveal the absence of knowledge in general. Nor does it reveal any special knowledge.

4.8 The 'Nañ' in 'Aham Ajñaḥ' stands for Avidyā itself. At the same time it is not of doubtful nature, because the two extremes are not similar. The extreme requiring the operation of Lakṣaṇā is weaker than the extreme which means 'Avidyā'.

4.9 The 'Nañ' in 'Ajñaḥ' conveys the sense of 'Avidyā'. This meaning occurs immediately to the mind. Its meaning as 'Abhāva' does not so occur.

4.10 Avidyā is also proved by Inference. The inference is : Pratijñā : The knowledge of Pramāṇa (Pakṣa), which is the matter under consideration, has another object before it (Avidyā) - another object which is different from the antecedent negation of knowledge, which obscures the object of knowledge, which retires through knowledge and which exists in the place where the knowledge exists (Sādhya).

**Hetu :**

Because that knowledge reveals something which is so far not revealed (Hetu).

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**Udāharaṇa**

Like the lamp lit for the first time in darkness.

4.11 Dalaprayojana of the Viśeṣaṇas given to Hetu.

4.12 There are no Dōṣas in the inference adduced to prove the existence of Avidyā. All the objections are answered.

4.13 Avidyā can be proved by Śabdapramāṇa also. "भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः" is the Śruti proving Avidyā.

4.14 Refutation of Śāktamata. The story of the birth of Brahma, Viṣṇu and Mahādeva is refuted as having no Śruti evidence.

4.15 Saṃsāra is Avidyākalpita

4.16 Avidyā is Mithyā. This is proved through an inference :

**Pratijñā :** The bondage is false

**Hetu :** Because it is removed by real knowledge.

**Udāharaṇa :** Like the shell - silver illusion.

4.17 Śrīharṣa shows that all Pramāṇa apply to Vyāvahāra only. The Advaitaśrutis and Pratyakṣādi-Pramāṇas have different application. Their fields of operation being separate, there is no mutual controversy between them.

4.18 Avidyā is 'Anādi'. This answers to question as to why Ātman enters the body (prison) again and again.

4.19 Rājaputradṛṣṭānta. It clearly brings out the plight of the Jīvātman due to the influence of Avidyā and its enlightenment through the teaching of Vedānta.

4.20 The Abheda of Jīvātman and Paramātman is proved on the basis of "Tat tvam asi".

4.21 The Abheda of Jīvātman and Paramātman is proved on the basis of "Tat tvam asi".

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4.22 The first four Adhikaraṇas of Brahmasūtra are briefly explained. The first Adhikaraṇa gives the Anubandhacatuṣṭaya. The second Adhikaraṇa gives the definition of Brahman. The third Adhikaraṇa shows the omniscience of Brahman and establishes that Brahman can be known only through Vedānta. The fourth Adhikaraṇa teaches that brahman is the purport of all Upaniṣadic statements and that it is not taught as sabordinate to Upāsanā.

## 5 Intext questions

5.1 Write on essay on the nature of Avidyā.

5.2 Distinguish between Āvaraṇaśakti and Vikṣepaśakti.

5.3 Explain fully the inference proving Avidyā.

5.4 Explain the implication of "Aham Ajñaḥ" and establish that Avidyā is " Bhāvarūpa ".

**5.5 Explain the following :**

१. त्रिविधं सत्त्वम्।

२. माया विक्षिपदज्ञानमीशेच्छावशवर्ति च।

अविद्याच्छादयत्तत्त्वं स्वातन्त्र्यानुविधायि वा।।

३. लक्षणा च सम्बन्धेऽनुपपत्तौ च सत्यां वर्तते।

४. एवमप्युपपत्तौ न तत्त्वान्तरविषयत्वं कल्प्यम्।

५. न च ज्ञानसाधके प्रमाणे व्यभिचारः शङ्कनीयः।

६. बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वमन्तरेण शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादपि तदसिद्धेश्च।

७. एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मनो नाधिका मतिः।

८. अविद्याया अनदित्वेन दत्तोत्तरत्वात्।

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5.6 State the Rājaputravṛttānta and explain its significance.

## 6 Assignment

Read the Janmādyadhikaraṇa, Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa and Samanvayādhikaraṇa in Śāṅkarabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra and summarise them.

NOTES

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# WAY TO KSOU CAMPUS




Bus route

1. Suburban Bus Stand
2. City Bus Stand
3. Railway Station
4. St. Joseph's School
5. Manasagangotri Canteen
6. Crowford Hall
7. K.S.O.U
8. Metropole Circle
9. DC Office
10. Kukkarahalli Tank
11. Ramaswamy Circle
12. Mysore Palace
13. Town Hall
14. K.R. Hospital
15. Sayyaji Rao Road
16. Chamaraja Double Rd
17. University Guest House
18. Medical College
19. K.R. Hospital
20. KRS Road
21. Law Courts
22. Apollo Hospital
23. Akashvani Circle
24. Kalamandira
25. Maharani's College
26. Hardinge Circle
27. Railway Track
28. Saraswatipura 14 Main

| From | To | City Bus Number |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Suburban Bus Stand (SBS) | 7. KSOU | 130, 136, 266, 267, 268 |
| 2. City Bus Stand (CBS) | 7. KSOU | 129, 130, 136, 267, 268 |
| 3. Railway Station (Rail. Stn) | 7. KSOU | 130, 136, 266, 267, 268 |
| 7. KSOU / 4. St. Joseph's School | 1. SBS / 2. CBS / 3. Rail. Stn | 129, 266, 267, 268, 270 |
| 7. KSOU / 5. Manasagangotri Canteen | 1. SBS / 2. CBS / 3. Rail. Stn | 129 |
| 7. KSOU / 5. Manasagangotri Canteen | 2. City Bus Stop | 129, 130, |

To reach KSOU by bus no. 129 & 130 alight at Manasagangothri canteen stop. By all other buses, alight at St Joseph's School. Prepaid auto:From SBS - Rs. 25/- From Rail Stn: Rs. 20/-

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


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